Deccan College Building Centenary & Silver Jubilee Series: 71

THE VĀKYAPADĪYA OF BHARTṚHARI

CHAPTER III, pt. i

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

BY

K. A. SUBRAMANIA IYER

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Postgraduate and Research Institute
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FOREWORD

On the 15th of October 1964 the Deccan College celebrates the centenary of its main Building, and curiously enough this period coincides with the Silver Jubilee of the Postgraduate and Research Institute which, as successor to the Deccan College, started functioning from 17th August 1939 when members of the teaching faculty reported on duty. When I suggested to members of our faculty the novel idea that the centenary should be celebrated by the publication of a hundred monographs representing the research carried on under the auspices of the Deccan College in its several departments they readily accepted the suggestion. These contributions are from present and past faculty members and research scholars of the Deccan College, giving a cross-section of the manifold research that it has sponsored during the past twentyfive years. From small beginnings in 1939 the Deccan College has now grown into a well developed and developing Research Institute and become a national centre in so far as Linguistics, Archaeology and Ancient Indian History, and Anthropology and Sociology are concerned. Its international status is attested by the location of the Indian Institute of German Studies (jointly sponsored by Deccan College and the Goethe Institute of Munich), the American Institute of Indian Studies and a branch of the Ecole Francaise d'Extreme-Orient in the campus of the Deccan College. The century of monographs not only symbolises the centenary of the original building and the silver jubilee of the Research Institute, but also the new spirit of critical enquiry and the promise of more to come.

7th March 1964. S. M. KATRE

PREFACE

This translation of the *Kārikās* of the *Vākyapadīya* relates to the portion included in my critical edition of the *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari, Kāṇḍa III, pt, i, with the commentary *Prakāśa* of Helārāja, published as no. 21 of the Deccan College Monograph Series, Poona, 1963. In other words, it is a translation of the *Kārikās* of the seven *Samuddeśas, Jāti, Dravya, Sambandha, Bhūyodravya, Guṇa, Dik* and *Sādhana*. Though my edition includes the commentary of Helārāja, I have not translated it, because my interest was chiefly in the work of Bhartṛhari. I have, however, given some brief notes after the translation of each *Kārikā*. In these notes, I have tried to state briefly the main point or points which Helārāja makes in his commentary. I have mentioned only points of general interest, relating to language in general or to the Sanskrit language. As I look upon Bhartṛhari as one who has, in his *Vākyapadīya*, given a definite form to the contribution of Ancient India to General Linguistics, I have picked out of the commentary of Helārāja only those points which may be said to be related to General Linguistics, even though they may have been stated in connexion with the Sanskrit language. I have omitted all the points connected with *prakriyā*, the process of derivation of the forms of the Sanskrit language according to the *sūtras* of Pāṇini. Helārāja was a master of *prakriyā* and his commentary abounds in references to it, sometimes with quotations from the *Vārttikas* of Kātyāyana and the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali. As my translation aims chiefly at bringing out ideas of a general nature, I have omitted these purely technical points.

Helārāja looks upon Bhartṛhari as a *vivartavādin* and is anxious to emphasise this point in his explanation of the *Kārikās*. It is in the *Sambandhasamuddeśa* and the *Kālasamuddeśa* that this comes out particularly clearly. We know

from the *Tattvasaṅgraha* of *Śāntarakṣita* and its commentary *Pañjikā* of Kamalaśīla that already in the 8th century A.D., some interpreted Bhartṛhari as a *vivartavādin* and others as *pariṇāmavādin*. The earliest commentary on the *Vākyapadīya*, the *Vṛtti*, looked upon by a more than thousand-year old tradition as that of Bhartṛhari himself, though the colophon gives the name of the author as Harivṛṣabha, interprets the very first *Kārikā* of the work in terms of *vivartavāda*.

In addition to giving a brief summary of the commentary of Helārāja in my notes, I have, in many places, added references to ancient works and some explanatory remarks. In some places, I have also pointed out emendations required in the text of the *Kārikās* as printed in my edition of the *Vākyapadīya*, referred to above.

St. Ral, Jilling,
P.O. Padampuri,
via Bhim Tal,
Dt. Naini Tal, U.P.,
12-6-1971.

K. A. SUBRAMANIA IYER.

CHAPTER III

Section 1. On the Universal

1. Some analyse a sentence as consisting of two kinds of words, others of four kinds and others still of five kinds, just as a word is analysed into base, suffix etc.

[In the Vākyapadīya, the eight topics mentioned in Chapter I, 24-26, are dealt with, namely, the two kinds of meanings, the two kinds of words, the two kinds of relation and the two kinds of purpose. In Chapter I, the purposes and other matters were considered. In Chapter II, the sentence which is to be grammatically analysed (*anvākhyeya*) and its meaning which has a fixed character (*sthitalakṣaṇa*) were determined. In Chapter III, words and their meanings, obtained by artificial division (*apoddhāra*) are going to be considered. Words are obtained by artificially analysing sentences and a sentence may be analysed in different ways according to one's point of view. Strictly speaking, a sentence is indivisible and it is such a sentence which is expressive (*vācaka*). The cognition of individual words and their meanings is really an illusion (*vibhrama*) and they are the result of an artificial analysis of sentences. This artificial analysis is a means of understanding and explaining the indivisible sentence, just as the division of a word into stem and suffix is a means of explaining the indivisible word. Sentences are infinite in number and no two sentences are alike. Their artificial parts seem to resemble one another and these parts are abstracted from the sentence as that is the only way of explaining the sentence. The individual word which is abstracted from the sentence on the basis of meaning is as unreal as the stem and suffix abstracted from the individual word on the basis of meaning by following

the method of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* (agreement and difference) mentioned by Kātyāyana in his Vā. 9 on P. 1.2.45—

Siddhaṃ tv anvyayavyatirekābhyām

When the sentence is divided into individual words, the sentence-meaning is automatically so divided. The former depends upon the latter. That is why we cannot divide a word into so many phonemes, because these would have no meaning. The sentence-meaning is of a fixed character (*sthitalakṣaṇa*). It is really indivisible, but we divide it artificially and we get two kinds of meanings out of it: action and accessory to action. That which expresses the former is called the verb (*ākhyāta*) and that which expresses the latter is called noun (*nāman*). Thus we get two kinds of words. In a noun, there are two parts: the root and the suffix. Number and the like are the meaning of the suffix and even though, formally, it is the meaning of the suffix which is the predominant one in a noun, from the point of view of the meaning, that which comes from the word as a whole, namely, the individual (*dravya*) qualified by the universal (*jāti*), something which is in the nature of a thing (*siddha*), is the predominant meaning, because it is this individual which is the substratum of number and the accessories (*śādhana*). Particles (*nipāta*), Prepositions (*upasarga*) and Postpositions (*karmapravacanīya*) come under nouns and verbs. Some particles express some peculiarity belonging to the thing (*siddha*), the meaning of nouns and, therefore, come under them. It makes no difference whether a word expresses a thing (*siddha*) directly or expresses a peculiarity in it. Some particles like *svaḥ* are primarily expressive of things (*sattvapradhāna*). Thus they also come under nouns. Particles like *hiruk* come under verbs, because they are primarily expressive of actions. It is not merely words ending in verbal affixes (*tiṅ*) which are verbs. Any word which is primarily expressive of a process is a verb. That is why prepositions (*upasarga*) and postpositions (*karmapravacanīya*) and particles (*nipāta*) are also verbs, because they also can express some peculiarity in a process.

But, if one wants to emphasize their special feature, particles and prepositions are classed separately. They do not express a meaning directly, but express a peculiarity in the meanings expressed by nouns and verbs and so they are classed separately. Particles (*nipāta*) and prepositions (*upasarga*) differ from one another also, because the former express a peculiarity found in things and processes whereas the latter can express a peculiarity in processes only. Postpositions (*karmapravacanīya*) on the other hand express a relation brought about by some particular action. Thus, they also denote a peculiarity in processes and come under prepositions. In this way, we get four kinds of words, according to some.

Others consider postpositions (*karmapravacanīya*) to be a fifth kind of word. They argue that they differ from *upasargas* because they refer to an action that is past and not to one that is present. The delimitation of a relation with reference to some action or other, is their function. Relation is brought about by action or some service (*upakāra*) rendered through action. Sometimes the verb expressive of the action is actually heard and sometimes it is not. Where it is actually heard, the understanding of a particular relation is direct as in *mātuḥ smarati, mātuḥ smṛtam, sarpiṣo jānīte.* Action can spontaneously and directly enter into relation with things, without another action coming in the middle. Where the verb is not used, there are two possibilities: the very nature of the things related brings the action to the mind and, without the help of the *karmapravacanīya,* we understand that the relation must have been preceded by a particular relation of action and accessory between two things. *upagor apatyam, vṛkṣasya śākhā* are examples. In *upagor apatyam,* there is the relation of father and offspring, it is brought about by the act of procreation. In *vṛkṣasya śākhā,* there is the relation of whole and part, brought about by the action of standing and supporting (*sthitikriyānimittaḥ*). Sometimes, the relation has not the power of bringing any particular action to the mind. For instance, in the sentence *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ,* the relation is that of master and servant (*svasvāmibhāva*)

and it may have been due to one of many actions: maintenance, abduction, purchase and begging. (Cf. M. Bhā I. p. 463, l. 12). From the expressioin 'the King's man' (*rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ*) the particular action which was the cause of the relation of *sva* and *svāmin* is not understood. Sometimes, it is the presence of the post-position which tells us about the particular action which has brought about the relation in question. For example, in the sentence *Śākalyasya samhitām anu prāvarṣat,* there exists the relation of cause and effect between the saṃhitā and rain and this relation is due to the action of reciting the saṃhitā text. The post-position *anu* tells us that it is due to this action. (Cf. Vāk. a. II, 109-201; 204–205). The word *anu* is found associated elsewhere with the action of hearing, as in *anu-niśamya*. But that is not a reason for considering it as directly expressive of the action here. Nor does it suggest action because a verb expressive of the act of reciting is not used here at all. Nor can *anu* suggest a verb here in the way in which *vi* suggests the gerund *vimāya* in *prādeśaṃ vi-parilikhati.* In *Prādeśam,* there is a suffix (case–ending) expressive of an accessory to action; therefore, *vi* can suggest a word expressive of action. But in *Śākalyasya saṃhitām anu prāvarṣat,* there is a case-ending expressive of *śeṣa* in *saṃhitām.* Nor does *anu* directly express the relation of cause and effect, because that is done by the accusative case-ending which is specially taught instead of other case-endings. (P. 2.3.8.). The real function of *anu* is, therefore, to delimit the relation, to say that it is brought about by the particular action called 'recitation' (*paṭhanam*). This is what is called *Saṃbandhāvaccheda,* the delimitation of the relation. This is made clear in the verse *Kriyāyā dyotako nāyam, sambandhasya na vācakaḥ* etc. (Vāk. a. II, 204). This is the function of *anu.* There is no use of attributing to *anu* something which is the effect of something else.

Nor can it be maintained that the delimitation of the relation, referring it to a particular action, is the function of the sentence and that *anu* merely expresses the idea of posteriority. Those who maintain this rely on the principle

that the meaning of the sentence is that which is understood over and above those of the individual words. But it must be remembered that 'over and above' does not mean going against the meaning of individual words. Sentence-meaning, even when it is an 'extra', must be based on those of individual words. It really consists of the relation of the process or the thing primarily conveyed by a sentence with its accessories or its attributes. This delimitation of the relation cannot be considered to be the sentence-meaning, because it is not based on that of any individual word. It is, therefore, better to consider it as the meaning of the *Karmapravacanīya*. About this delimitation of the relation by the post-position, there are two views: (1) that it is delimited in its own form (*svarūpeṇāvacchidyate*); (2) that it is delimited as brought about by a particular action. According to Bhartṛhari it means that it is delimited by reference to the particular circumstance (*nimittaviśesāvacchedaḥ*). Thus in *adhi brahmadatte pañcālāḥ, adhi* indicates that the relation of ruler and ruled (*svasvāmibhāva*) is due to the act of protection which is the particular circumstance (*nimittaviśeṣa*).

Thus the abstraction of words from a sentence on the basis of meaning is the only means of explaining a sentence.]

The nature of the abstructed meanings is now explained

2. When the meaning of a sentence is analysed into those of individual words, two word-meanings have been declared to be the eternal meaning of all words, either the universal (*jāti*) or the particular (*dravya*).

[Once the meanings of words are abstracted from that of the sentence, the next question is: what is the nature of these meanings? According to some, the universal (*jāti*) is the meaning of all words. According to others, it is the particular (*dravya*) which is the meaning of all words. A third view is that it is the particular as qualified by the universal. This third view is indicated by the dual number

in the word *padārthau*. If the third view is the correct one, then a word would convey both the universal and the particular at the same time, because it is inconceivable that a word should convey one thing first and another thing after a little interval. When both are conveyed, one would be more important than the other in a particular context. The dual number in *padārthau* might be taken to mean that the universal and the particular are equally important, but, in particular contexts, only one of them is conveyed. A word like *gauḥ* conveys the universal 'cow-ness', but, as a universal without a substratum is impossible, the particular is also necessarily understood. Similarly, the verb denotes the universal aspect of action, present in the different moments of action and causing the same cognition and the use of the same word. The universal of the accessory (*kāraka*) conveyed by a verb plays a subordinate part in the cognition produced by a verb. The universal of action, conveyed by the verb, enters into relation with the universal of the accessory conveyed by the noun through the particular (*vyakti*). In the particular inheres the universal which enters into relation with action through the power called accessory which also inheres in the particular. It will be explained in the section on the Accessory (*Sādhanasamuddeśa*) that what is called 'accessory' is really a power or a capacity. The universal of an action like cooking is manifested by the different moments of it like putting the pot on the fire. Even though the universal of action is eternal, it becomes a process (*sādhya*) through the particular. According to this view, prepositions (*upasarga*) also express the universal, because they do no more than denote a peculiarity in the meaning of the verb which is a universal. A postposition is also based on the universal of a relation. Similarly, words like *śukla* express the universals of qualities (*guṇa*). So do proper names like *Ḍittha*. This is the view of Vājapyāyana. (See M. Bhā I. p. 242, l. 10).

According to Vyāḍi, the particular (*dravya*) is the meaning of all words, because it is the particular which is connected with action. What Vyāḍi calls *dravya* is often called

Vyakti, the individual, also the correlative of universal. Thus, according to *Vyāḍi,* the particular or the individual becomes an integral part of the meaning of a sentence. It is to this that Vedic injunctions refer as declared in the Vārttika.

Codanāsu ca tasyārambhāt (Vā 47 on P. 1.2.64). Even though the universal is not directly expressed by the word, it is also understood. In the verb also, it is the particular which is predominant, according to Vyāḍi. The meaning of a verb is the particular penetrated by action (*vyāpārāviṣṭaṃ dravyam*). Words like *śukla* also denote the particular.

Alternatively, one might understand by *dravya* what is going to be explained in the next section: that it is Brahman, conditioned by this or that limiting factor and that is the meaning of every word.

Ordinarily, the word *dravya* is a synonym of *vyakti,* the individual. As the two word-meanings in question are declared to be those of all words (*sarvaśabdānām*) they are also attributed to the parts like base and suffix which are abstracted from the individual word. The truth is that both are recognised meanings of words, even though one or the other may be emphasised in particular contexts. Whether the meaning of a word is *jāti* or *dravya,* in either case, it is something which is eternal (*nitya*). By *nitya,* it is continuity (*pravāhanityatā*) which is meant, as is made clear in the statement—

Tadapi nityaṃ yasminstattvaṃ na vihanyate

(M. Bhā I, p. 7, l. 22).

Thus, it has been shown that the universal and/or the particular can be the meaning of a word. In this section, the considerations which favour the view that it is the universal will be explained.]

Now a doubt arises: If the universal is the meaning of every word, how can it enter into relation with action which is the meaning of the verb in the sentence? It is only the accessory (*sādhana*) which can be connected with action and

the universal can never be the accessory. No doubt, its substratum can be the accessory; but, after all, it is the universal which is directly conveyed by the word. So, when something having the universal prescribed in a Vedic injunction is not available, we cannot use a substitute, because it would not have the prescribed universal. Thus Vedic injunctions cannot be carried out. This difficulty is removed as follows—

3. According to some, the universal is the means of conveying 'power' because of association. If the 'acacia catechu' etc. are powerless (i.e., not being available, are powerless to accomplish the action in question) a substitute having that power is taken.

[According to the view of some theorists, the universal is the means (*upalakṣaṇa*) whereby power or capacity is conveyed, because the universal and power reside in the same substratum. Others, on the other hand, think that it is the universal which is primarily conveyed by the word and that, in some cases, it enters into direct relation with action, while, in other cases, it does so through the medium of power. The word *keṣāñcit* in the verse can also mean: 'in the case of some words'. Those words which express the accessories denote mainly capacity. In such words, it is the case-endings which stand for power or capacity and as the case-ending cannot be used by itself, the stem must necessarily be used and that expresses the universal which qualifies the capacity conveyed by the case-ending. All this is true where the thing prescribed is available. Where it is not available, power or capacity becomes associated with the nearest universal. The Vedas enjoin actions which must be performed. Particular materials for the performance of these actions are also taught. If any material is not available, the action must still be performed with a substitute.]

The author now points out how, even according to those who hold that the word primarily conveys the universal and

not capacity through the universal the use of substitutes can be explained.

4. (In the injunction 'khādire badhnāti') the root 'bandh' (to bind) denoting an action which results in loss of independence is taught like the act of killing (*pramāṇa*) etc. Therefore, though the universal is the primary meaning, nothing that is devoid of 'power' is taken.

[Even according to those who maintain that the word primarily conveys the universal, the use of a substitute can be explained. In the injunction *khādire badhnāti,* the action denoted by the verb is that of binding the animal to the sacrificial post, resulting in its loss of independence. That can take place only if a post which has the power to yield the desired result is used. Therefore, a substitute is allowed if the original article, the khadira wood, is not available.]

The author now points out that there is an indication on the basis of which a substitute can be allowed.

5. Even if the meaning of the root *bandh* is nothing more than contact (with the sacrificial post) the very fact that killing etc. are taught as the next step is an indication that an efficient thing is to be taken.

[Even if it is maintained that the root *bandh* means nothing more than contact (with the sacrificial post and not loss of independence) the fact that killing etc. are taught as the next step is an indication that the animal must be well tied to the post. Therefore, something which is fit to be used as a post must be taken. Khadira has this fitness or capacity, but if it is not available, something else which has this capacity must be substituted. Thus, on the view that a word denotes the universal, the use of a substitute becomes

justifiable in three ways: (1) on the basis of the meaning of the word (*padārtha*) as shown in verse 3 where it was said that the meaning of the word, the universal, stands for something which has the required power, (2) on the basis of sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha*) as shown in verse 4 where it was said that the word must convey something which has the capacity to help in the accomplishment of the main action conveyed by the sentence and (3) on the basis of context (*prakaraṇa*) as shown in the present verse which says that a substitute must be allowed if one takes into consideration the other acts like killing which are taught in the same context.

Here Helārāja mentions two further arguments in order to justify the use of a substitute. The first one is called: *asambhavaniyamatyāgaḥ*. An injunction like *khādire badhnāti* must not be understood as an *asambhavaniyama,* that is, a restrictive injunction (*niyama*) making alternatives impossible (*asambhava*). The second argument is called *niyamamātratyāga*. The injunction in question is so interpreted that its positive aspect is retained; that is, one understands from it that the animal should be tied to a post. One rejects the negative or restrictive aspect of it. In other words, one rejects the restriction that the post should necessarily be made of khadira wood. By adopting these two arguments, one avoids going against scriptural injunction, because one follows the positive aspect of it, even if one rejects its negative or restrictive aspect.]

6. All words first express their own universal which is then thought of as being superimposed on the universals of the meanings.

[When we hear a word, it is its own form which we understand first. And we do so, no matter who utters it. The form remains the same in all utterances. This form is, therefore, a universal (*jāti*) and it is this which we understand invariably. This invariable cognition of the uni-

versal of the word is what is meant by the word 'first' (*prathamam*). See Vāk I. 66. After this is understood, or while it is being understood, the meaning which is also a universal, is understood. The two appear to be one. The form of the word is understood by us as having been superimposed on the meaning. We take the two as one. To understand the one as being superimposed on the other implies that we consider the two to be different. We do, but this is only a fiction (*kalpanā*) on our part, because the meaning (the object), according to Grammar, is only an unreal manifestation (*vivarta*) of the word. Therefore, the two are not really different from each other. This superimposition of the word on the meaning is the basis of convention and also of the relation of expression and expressed (*vācyavācakabhāva*) between the two. This universal of the word is progressively clearly revealed by each sound of the word, just as each moment of a movement like the lifting of the arm reveals it fully and progressively more clearly, or just as a passage of a text, not fully learnt by heart at the first reading is gradually memorised by repeated reading or just as the genuineness of a precious stone, not fully clear at the first gaze, becomes so progressively.]

The author now says how the universal of the word, existing in the word, can convey the universal of the object as identical with itself.

7-8. Just as 'redness', residing in the quality red is attributed to the substance 'lac' and then, on account of its intimate union with the intimately united, it is perceived in clothes etc., in the same way, on account of the intimate connection between word and meaning, the universal residing in the word performs the function of universal for the universals of objects also.

[It was declared in the previous verse that the universal of the word is superimposed on that of the meaning and that

the latter appears as one with the former. Here a doubt might arise: the universal of the word is inherent in the word and not in the meaning; how can it then denote the meaning through the relation of identity? This doubt is sought to be removed by means of an example. Redness is inherent in a particular case of red, in what is red. It is also attributed to the substance which is red. Due to contact with the substance which is red, redness is attributed to another object also like cloth when we speak of it as being red. In other words, due to the contact of the cloth with a substance which is red, the cloth is also said to be red. Similarly, there is the eternal relation between the word and its meaning, a relation which is grasped only at the time of the learning of the convention. This relation is evident from the fact that both about the word *gauḥ* and the object *gauḥ*, we can say: *ayaṃ gauḥ*. Through this relation, what belongs to the word is superimposed on the meaning. The universal of the word is superimposed on the universal of the meaning. The latter becomes the expressed meaning (*vācya*) of the former. Not only that. The universal of the word becomes a kind of universal among the different universals, though, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, there cannot be a universal of the universals. But the universal of the word plays the part of a universal among the universals of the meanings. It performs the two functions of such a universal. The two functions are: persistence of the same word (*sabdānuvṛtti*) and persistence of the same cognition (*pratyayānuvṛtti*). How this happens is explained in verses 9 and 10.

This universal of the word exists in the word considered as a unity and not in the different phonemes, because it is this unity which is expressive (*vācaka*). This unity is called *vyaktisphoṭa* and the universal, jāti, inheres in it. It is called *jātisphoṭa*. Thus *sphoṭa* is of two kinds. The particular relation through which *vyaktisphoṭa* expresses the meaning is fitness (*yogyatā*) which is eternal and not the work of man (*apauruṣeya*). When a meaning is understood from a word, it appears as one with it. With all that, the form of the meaning is not completely obliterated. When an object is revealed

through light, it appears as enveloped in light, but with all that, its own form appears distinctly. Light and the word reveal other objects by superimposing their own form on them. This is the eternal character of words, not due to human agency. This can happen only in the case of one who knows a language. In the case of one who like a child does not know it yet, there cannot be superimposition of the word on the meaning, because he does not know the word yet. The universal of the object appears to him as distinct.]

How it performs the function of a universal is now explained.

9. When one has to form the 'ekaśeṣa' of words denoting universals, the universal of words is the universal of the universals of objects. In the formation *śabdajātayaḥ* (universals of words) the universal of the word (is the cause of the *ekaśeṣa*) when the universals of the words have to be expressed.

[When we apply the same word, say 'cow' or 'tree' to a large number of objects, it is because we see some common characteristic in all of them called *jāti* or universal. When we apply the word *jāti* to a large number of universals, the natural conclusion would be that, in all of them, there is a common characteristic, another universal above the original universals. But this is impossible according to the *vaiśeṣika* principle: *niḥsāmānyāni sāmānyāni*. And yet we do apply the word *jāti* to a large number of universals. How to explain this? It is explained in this way: the universal for which the word *jāti* stands does the work of such a super-universal which really does not exist. Similarly, if each word stands for its universal, there would be as many word-universals as there are words and when all these universals existing in the different words are referred to by the expression *śabdajātaya imāḥ*, what really happens is that the universal existing in the word *śabdajāti* itself does the work of such a super-universal.]

10. The universal of words, residing in words and differing from the words themselves, includes also the universal existing in the word *śabdajāti*.

[The universal which exists in words and which is different from the words themselves is so comprehensive that it includes the universal which exists in the word *śabdajāti* itself. When we say: *śabdajāti*, it does not denote a universal which is over and above such universals as *gośabdatva, aśvaśabdatva* etc. Because, one does not believe in a universal over a universal. So the universal which exists in the word *śabdajāti* itself does the work of such a universal. The universal which exists in the word *śabdajāti* is in the same category as the universal which exists in the word *gauḥ* or *aśvaḥ*. *Atikramya vartate* has been translated as 'includes', following Helārāja.]

The author now tries to show that all words denote the universal without resorting to the concept of 'adhyāsa'.

11. (Some) words may denote the universals of objects, but all denote the universal, since the meanings of words are determined by the functions (*vyāpāra*) of words (i.e., they are determined by what the words actually convey).

[So far, the author has established the doctrine that all words denote the universal with the help of the grammarian's idea of adhyāsa, the idea that the universal of the meaning appears as one with that of the word, or rather that the universal of the word is superimposed upon that of the meaning. Even without recourse to the idea of *adhyāsa*, it is possible to show that all words denote the universal. If one does not accept *adhyāsa*, the alternative is to say that words denote the universals of the object, pure and simple. Even then, one will have to maintain that all words do so. By 'all', what is meant is: not only words like *gauḥ, aśvaḥ*, etc., but also words like *jāti*. Here one has to meet the Vaiśeṣika objection that if the word *jāti* also stands for a universal, it must

be a universal existing in other universals. And that is not possible. If there is universal in universals, where would one stop? But grammarians have a different point of view. Their chief concern is to find out the nature of meanings conveyed by words. What they find is that in all universals as conveyed by words, there is a common point or characteristic which can be looked upon as another universal and can be called by the name *jāti*. The existence of the first universal was postulated because a common characteristic was experienced in the individuals. Even invisible things are assumed to exist if they somehow produce a cognition in regard to themselves. What to say of things conveyed by words? Grammarians go by what the words convey. They are not really concerned with things as they really are, but with things as conveyed by words. If a quality is conveyed by words as a common characteristic, it becomes a universal for them. The word *śyāma* is considered to be expressive of a quality but Pāṇini gives to its meaning the nāme of sāmānya in the compound word *śastrīśyāmā* according to his sūtra: *upamānāni sāmānyavacanaiḥ*. (P. 2.1.55). The same is the case with action. In such matters, grammarians are more anxious to follow worldly usage than the views and conventions of other systems of thought. To them, *artha* means what words convey and all words convey the universal, because that is a matter of fact. In reality, the universal which a word conveys may or may not exist. But the word in question, through its function called *abhidhā*, does convey it. So that is the meaning of the word.]

The author now makes clear the function called *abhidhā* of words.

12. In the view that the universal is the meaning of words, the universal or even the particular becomes the meaning of words in the same way as (the well-known) universals; therefore, they (the words) denote the universal.

[The peculiar features of an object, not found in any other object in the world, cannot be expressed by words at all. At

the time of learning the convention about words, it is with the common characteristics of objects that we connect the words. Thus the words become expressive of them. The universals may really differ from one another, but words cannot express them. Even proper names denote universals. The name of a person stands for that unchanging recognisable element which persists in all the changes which he undergoes.]

The author now states that even the other view, namely, that words denote substance (*dravya*) depends on the function of words.

13. In the view that substance is the meaning of words, the meaning of all words can have the characteristic of substance. As the meanings of words are susceptible of assuming the properties of substance, the latter is said to be the meaning of all words.

[The other view about the meaning of words is that it is *dravya* which can be rendered as substance (as distinguished from attribute) or individual (as distinguished from the universal). This is the view of Vyāḍi as stated in Vā. 45 on P. 1.2.64. According to this view, all words denote *dravya*, some primarily and directly, others secondarily and indirectly. Just as, in the other view, some words denote the universal primarily and directly, while others do so secondarily and indirectly. According to this view, whatever may be the reality, a thing as conveyed by words is seen to possess the characteristics of *dravya* which are: the capacity of being referred to as 'this' or 'that', a certain completeness and independence, the fact of having gender and number. A quality like 'whiteness' may or may not in reality possess these attributes, but as presented by a word, it can have these properties or rather these properties are attributed to it.]

So far, it has been shown that all words have the same meaning (the universal or substance) on the basis of word-function (*śabda–vyāpāra*). The author now proceeds to show

that, according to the Vaiśeṣikas also, i.e. on the basis of the common characteristic of objects, all words denote the universal.

14. In all universals, the fact of being a universal consists in being found in all (the individuals which belong to the class) while in all particulars (*viśeṣa*), the universal consists in this that they distinguish (the things in which they reside from others).

[So far it has been maintained that it is in the nature of a word to convey the universal, whether that universal really exists or not. A word conveys it through its function, its power to convey meanings. But even by following the Vaiśeṣika line of reasoning, one can show that the universal is the meaning of words. What is, after all, a universal? It is something which exists in all its substrata, as a result of which all of them produce a uniform cognition and are called by the same name. Another characteristic of a universal is that it pervades the whole of its substratum and not merely a part of it. A universal like *gotva* has these characteristics. But there are many universals and it is not unreasonable to believe that there is another universal existing in all of them and sharing the characteristics of a universal in general. The word *viśeṣa* also denotes a common characteristic of the same kind. There are as many *viśeṣas* as there are eternal things (*nityadravya*) and they all have this common characteristic, namely, that each one exists in one eternal thing and not in any other. This is also thus a common property, something like a universal. Words like *abhāva* also denote a universal of the same kind.

What Helārāja wants to point out is that all the *viśeṣas* produce a uniform kind of cognition and are the cause of the same name (*viśeṣa*) being applied to them.]

The author now explains how words like *ākāśa, kāla* and *dik,* which stand for things which are one and eternal, denote the universal.

15. Once parts are postulated on the basis of the properties of the different objects (with which space (*ākāśa*) is) in contact, the universal of space also is found in these parts.

[Words like *ākāśa, kāla, dik,* stand for that common feature which is present in all the contingent divisions which we make in these things. For instance, *ākāśa* is one, but we artificially divide it into localities according to the different objects which exist in space. The space occupied by a jar is *ākāśa* just as the space occupied by a piece of cloth is *ākāśa.* In regard to all these divisions, we have the cognition that they are *ākāśa* and that is what the word stands for. The same thing can be said about time, direction, soul and the relation called *samavāya.* Soul is one, but it can be looked upon as different in each person with whom it is associated. We can say also that there are as many *samavāya-s* as there are pairs of things united by *samavāya;* but everywhere there is *ihabuddhiḥ*: which is the connecting link.]

It is also possible to look upon these divisions of *ākāśa* as real ones and not merely as contingent ones.

16. Just as the connected (potsherds etc.) are parts of the jar and the like which (as such) are without divisions, in the same way, the connected objects are the parts of *ākāśa* which is really without any division.

[In the previous verse, it was declared that words like *ākāśa* denote a kind of universal on the basis of the contingent divisions of such things as *ākāśa.* But, perhaps, one can speak of these divisions as real and not contingent. An object like a jar, a whole, is, in itself, partless. Its parts, the potsherds, are its causes and connected with it by the relation of inherence (*samavāya*). Similarly, the various objects of the world which are in contact with *ākāśa* and which delimit it are the

real divisions of *ākāśa*. They become the *deśa* of *ākāśa* which, being their background, become their *deśa* too. *Ākāśa* and the objects become *deśa* to each other.]

The author now states where the divisions (*deśa*) are primary and where they are secondary, as, unless they are primary somewhere, we cannot speak of them as being secondary elsewhere.

17-18. The idea of difference persists in the case of objects joined together by the relation called conjunction (*saṃyoga*) whereas in the case of objects joined together by inherence (*samavāya*) the perception of difference disappears.

Therefore, the divisions consisting in objects joined together by conjunction are secondary whereas the divisions consisting in objects joined (to the whole) by inherence are primary because (the wholes) so united are not really different from the divisions.

[When we have the idea of two things being in contact, it is based on a difference between the two things. Even when we see the contact, we continue to see them as different from each other. The two things which come into contact make a kind of whole, but the two things are not essential parts of that whole, because we continue to perceive them as apart from the whole. But when two things are related to each other by inherence, the position is different. When we see a sphere, we do not see its two halves as distinct from the sphere. They form the very body of that sphere. They are, therefore, real parts of the whole called sphere. The division is a primary one and not a secondary one. But even within the field of things related by *saṃyoga* or contact, one must make a distinction. When an all-pervasive thing like *ākāśa* comes into contact with things, it is an invariable contact. The contact between the clothes and the

body is not an invariable contact. In the former case, we do divide the all-pervasive substance on the basis of the objects with which it is in contact].

The author now explains the universal according to the Vijñānavādins.

19. Some consider the universal to be merely something which figures as a common characteristic in our mind and the particular (*dravya*) to be that which figures as differentia.

[According to the Vijñānavādins, this attempt to show that words like *ākāśa* also denote the universal is futile, because, according to them, there is no such thing as the universal at all. They do not believe in the reality of the external world. They only believe in the different states of consciousness and, in them, some things figure as common properties while others appear as distinguishing features. A word denotes only this thing which figures in the consciousness and this is what is called *jāti*. In such matters, the grammarians are governed by two principles: (1) Grammar is common to all disciplines, (2) for Grammarians, meaning (*artha*) is just what the word conveys. The second principle enables them to explain the universal according to the Vijñānavādins. According to the latter, the universal is something which occurs in the mind when a word is heard. In other words, it is *śabdārtha* and for Grammarians also, *artha* means *śabdārtha*.]

The author now points out the need for postulating the existence of the universal.

20. To say that things are different or that they are identical presupposes some external basis (*paro-pādhiḥ*). This diversity in objects arises only when they are united in some way.

21. Neither identity nor difference, neither existence nor non-existence of objects is possible if they are not linked with one another.

[The above two verses are meant to be an answer to one who might say that things differ from one another only because of time, place and circumstances. If such differences are ignored, all things would be the same. Why then postulate an universal? It is pointed out here that unless it is postulated, all *vyavahāra* or verbal transaction, would be impossible. *Vyavahāra* depends upon some basis (*upādhi*) or other].

The author now puts forward the *advaita* view on this subject, namely, that it is the powers of the One which are the basis.

22. The ultimate view is that it is the One which has all the powers. To postulate difference between the objects themselves is unnecessary.

23. Therefore, substance etc. are only powers (of the Supreme), made known by their different functions. United, they help man to reach his goal and not separately.

24. Just as the collocation of the senses etc. is not an entity over and above the things composing it, in the same way, the connection between the different powers of the Supreme is not a separate entity.

[All the previous discussion arose in connection with the question: how do words like *ākāśa* denote the universal? The answer was based upon contingent divisions of *ākāśa*. Contingent divisions are only artificial divisions which really do not exist. But when it comes to the other things of the world, they were assumed to be real. In verse 22, the author states that, according to *Advaita*, *Brahman* is the only reality.

Everything else, that is to say, all distinctions such as the universal, the particular and so on are unreal. They are all the products of the powers of *Brahman*. The seven categories of the Vaiśeṣikas are only the powers of *Brahman*. These powers are inferred from their effects. Though the various objects of the world, produced by the powers of *Brahman* are distinct from one another, still they join together in order to do their work. But one cannot, because of that, maintain that it is their connection and not the things themselves which are effective nor that the connection which is eternal, is an entity different from *Brahman*. That would go against monism. The connection is not over and above the things connected. Just as in perception, the senses, the mind and the object must come together and this coming together, this collocation (*sāmagrī*) is not an entity over and above them, so is the case here. Thus, there is no damage to monism].

Remark: *Sambandhi-sambandha-saṃsarge'pi. Sambandhin*=the Supreme, *sambandha*=the powers of things, *saṃsarga*=the connection of the powers.

The author now says how the universal which is eternal helps the effect.

25. Nothing is produced in which its universal does not exist. The universal sets the causes (of the particular) in motion for its own manifestation.

26. The universals, after having obtained a footing among the eternal and non-eternal causes, manifest themselves again and again in some effects.

[The universal requires the particular or the individual for its manifestation. It, therefore, prompts, as it were, the causes of the particular, so that the latter may come into existence. It becomes a kind of contributory cause in the creation of the particular. The word used here is *prayojikā*. In Vaiśeṣika terminology, it would be a *nimittakāraṇa*. The universal exists in the material cause of an object, whether eternal or otherwise and makes its appearance when the parti-

cular is produced. The effect is supposed to exist in the cause in the form of the universal which is manifested in the particular which is produced. Thus, the universal helps in the production of the particular which is the effect].

As the universal exists even before the individual is produced, it is eternal. How it helps is now stated.

27. The universal is the cause even of that object which is newly produced. In order that its substratum might be produced, it prompts the action to come to be.

[In a sentence like *sa Kaṭaṃ Karoti* (he makes a mat), 'mat' is the object of the action of making. In other words, it is a *sādhana,* an accessory of the action of making. Before it is made, it does not exist. How can it then become a *sādhana*? To this objection, the answer is that its universal was already present in its causes and it is that which helps in its production. The universal aspect of it is the *sādhana* and the individual (*vyakti*) aspect of it is the effect (*Kārya*). After all, the universal and the individual are not two totally different things like a cow and a horse. They are indissolubly mixed up. They are two aspects of the same thing which gets two names accordingly. Why the universal is called *prayojikā* is this: Before a man makes a mat, he has the universal of it in his mind and then proceeds to assemble the material. But for that, he would not act. It is the universal which prompts him].

The author now states that, according to the view that the word denotes the universal, it is not the individual which is the accessory of an action (*sādhana*), but the universal.

28. A universal such as brāhmaṇa-hood is the accessory in the case of a command or a prohibition. This universal is qualified by the one belonging to the number of the individual.

[It is the universal which is the object of all the actions, commands or prohibitions, which are found in the *Vedas.* In

carrying them out, it is the universal which is the accessory, that is, the means (*sādhana*). Not only that. The universal of the number expressed by the suffix qualifies this universal].

As the universal is never found apart from the individual, would it be right to maintain that the word expresses the former only? This doubt is now answered.

29. Just as a face, reflected in water etc. is only called as such (that is, a face without any connection with water etc.), in the same way, a word expresses only the universal manifested by the individuals.

[In reality, we never see the universal apart from the individual in which it inheres. But in spite of that, a word conveys only the universal through its expressive power (*abhidhā*). We use the word *mukha* for the face which is reflected in a mirror and not also for the mirror which reflects it. Similarly, a word conveys by *abhidhā*, on the basis of convention, the pure universal and not also the individual which manifests it. In perception, however, the two are mixed up. A word, on the other hand, conveys a meaning according to convention.

See Vāk. I. 100 and the Vṛtti thereon].

The author now states how, if the individuals are not conveyed by the expressive power of words, they can distinguish the universals.

30. Just as the difference in the organ of sense, though unperceived because of the non-perception of the organ still leads to an awareness of the difference in the knowledge (produced by the senses) of their respective objects,

31. in the same way, some individuals, though themselves unperceived, still become the cause of the difference in the knowledge of the universals.

[The individuals, though not conveyed by words, still serve to qualify the knowledge of the universal which arises from words, just as, in perceptual knowledge, the senses, though not themselves perceived, still serve to distinguish one kind of sense perception from another].

So far, the view that the word conveys the universal only by its expressive power has been explained. There are two other views: (1) that it conveys the individual as qualified by the universal, (2) that it conveys the individual.

The author now states that the distinction between the universal and the individual can be explained on the basis of the view that everything is the result of the different powers of the One Reality.

32. Of the real and unreal elements which are found in every object, the real element is the universal, whereas the unreal one is the individual.

33. It is Being which, being differentiated according to the object in which it is present, is called the universal. All words are based on that.

[That element in objects which is peculiar to them, which comes and goes, is a transformation of nescience (*avidyā*). It is that which is called *vyakti*. It is not real, because it is not permanent and not found in all objects. Only that is real which is permanent and which constitutes the pervading essence of an object. That is what the monists call the universal (*jāti*). In such gold ornaments as *rucaka, svastika, kuṇḍala* etc., the particular shape of the ornament is the impermanent thing. These shapes are mutually exclusive, whereas gold is the persisting essence of all. That is real or *satya*. But it has only a relative reality. Gold is fire (*tejas*) which is more pervasive and, therefore, the persisting element compared to goldness. But even the reality of *tejas* is relative. If we go on seeking wider and wider realities, we will come to *Brahman* which is the only Reality

which is everywhere and in everything. That is the highest universal. So it is called *mahāsattā*, the great Being. It is this *mahāsattā* which is found in all objects in the form of their universals, as 'cowness' in a cow, 'horseness' in a horse and so on. What is called *gotva* is nothing but *gosattā*, Being as it exists in a cow. All words thus ultimately express this great Being and it is only through the limiting factor with which it is associated in each object that it appears as *gotva*, *aśvatva* and so on].

34. That is the meaning of the stem and of the root; it is eternal, it is the great Soul; it is the meaning of the suffixes *-tva* and *-tal*.

[In all things, there is the comprehensive universal called 'Being'. Even negative entities have it because they also figure in our mind. Hence every noun-stem denotes this, whether it is the name of a positive or negative entity. Roots also do the same. They denote 'Being' as existing in the different individual actions which depend upon the accessories (*sādhana*) for their accomplishment. Thus, it is this Being which is presented as finished or accomplished (*siddha*) by nouns and as a process (*sādhya*) by roots and there is no third possibility. It is not merely the stem and the root which thus denote Being, but also the suffixes. They denote Being as associated with such limiting factors as number, accessory etc. Not merely according to the monists, but according to the followers of Sāṅkhya also, all words denote Being which is the same as what they call 'Mahat' or Buddhi].

Remark: For the Sāṅkhya view, see *Vyāsabhāṣya* on Y. Dar. II. 19.

This idea is now further explained—

35. It is this universal, (namely, Being) which is called 'action' when it assumes sequence in the details. When the form having sequence is destroyed, it is just called substance (*sattvam*).

[In all things, there is the comprehensive universal called 'Being'. What is called 'action' and what is called 'substance' (*sattva*)—both these are only transformations of Being (*sattā*). A verb expresses this *sattā* as a process, something which has parts arranged in a sequence and which depends upon accessories endowed with movement for its accomplishment. Every verb expresses a process of this kind. Even though these processes differ from one another, they are all processes. The fact of being a process is their common feature. This is the universal of action which is a *vivarta*, an unreal manifestation of *sattā* or Being. This is the meaning of all roots. When a process of this type is not understood from a root, when the inner sequence which is the essence of a process is not understood, what we understand is called *sattva*, substance or thing, which is also a transformation of Being. This is also called *dravya*. Action is *sādhya* and *sattva* is *siddha*, and they are the two unreal manifestations (*vivarta*) of Brahman. To say that all words convey Being is equal to saying that all words convey the universal (*jāti*) because Being is the greatest of all the universals and it is identical with Brahman. Thus according to the view that all words convey the universal (the *jātipakṣa*), they really convey Brahman. According to the other view also, namely, that all words denote *dravya*, they denote the same thing, namely, Brahman, because it is going to be explained that what is called *dravya* is also Brahman. *Jāti* and *dravya* are only two ways of understanding Brahman. When it is thought of as the persisting feature in everything, it is called *jāti*. When it is thought of as a finished thing, it is called *dravya*. Thus both the views really stand for the same view, namely, that all words denote *Brahman*.

All this has been said according to *Brahmadarśana*. But *Vyākaraṇa*, as a *śāstra*, is not particularly attached to any system of philosophy. It is *sarvapārṣada*, it is common to all schools. Therefore, points of Grammar are sometimes sought to be explained by reference to other systems also].

The author now states that, according to the author of the Nirukta also, all actions are unreal manifestations of Being.

36. It is this universal which assumes six states in the transformations of Being. On account of its powers, it appears so in a sequence.

[That all actions are only unreal manifestations of Being (*sattā*) is supported by Yāska also. He quotes with approval the view of Vārṣyāyaṇi who said that *bhāva* or Being undergoes six transformations: it is born, it exists, it changes, it increases, it decreases and it is destroyed. A thing is first born, then it is said to exist, what exists necessarily undergoes change, change means growth and then decay and, finally, comes destruction. (See Ni. 1.2.9.) These so called transformations (*vikāra*) are not real. Here *vikāra* only means *vivarta,* an unreal manifestation. Followers of Āgama maintain that Brahman who is omnipotent has a power called 'Nescience' on account of which the one Brahman is presented as many. Because what is manifested has multiplicity, the power which is One, is spoken of as being many].

The author now explains how the manifestations appear in a sequence.

37. Sequence also belongs to the very essence of this Being. In it, Time is seen, as though divided into forms like priority and posteriority.

[What is called Time is a power of *Brahman.* Sequence is the very essence of Being and it is also the very essence of Time. Sequence is really not different from what has sequence. Time is not an entity quite apart from the things which appear in a sequence. Time is just a power of *Brahman,* as a result of which actions appear with sequence within them].

The author now explains how destruction is also essentially "Being".

38. If one accepts the eclipse of objects, that is their non-existence. When this eclipse assumes inner sequence, one gets the cognition that the object is perishing.

[The question now arises: how can birth and destruction which are not positive things be transformations of Being? The answer, as far as destruction is concerned is this: what is called destruction is nothing more than hiding (*tirobhāva*), not being visible. When a thing exists in its causes as a mere potentiality, it is called destruction. This condition exists before a thing is produced and when it is destroyed. When, due to the activity of the accessories, the process of hiding becomes perceptible and is conveyed by a verb, in its first stage it is expressed by the verb *apakṣīyate*=it declines, and, in its last stage, by the verb *vinaśyati*=it is destroyed. Thus, out of the six transformations of Being; two relate to the process of hiding or disappearing. Hiding or existing in the causes in the form of a potentiality is a form of 'Being'].

The author now points out that 'birth' is also a transformation of 'Being'.

39. It is Being which, fallen from its previous state and not having yet attained the later state, is called 'birth' on the basis of the different moments coming between the two.

[To say that something is being born amounts to this: that it has moved from the previous condition of existing as a mere potentiality in its causes, but has not yet reached a condition where it can be said to exist. Birth is not the coming into being of something which did not exist at all before. It stands for that intermediate state between existing

in the causes as a potentiality and existing as an actuality, a state conceived of as a process. In the list of the six transformations of Being, each represents the coming into being of some new feature. In that sense, each stands for birth].

The author now points out which associated things bring about multiplicity in 'Being'.

40. It is its substratum or its (fictitious) parts or things appearing to be different from it or its own powers which are the causes of differentiation in Being.

[The substratum causes variety or multiplicity. Just as the same face, reflected in oil or water or mirror, appears to vary, similarly, the same 'Being', manifested by a cow or a horse, appears to be different. Or, one can say that the universals like 'cowness' or 'horseness' etc. which are nothing else than artificial divisions of Being, make the one appear to be many. The whole which is one appears to have multiplicity through its own parts. Sometimes multiplicity is due to things like space, time and the senses. We speak of things thus: 'this is here now', 'that was there them' and so on, showing how time and space bring about difference. To one who is suffering from jaundice, white appears to be yellow. The ultimate truth is this: Brahman which is omnipotent appears as many for the worldly experiencer].

After having pointed out that, according to the views of others and of the Grammarians, the universal is the meaning of words, the author now explains its properties.

41. The universal does not depend upon any particular shape for its manifestation in Earth etc. Nor does it become destroyed with its substratum, though the latter is not eternal.

[Universals like earth-ness, water-ness do not require any particular shape or disposition of parts for their mani-

festation. A jar appears as earth just as much as a mountain does. But such universals as cowness (*gotva*) require a particular shape for their manifestation. Secondly, a universal, like a quality exists in its substratum by the relation of inherence (*samavāya*), but if the substratum is destroyed, the quality is also destroyed, but not the universal. A universal depends upon a substratum only for its manifestation and cognition and not for its very existence].

Where would the universals, inhere when, at the Great Dissolution, even eternal things are destroyed? To this, the author replies as follows:

42. Others declare that the substratum of all universals cannot be destroyed, holding the view, that, at the Great Dissolution, everything is not destroyed at the same time.

[The universals require a substratum for their manifestation. But, at the time of the Great Dissolution, all effects and transitory things which form the substrata of the universals disappear. What happens then to the universals? This question is answered by some by saying that such a thing as Great Dissolution does not take place at all. So all universals always have some substrata or other. Others say that all things are not simultaneously dissolved with the same universe and secondly, there is no end to the number of universes. So, somewhere or other, there are always substrata for the universals.]

Remark: The Mīmāṃsakas do not believe in *Mahāpralaya*.

What is the answer of those who believe in the Great Dissolution?

43. Those who believe in Unity hold that, once the different objects are dissolved in the ultimate cause (Prakṛti), the universals have their existence as one with the ultimate substance.

[Those who believe in the Great Dissolution must naturally answer this question differently. They say that what is called the Great Dissolutoin is nothing more than the merging of everything in the root-cause, the Great Universal (*mahāsāmānya*). The universals also merge in it which is here called substance (*dravya*). This root-cause is nothing more than the Great-Universal. According to Advaitins, it is nothing more than the cause which is found in all effects. The Vaiśeṣikas believe that, in the Great Dissolution, the universals exist without any substratum. But here the author has stated his own view].

The author now makes a statement on the basis of the view that all universals exist everywhere.

44. Universals like brāhmaṇa-hood reside in all living beings. Once they are manifested, they produce their effects. This is another tradition.

[Universals like brāhmaṇa-hood exist everywhere, but are manifested only through particular substrata. So one cannot argue that if the universals exist everywhere, jar-ness would exist in a cloth also and thus confusion would result. Only a jar can manifest jar-ness and not anything else. Thus, according to this view, all universals exist in the ultimate cause like the atoms at the time of the Great Dissolution.]

45. Some declare that the universals are manifested in pictures etc. But they become the cause of the attainment of merit and demerit only when they have living beings as substrata.

[Some go to the extent of saying that the universals of sentient things exist in their non-sentient images. But this is not correct. All that happens is that, due to similarity between the original and the image, similarity of cognition takes place. That does not prove the presence of the universal.]

The author now states how the omniscients acquire their knowledge of the universals.

46. The knowledge regarding the universals of those who are different from us proceeds from all the senses, just as that relating to the characteristics of precious stones and coins comes through practice in the case of those who know them.

[All words denote universals which exist in the particulars that manifest them. But here a doubt arises. If the particulars manifest the universals, how is it that they do not do so for one who does not know the language. Such a person, after seeing a large number of cows and other animals, does not seem to see the 'cowness' which exists in all cows and does not exist in the other animals and give expression to it by the word 'cow'. If the individual cows do manifest 'cow-ness', how is it that he does not perceive it? And if he ultimately comes to see it through others, how did the latter know it? Such reasoning will ultimately take us back to one who is naturally omniscient and knows all the universals and their words and teaches others. The assumption of the existence of such a person or persons becomes necessary for the knowledge of such universals as 'brāhmaṇa-hood' which differs from such universals as 'cow-ness' in that the latter can be observed by all as existing in all cows and not existing in other animals, whereas the former cannot be so observed. These omniscient beings were the original teachers of mankind and they were taught by God (*Īśvara*). As the Yogasūtras say: *Sa pūrveṣām api guruḥ, Kālenānavacchedāt.* (Y. Dar. I. 26). When, after the Great Dissolution, Brahmā and others are created again, it is Īśvara who teaches them and they pass on the knowledge to others. All the *śāstras* testify to the existence of omniscient Beings, *Īśvara* and the deities. They directly see the universals and the substrata which manifest them. They differ from us in that their senses are not restricted in their scope. They can hear with the nose, see what is behind them and do the work

of all the senses with the tips of their fingers. For them, knowledge of Brāhmaṇa-hood is not merely visual, but proceeds from their other senses also. They can see subtle universals in words. Besides Tradition, there is another proof for the existence of omniscient beings. We do see in life that practice increases both knowledge and power in some individuals. Jewellers acquire great skill in detecting the genuineness of precious stones. Whatever has degree reaches its climax somewhere. That Being in whom knowledge and power reach their climax is Īśvara. From Him, some Yogis get their knowledge. These Yogis are superior to us. They can see what we cannot. They can see Brāhmaṇa-hood directly, just as we can see 'cow-ness'. It is they who teach us that such and such a word denotes such and such a universal. In doing so, they only make known what is already there. The relation between word and meaning is eternal.]

The author now considers whether, in words like *jātigandhatva, 'utpalagandhatva'* etc., the abstract suffix-*tva* expresses the wider universal, namely, the fact of being smell or the lower universal, namely, the fact of being the smell of *jāti* flower etc.

47. The particular fact (smell) which is resorted to in words like *jātigandha* and *utpalagandha*, is not conveyed in the world by the abstract suffixes, it being (relatively more) transitory.

[It was said before that all words denote universals. Here a question arises: in words like *jātigandhatva, utpalagandhatva* etc., does the suffix-*tva* denote the universal of smell or the universal of a particular smell? The answer is that the suffix expresses smell in general and not the fact of being a particular smell, the smell of a particular flower. That is because the former is wider and more comprehensive. The quality of being a particular smell is relatively *'anitya'*, less comprehensive. So the suffix must be taken to express that which is relatively more permanent and more comprehensive.]

The author now points out that some universals have no words to express them.

48. Universals like the fact of being a 'man-lion' have no words of their own to express them. They are conveyed by other words the (fictitious) parts of which are similar (to other words in the language).

[Universals like 'the fact of being a man-lion (*nara-siṃhatva*) have no words to express them. The word *nara-siṃha* has two parts, each of which is like another word in the language. The result is that each of these words brings to our mind its own universal. The word *nara* brings the fact of 'being human' to the mind and *siṃha* brings to the mind the fact of 'being a lion'. But the universal 'the fact of being a man-lion' is something quite different from *naratva* and *siṃhatva*. It is not a mixture of the two. The word *narasiṃha* is really an indivisible word and to say that it has two parts which resemble two other words in the language is really a fiction. Because the two fictitious parts of the word bring to our mind two other universals, the word can cause only an error in us. The fact is that such universals have no words of their own to express them.]

The author now states that like the stem, the suffix also denotes the universal and that the two are coordinated.

49. In any consideration of the scope of the universal (of a thing or of an action) the number or the universal in it (denoted by the suffixes) is of use because of its connection, even though it may be separated.

[The universal exists in a thing or in an action by the relation of inherence. The determination of its scope is based on the consideration whether it resides in one thing or in more than one thing. When such a consideration is made, the universal of the number conveyed by the suffix in the

noun or the verb plays a useful part. It does so, not because it is directly connected, but by the relation of *ekārthasamaveta-samavāya* = inhering in what inheres in a thing. Between the universal of number conveyed by the suffix in a verb and the universal of action, there is this relation through their substratum. The universal conveyed by the stem and the particular number reside in the same thing. Only that which has been understood can qualify, it does not matter whether it is understood directly or indirectly. According to the view that all words denote the particular, the particular number is conveyed directly by the word and not indirectly understood. In such expressions as *gauḥ, gāvau, pacati, pacataḥ,* a thing having a particular number is understood as the main thing. Thus the meaning conveyed by the suffix becomes the *viśeṣaṇa* and the meaning conveyed by the stem becomes the *viśeṣya*. This is also in keeping with the well-known saying that a verb is a word which primarily expresses an action. In the word *pacati,* for instance, the action of cooking which is the meaning of the root is the main thing and it is qualified by the accessories etc. which are conveyed by the suffix. In the word *aupagava,* on the other hand, the idea of progeny, conveyed by the suffix, is the main thing and it is qualified by the meaning of the stem. It is in reference to words like that that the saying *Prakṛti-pratyayau pratyayārtham saha brūtaḥ* applies.]

The author now points out that, sometimes, the meaning of the suffix is not meant to be coordinated with that of the stem.

50. Even when the powers of number, the accusative case and the like have the same verbal element to express them, it is seen that there is secondary usage (*lakṣaṇā*) when they (are not actually meant but merely exist to) give a certain completeness to the word or that they help in the accomplishment of the action (which is the real meaning of the sentence).

[Thus, speaking generally, one can say that the word conveys the meaning of the stem as qualified by that of the suffix. That is how the meanings of the two elements of a word, both universals, are co-ordinated. Sometimes, things happen differently. That is, though the suffix is used in order to lend a certain completeness and correctness to the word, its meaning does not play any part. In the sentence *grahaṃ sammārṣti,* the second case-affix expresses the singular number, but it is not to be taken seriously, because more than one vessel (*graha*) is wiped. Similarly, in the sentence *saktūn juhoti,* the accusative case expressed by the second case-affix in *saktūn* is not to be taken seriously. All that the sentence means is: the sacrifice is to be performed with ground grain (*saktu*). The act of performing a sacrifice is meant to serve an invisible purpose and, therefore, that is the important thing. The *homa* is not performed in order to reduce the flour to ashes. It is performed in order to attain an invisible fruit, with, of course, ground grain as the material. Somebody at this stage might argue as follows. If this is the case, it is wrong to say that the accusative case in 'saktūn' is not significant. One can speak of something which actually exists as not seriously meant. For example, in *grahaṃ sammārṣti,* the second case-affix does convey the singular number which, therefore, really exists, but is not significant. But nobody says that the accusative case is not significant in *Kāṣṭhāni pacanti*=the fuel cooks, because it does not exist at all. There, the nominative case is used instead of the usual instrumental case which, therefore, can be said to be not meant. But this line of argument is not right. Because, if, in the sentence *saktūn pacati, saktu* is not the grammatical object (*karma*), that is, if it is not what the agent wishes to reach most, the invisible purpose itself cannot be attained. What one means by saying that the accusative case is not significant is that the sacrifice is not performed for the sake of ground grain. It is the latter which is made use of in order to attain some other purpose.

Sometimes number and the accusative case serve the purpose of accomplishing the action which is the meaning

of the sentence and that is done by specifying in some way the things which are the accessories of the action. For example, in the sentence, *paśunā yajeta*=one should perform the sacrifice by means of an animal, the singular number in *paśunā* is significant, because the sacrifice can be fully accomplished even with one animal. Similarly, in *Vrīhīn avahanti*=he threshes the paddy grains, the accusative case expressed by the second case-affix is significant, because *vrīhi* is what the agent wishes most to reach, because it is to be cleaned by means of threshing. Threshing is never for its own sake, but for the sake of the paddy-grains. When threshed, they become fit to make the sacrificial cake (*purodāśa*). Thus, they become accessories to the sacrifice. The grains are more important than the act of threshing. They, when threshed, are of further use *Saktu*, on the other hand, after it is thrown into the fire, is not of further use, because it exists no more. When it is said that threshing is less imporant than the grains, it is from the point of view of reality. As far as the language is concerned, it is threshing which is enjoined in the sentence *vrīhīn avahanti.*]

The author now points out the scope of secondary power (*lakṣaṇā*) in the formation of words.

51. No finished object (*sattvabhūto'rthah*) can be expressed without a number. Therefore, the number which is found in all expressions is not (necessarily) significant.

[A thing is what can be referred to by a pronoun such as 'this' or 'that'. It is always associated with some number. It cannot be otherwise expressed in language. So the number which a word expressive of a thing (dravya) has should not always be taken seriously. It is there only to lend a certain completeness or correctness to the word].

To this general rule, some point out an exception,

52. According to some, the singular and the plural numbers are not significant, as they serve only to convey the universal. But the dual number is significant.

[According to some, the singular and plural numbers may not be meant to be taken seriously. They may be only the means to convey the universal, as in the sentences: *brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ*=a brāhmaṇa is not to be killed, *surā na peyā*=wine is not to be drunk, *vṛṣalair na praveṣṭavyam*=*śūdras* are not to enter. Where the singular number is significant, the word may primarily convey the individual (*dravya*). The dual number, on the other hand, can never be used for conveying the universal primarily. It always denotes the individual primarily].

The author now says that, sometimes, even the dual number is not significant.

53. In such a sentence as: "if these two fall ill, this medicine should be given", the number two belonging to the objects is not significant.

[But even the dual number is sometimes not meant to be taken seriously, as, in the sentence: 'if these two (dual number) fall ill, this medicine should be given to them'. Even if only one of them falls ill, the medicine is given].

The author now points out that the number expressed by the stem is always significant.

54. In sentences like: "he digs to the accompaniment of two (mantras)", the number expressed by words like 'one' etc. is to be considered as part of the action, because this (number) arises out of the stem of the word.

[The universal of number conveyed by the stem is always seriously meant. In such expressions as *dvābhyāṃ mantrābhyāṃ mṛdaṃ khanati, caturbhir ādatte, āṣṭabhir harati,* the number conveyed by the stem is significant. Otherwise, there would be no meaning in using that particular stem at all. That particular stem denotes a particular number].

It is now pointed out that the singular number, conveyed by the suffix, is also sometimes significant.

55. In the sentence "one should sacrifice with an animal", though there is a certain completeness (*saṃskāra*), the number one must be considered to be as much a part of the action to be performed as the universal.

[It was said before that the dual number is always seriously meant. It does not come in merely to lend a certain completeness or correctness to the word. A word which ends in a dual-suffix denotes primarily the individual and not the universal. But, sometimes, the singular number is also significant, as in the sentence: *paśunā yajeta*. Here the universal conveyed by the stem, namely, that of an animal is an important element in the action. Similarly, the singular number conveyed by the suffix is also an important element. The two elements are conveyed by the same word, appear as one in the mind and cannot be separated. The inner relation between the different elements of the same word is *apauruṣeya,* not made by man. The injunction to perform the sacrifice, expressed by the sentence *paśunā yajeta* applies to the singular number also, through *upādāna* or inclusion or implication which is different from the six authorities, *śruti* etc. The injunction cannot, relate to a bare animal without any number].

Remark: See Mī. Sū. 3.3.14.

The author now says that, even those who hold that the suffix expressive of the singular number is only for the sake

of lending completeness to the word, consider it to be significant for other reasons.

56. The mention of second etc is an indication that the singular number is significant. It is also an indication that both the universal and number are found in the same thing.

[After having declared: *Āgneyamajamagniṣṭoma ālabheta,* it is said: *aindrāgnaṃ dvitīyam ukthye, aindraṃ pṛśniṃ tṛtīyaṃ ṣoḍaśini.* The very mention of *dvitīya*= second, *tṛtīya*=third etc is a proof that the number one expressed by the suffix is significant. It also proves that the universal and number are found in the same object. Unless the universal is found completely in one individual, it would be impossible to sacrifice a second animal. Unless the whole universal is found in an animal, it would not be that animal at all. As Helārāja puts it: *Yāvatā hi vinā nopapadyate tāvato'rthasyaitalliṅgam*].

57. (In the sentence *paśunā yajeta*) the animal is taught for the first time as the means of sacrifice, not taught elsewhere and also that it is subsidiary to the act of sacrifice. That is why it (the singular number) is significant.

[The reason why the singular number is significant in the sentence *paśunā yajeta* is that it mentions for the first time that the object to be sacrificed is an animal which is, therefore, an *aṅga* of the sacrifice. There is no other text where the number of animals to be sacrificed is mentioned. From this very text, we have to understand the number also].

The author now says that the sentence *grahaṃ sammārṣṭi* is a different case.

58. In such sentences as "vessels dedicated to Prajāpati are nine in number", the vessels are taught in different numbers.

59. How can the number mentioned in connection with what is (generally) understood as being subsidiary but becomes important as far as cleaning is concerned be significant?

[This is not the case in the sentence '*grahaṃ sammārṣṭi*'. Here the singular number in '*graham*' is not significant because there are other texts where the exact number of the vessels (*graha*) in the different ceremonies is mentioned. In those texts, the number comes as the meaning of the stem. Here, the main purpose of the text is to teach the cleansing of the vessels. Thus, the vessels become, in reality, the important thing (*aṅgin*) in regard to the act of cleaning, though, verbally, cleaning is the important thing. It is natural that all the vessels previously mentioned should be cleaned and not merely any one of them. Therefore, the singular number is not significant for two reasons: (1) the real number is taught elsewhere (2) in regard to cleaning, the vessels become *aṅgin*].

The author now says that the singular number becomes significant where there is a special reason for it.

60. Neither the idea that the singular number lends completeness to the language when number has been taught elsewhere nor that it becomes important is the reason for considering it as insignificant. It is significant when an effort is made to make it so.

[Though the above two reasons have been given for holding the singular in *grahaṃ sammārṣṭi* to be not significant, the real reason is the one given in verse 51. It becomes significant only if there is a special reason for it. There is no such reason in this case].

That is what the author now says—

61. No distinction has been made as far as the cleansing of vessels is concerned. They are taught (in different numbers) and they have to be purified. Therefore, all are taken.

[There is no indication anywhere that only one particular vessel is to be cleaned. The singular number in *graham* is no such indication as it does not specify any particular vessel].

The author now points out what indication there is in *paśunā yajeta.*

62. As the universal is present in full in every substratum, one would think of resorting to more than one animal only if the act cannot be accomplished with one.

[In the sentence *paśunā yajeta* there is a special reason for considering the singular number significant. If the universal of the animal were to reside completely only in more than one animal taken together, it would be necessary to sacrifice all of them before the whole of the universal is sacrificed. That is not the case. The whole of the universal is found in any single animal.]

63. When the act has been accomplished with one animal, if one takes another merely because it is possible to do so, such an act would be useless.

64. Just as it is useless to sow the seed in a woman in whom it has already been sown, in the same way, it would be useless to resort to another animal when the act has been completed with one.

[The sacrifice is complete when one animal has been sacrificed. By sacrificing more than one animal, the sacrificer is not likely to get any extra fruit. Thus, it is simpler to say that the singular number is significant.]

Others give some other reason than simplicity for considering the singular number to be significant.

65. As the act can be accomplished by that much (that is, by one) some think that there is no reason for by-passing the number one. In this way, the singular would not be (openly taught as) accessory to action.

[Some argue that we come to many only after having passed one and as the sacrifice can be performed with one, we take one and not more than one. There is no special reason for by-passing the number one. The number one would serve the purpose (*sāmarthya*). Thus, due to simplicity and because it would serve the purpose, the singular number is significant.]

66. The indcations in 'second' etc. only confirm what has already been understood through reasoning. From them, number is not understood as an accessory as the universal is.

[The words *dvitīya*, *tṛtīya* etc. are *liṅgas*, indications of what has already been understood through simplicity and fulfilment of purpose (*lāghava* and *sāmarthya*). They say nothing new. The singular number in *paśunā* does not say that it is also a part of the accessory, because it has already been understood through simplicity and fulfilment of purpose. Verbally, it is not significant and still it comes in as shown above and the work is done.]

The view expressed in verses 65 and 66 was that of 'some' (*kecit*). It is now criticized.

67. If, on the basis of agreement and difference, number is actually understood from the text, it is right that it should also become an accessory and not merely be secondary to the meaning of something else.

[This is not the right way of looking at it. The real position is that the singular number is understood only if the suffix of the singular is present and not otherwise. If it is thus understood, what is the reason for abandoning it? It should also be considered a *sādhana,* accessory to action. It is not there merely to give a certain completeness to the meaning of the stem. The word *paśunā* expresses two ideas, one through the stem and the other through the suffix, and they stand in the relation of primary and secondary to each other. To accept one and reject the other is not right. Secondly, unless the singular number is taken as actually taught, it would not be possible to substitute clarified butter when, for some reason or other, one of the avadāna-s is lost. One can use another animal, because there would be no obligation to stick to one animal. But if the singular number is openly taught one cannot resort to another animal and so one can take clarified butter as a substitute.

68. When the full meaning of the word (including both the unversal and the number) is the accessory to action, the power of the word to convey both is not affected and that is an indication that number has also a function to perform in regard to action.

[When, both the universal and the number are equal because both are expressed by the same word, both become accessories. Thereby, the word does not lose its capacity to express the accessory. From this we understand the function of number. As smoke is invariably concomittant with fire, it causes the inference of the latter. Similarly, because the power of the word to convey the accessory is not lost, so it becomes the cause of our understanding the function of number. Where there is no such indication of the function

of number as for example, in *grahaṃ sammārṣṭi*, there the number is not significant.]

The author now adopts another argument and reaches the same conclusion.

69. The unknown (*apūrva*) is to be considered important as it is to be taught; the known (*vihita*) is to be considered secondary, as it exists for something else.

70. As (in the sentence in question) cleansing is to be taught and considering that the vessels are taught elsewhere (for the first time) the number found in the injunctive sentence is not to be rejected in (the interpretation) of the confirmatory sentence.

[The question which is being discussed here is when the meaning expressed by the suffix, such as number, is significant and when it is not. So far, the question was discussed on the basis of the nature of the meaning conveyed by the suffix. Now, it is being discussed from the point of view of the function of the sentence. That which is *vidheya*, that is to be primarily conveyed by the sentence is the new feature and that is the important thing. That which is already made known elsewhere is mentioned in order to convey something else through it. It is only restated (*anūdita*). In the sentence *grahaṃ sammārṣṭi*, it is the cleaning (*sammārga*) which is the new thing to be taught in regard to the vessels already taught elsewhere. In that other passage, the number of the vessels is also mentioned. That number is the one which is meant in the sentence in question. The number expressed by the suffix here is not to be taken seriously. The suffix only serves the purpose of lending correctness or completeness to the form (*śabdasaṃskāra*). The number expressed by it is set aside by the number openly mentioned by the stem in that other sentence. Before, the line of argu-

ment was that the cleaning is for the sake of the vessels which are, therefore, more important in the sentence under consideration. Here, the line of argument is that what is mentioned in the injunctive sentence is more important than what is mentioned in a mere re-statement (*anuvāda*).]

The author now points out that the case is different in the sentence *paśunā yajeta.*

71. There is no contradictory number for the animal in some other injunctive sentence; therefore, it (the animal) is understood together with its qualities and the singular number.

[As to the sentence, *paśunā yajeta,* it teaches sacrifice with the animal as its accessory (*guṇa*). The animal is taught for the first time. Therefore, the particular number expressed by the suffix is also significant. Together with the animal which is specified, it becomes an accessory of the sacrifice. This way of looking at it is in accordance with the view of the Mīmāṃsakas. (See Mī. Sū. III. 1.7.13-15).]

The author now says something about other qualities besides number.

72. As an action depends upon substance (*dravya*), so does it on a quality which is taught in connection with an action whose relation to a substance is already settled.

[Just like number, other qualities also become accessories to action through the process of specifying a substance. Action requires accessories and it is a substance which can be so. But a substance is the substratum of qualities. It has always some quality or other. So action depends upon qualities also. It is quality which specifies a substance which is the real accessory to an action. In regard to action, a substance is an inner (*antaraṅga*) factor, whereas quality is

an outer (*bahiraṅga*) factor. That is why substance is connected with action first and, through it, quality also is connected. This sequence is significant. Substance is the substratum of power and power is the real accessory to action.]

73. Because of their mutual indispensibility a particular quality is associated with a substance. Similarly, a substratum is also invariably associated with a quality.

74. When, because of this mutual indispensibility, a relation between the two is understood, it should not be abandoned nor something not actually mentioned be brought in.

[Substance and quality require each other. This mutual requirement is called *sāmarthya*. Granting this mutual dependence, when a relation between them is understood from the very words of the sentence, it cannot be abandoned. All this about substance and quality is being said from the point of view of artificial abstraction (*apoddhāra*). In reality, the sentence is one and its meaning is an indivisible complex whole. Therefore, there cannot be any question of bringing in the meaning of a word which has not been mentioned in the sentence. As there is a mutual indispensibility between substance and quality, if both are expressed by separate verbal elements in the same sentence, they must be connected with each other. There is no justification to abandon this connection and connect any of the two with something not mentioned in the same sentence. A cognition which arises without any hitch must be taken as authoritative. The sentence is indivisible and conveys a single particularised meaning. For the sake of convenience in explanation it is divided artificially into parts and each part is assigned a meaning which is a universal. In association with the meanings of other words in the sentence, it becomes particularised. But this way of looking as it is only for the sake of convenience.

Really speaking, the meaning of the individual word continues to be a universal and only appears to be particularised in association with the meanings of other words. The word expressive of the universal disappears, as soon as it has been uttered, with its universal meaning and so with which particular is it to be identified? The speaker cannot mean to express both the universal and the particular at the same time. Besides, the other words also express universals and, so, with which particular is each universal to be identified? Therefore, the right view is that the individual sentence conveys a particularised meaning. So there is no question of bringing in an idea not openly expressed in the sentence].

It is now pointed out that, even when two relations come out in the same sentence, there need be no *vākyabheda*, splitting of the sentence, because of the two relations. One can be the main thing and the other secondary.

75. The relation of these two with the action is expressed by means of a verbal element (case-ending). The close relation between the substratum and that which exists in it is understood from the sentence.

[In the sentence *gāṃ abhyāja śuklāṃ daṇḍena*, both the substance and the quality stand in the relation of accessory towards the action and this is made known by the case-ending. The words *gām* and *śuklām* stand in the relation of qualified and quality to each other and this is understood through the sentence. Thus, the sentence conveys two relations and yet it is one. There is no splitting of the sentence. Of the two relations, one is the main one and the other secondary to it. Thus, in one expressive movement, the sentence conveys both, that is, it conveys a particular substance, having a particular quality as the accessory to action.]

The author now points out a difficulty.

76. In this view, when the (prescribed) substance or quality is not available, it would be possible to have

a substitute for either. The relation expressed directly by a verbal element is stronger than the one conveyed by the sentence.

[According to this view, there would be a difficulty. When, either the substance or the quality prescribed is not available, there could be a substitue for either, because that which is conveyed by a directly expressive verbal element is stronger than what is conveyed by the sentence. Therefore, the injunction, 'One should sacrifice a white goat' could be carried out with a black goat or a white goat made of flour if the prescribed substance or quality is not available.]

If the universal is the meaning of words, everything would be alright.

77. When the view is that it is the universal or capacity which is taught in relation to action, then substance and quality are also understood because of their indispensibility.

[Accordingly to the view that the universal is the meaning of words, everything would be alright, because, then, the connection of both substance and quality with action would not be direct, that is, through the verbal element. Only the connection of the universal or of the capacity with action would be so. It is the universal which is taught as the accessory to action and it has been declared that the universal stands for that which has the requisite capacity. So it is the connection of the universal or that of capacity which is directly expressed by the verbal element (*śruti*). But both must have a substratum and so a substance is also understood and through it, a quality also.]

78. Even though universals and qualities are equally accessories of action, it is the qualities of the goat etc. for which there may be substitutes and not for the universals.

[Both the universal and qualities enter into relation with action through a substance and yet, there cannot be a substitute for the universal. Only a quality can be replaced.]

The author now says why.

79. **The qualities are not as near to the substance having capacity as the universals are. The substance is directly connected with action. That is why there can be alternative only for quality.**

[That is because the universals are much nearer to the substance which is actually the accessory than the qualities which come later and are liable to change. So they are a step removed from substance which is directly connected with action. No quality can be connected directly with action. As the universal is much nearer to the substance which is connected with action, there can be no substitute for it. If it is replaced, it would become a different accessory and so the action itself would become different. All this is said on the basis of the universal being the meaning of words. According to the view that substance or the individual is the meaning of words, the universal is not directly taught and so can be replaced.]

80. Some (on the other hand) think that, because of resemblance, there can be alternative for either: there can be a goat which is not of the (prescribed) colour or a sheep which is.

[The other view that there can be a substitute for both the universal and quality, because both are connected with action through substance, is not the view of the Bhāṣyakāra, but of others, of those who follow Vyāḍi.]

After this digression, the author comes back to the subject-matter.

81. It is seen that the universal, together with the number attached to it, is applied (to action); sometimes, the universal alone, after discarding the number, is applied.

82. Where the universal is subsidiary to something else, there it is associated with the number of the substance (individual). Where, on the other hand. it exists on its own, it does not depend upon the number (of the substance).

[Before it was declared that the singular number in *graham* is not significant on the basis of verbal presentation (*śabdavyāpāra*) that is, whether something is presented by words as the main thing or as the secondary thing. Here, it is said on the basis of the factual situation (*vāstavam*), that is, whether something is actually the main thing or the secondary thing, that the number of the latter is significant.]

83. In the sentence 'one should sacrifice with an animal' (*yajeta paśunā*), the mention of animal is for the sake of the sacrifice and the act, (the sacrifice) the main thing, is fulfilled even with one animal.

[In the sentence *paśunā yajeta*, the sacrifice is the important thing. The animal is an accessory to it. As the sacrifice can be accomplished with one animal, there is no reason for sacrificing a second one. The universal of the animal, being subsidiary to the sacrifice, is associated with the singular number expressed by the suffix in *paśunā*. If a second animal is sacrificed, there would be another act altogether, which is not prescribed. Number should follow the main prescription and not vice-versa. If one were to sacrifice as many animals as one can, the sacrifice would follow number and not vice-versa.]

84. If one were to sacrifice with as many animals as one can, then it would be a case of the main thing being determined by the subsidiary things.

The author now gives an example of the principle referred to in stanza 82.

85. Where the act (of cleaning) is mentioned, the main thing being the vessel which is cleaned, there we disregard the particular number which is expressed.

[Where the vessel is to be cleaned, it becomes the main thing in relation to the act itself. There, the number expressed by its own verbal element, the suffix, is not significant. If the act were the main thing the number one expressed by the suffix would be significant, because the act can be accomplished even by cleaning one vessel. Cleaning more than one would be useless. But that is not the case.]

The author now points out an indication of this principle in the science of Grammar.

86. The very fact that in the sūtra teaching the retention (of a word as the main thing) the word one is specially mentioned, even though the word *śeṣa* (left over, retained) has a suffix expressive of a particular number (one) is a clear indication (of the principle).

[The principle that the number expressed by the suffix in regard to the subsidiary is significant, but not the one expressed in regard to the main thing can be known from the science of Grammar. In the sūtra: *sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣa ekavibhakatau*"=Of many words having the same form, only one remains when they are followed by the same case-ending (P. 1.2.64), there is the word *ekaśeṣaḥ*. The suffix in *śeṣah* expresses the singular number. So does the word *eka* (one). The very fact that the word *eka* has been put in even though the suffix is there shows that the number expressed by the

suffix is not significant. What remains is taught and is, therefore, the main thing. Hence the number mentioned in connection with it is not significant.]

An illustration of the principle from the science of Grammar is now being given.

87. In the rules teaching compound words and suffixes, just as there is express mention (of a particular number), in the same way, it is based on reason also, namely, that the secondary things (parts) depend upon something else (the whole).

[In the sūtra *saha supā* (P. 2.1.4.) the main thing is the compound word (*samāsa*) which it teaches. It is not the members of a compound word which are taught in that sūtra. Really speaking, a compound word like a sentence is indivisible. So it has no real parts. Parts are derived by abstraction. The elision of endings, shortening of final vowels, masculine form etc. which are taught in regard to the members of a compound word are really for the sake of the correctness of the whole. In the *sūtra* in question, the singular number is actually heard and it is justified by reasoning also. That is why, in a compound word, a word combines with one other word at a time and not with more than one. Similarly, in teaching suffixes also, the particular number mentioned is sometimes significant, as in the sūtra *ṅyāpprātipadikāt* (P. 4.1.1.). According to this, the suffixes taught in the subsequent sūtras come after a single word ending in *ṅī* or *āp* and after a single stem (*prātipadika*). One suffix cannot come after many of them at the same time.]

It is now shown that there are exceptions to this principle.

88. (Sometimes) even in what is secondary, the number (mentioned) is not accepted (that is, it is not significant) in order that the main thing may be accomplished. Therefore, in regard to the teaching of

the name 'object' (*karma*), the agent is understood unqualified by anything.

[It is not that, in the *śāstra,* the number coming after every secondary thing (*guṇa*) is significant. The *sūtra* teaching the name *karma* is: *kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma*=that accessory is called the object which the agent wants most to reach (P. 1.4.49). Here the word *kartuḥ* is in the singular number and in this *sūtra,* the agent (*kartā*) is secondary, because the name 'object' is the main thing. And yet, the singular number here is not significant. What many agents together want to reach most is also called *karma.*]

This conclusion is now further strengthened.

89. When something which is possible is expressly mentioned in order to remove other possibilities, there the number is not significant, as its purpose has been served by the removal of other possibilities.

[If Pāṇini had only said *īpsitatamaṃ karma*='that which is most desired to be reached is *karma,*' and not specified by whom, any accessory (*kāraka*) could occur to one. But as he has added *kartuḥ* (by the agent), the other accessories are excluded. This exclusion is the purpose of the mention of the agent in the *sūtra.* The singular number of the suffix in *kartuḥ* is not significant. It has been used because, after all, some number has to be used. Even what is desired to be reached by more than one agent gets the name of *karma.* This reasoning cannot be extended to the case of *paśunā yajeta,* because that is the main injunction in regard to the animal and so the singular number in *paśunā* is also significant.]

The author now explains how a single case-ending comes after many identical forms if the singular number in P. 4.1.1. is significant.

90. Where a case-ending comes after several identical stems, one of the latter is meaningful and is expressive of the whole group.

[The retention of one only of several identical forms (*ekaśeṣa*) is taught in P. 1.2.64 when the speaker wants to use them together (*sahavivakṣāyām*). When the meanings of the different identical forms are mutually connected, the meaning of the group comes into being. The different identical forms of the group and the group as a whole are meaningful and, therefore, get the name of stem (*prātipadika*). There can, therefore, be a case-ending after the group also, even if the singular number in P. 4.1.1. is significant. Once there is a case-ending after the group, it will serve each individual form also. No separate case-ending need come after each identical form. Thus several identical forms would be followed by one case-ending, only one of them would remain and the others would disappear according to P. 1.2.64.]

In this way, the main thing would be fully supported.

91. According to the view that the number expressed by the word denoting what is secondary is significant, the main thing, whether it be a suffix (as in the sūtra *ṅyāpprātipadikāt*—P. 4.1.1.) or a compound word (as in the sūtra *saha supā*—P. 2.1.4.) is supported in every way.

[Even according to the view that the number expressed by the word denoting what is secondary is significant, a suffix can be added after a single stem or a compound stem according to P. 4.1.1. and a compound word can be made by uniting one word with another or with many, as in the case of a *dvandva* or a *bahuvrīhi*.]

The author now begins to state a few more points about the universal.

92. Similarity consisting of absence of difference or the powers which are the very essence of things, these might be described as the synonyms of the universal.

[The universal is something the existence of which is inferred because of the similarity of the cognitions which the individuals produce. It is never seen apart from the individuals. Why not accept that the individuals are themselves the cause of this similarity of cognition on account of their resemblance? What is the use of postulating a universal? The mutual resemblance of the individuals, not different from the individuals themselves, is the cause of the similarity of cognition. It is different from the expressed conventional meaning of a word, it is a kind of power. This is just what is called universal. After all, the universal is nothing more than something in the individuals which causes a similarity of cognition. On this everybody is agreed. That something can be called resemblance, power etc. The only point on which the different thinkers differ is: Is it something over and above the individuals?]

The author now states that it is something over and above the individuals.

93-94. From a man's desire to hold a stick, one no doubt gets the idea of a stick, but still one does not get the idea that he actually holds it. From a man's desire, one does not get the knowledge which has the form 'he is one with a desire'. Therefore, even though there is power, the mind has recourse to something else.

[On this point, the followers of the Vaiśeṣika say that it is something over and above the individuals. They reason as follows— The universal is postulated because, the individuals, being different from one another, cannot account for the similarity of cognition. Resemblance and power are not over and above the individuals. Therefore one has to postu-

late the universal which is over and above them. These universals have particular abodes, namely, the individuals having a particular disposition of parts. A cow, having a particular disposition of parts is the substratum of cow-ness. The samething can be said of horse-ness. If a particular arrangement of parts determines the substratum of each universal, why not attribute similarity of cognition also to this very arrangement? Why postulate the universal, apart from the disposition of parts? The reason is that particular effects have particular causes. When we get about somebody the cognition that he is the holder of a stick (*daṇḍī*), the cause of it is his connection with the stick. The cause of this connection is the desire of the person in question to take a stick. We cannot say that this desire is the cause of our cognition that he is the holder of a stick. Similarly, we have to postulate a special cause for the similarity of cognition which we have when we look at different individuals belonging to the same class. Thus resemblance and the particular disposition of their parts can account for certain things, but not for this. This can be explained only by the universal, which is over and above the individuals.]

Otherwise

95. In the end, the indeterminate nature (of things) or power would remain and all verbal usage would become difficult.

[If we do not accept direct and immediate causes for effects, but try to explain them by remote causes, it would take us back to the root cause of everything, whether it be primordial matter (*pradhāna*) or anything else. It would be something indefinable. It would, then, become impossible to make statements of cause and effect. To explain verbal usage, universals have to be accepted.]

The author now states that, according to the Sāṅkhya and the Advaita, the universal is not something over and above the individuals.

96. When, abandoning all distinctions, the essence of the individuals is perceived as one, then a single conception comes into existence.

[We trace back the whole universe to one cause if we find some common feature in everything. That which does not exist in any way cannot come to be. Thus cause and effect are really the same thing. Everything is like everything else and yet not so. As one and the same thing becomes many, the common point is the universal and the difference is the distinguishing feature. The most comprehensive common feature would be the great universal (*mahāsāmānya*) and the less comprehensive ones would be the intermediary universals (*avāntarasāmānya*). The factors that determine the parts are also transformations of the one. Everything is a transformation (*parināma* or *vivarta*). Thus there is no absolute difference between cause and effect, *dharma* and *dharmin, sāmānya* and *viśesa*.]

As the *sūtra* teaching retention of one only of many identical forms has been declared to be impossible if the universal is the meaning of words, the author now brings it within the sphere of the idea of collection.

97. When, that which has diversity is looked upon as one, then from the many is born the conception of a 'collection'.

[When both diversity and unity figure in the cognition, then the object is what is called a collection. Unity is superimposed on what is diversity. The cognition of collection arises from the many, to which unity is subordinate. In the cognition of the universal, diversity does not figure. Unity or identity is the predominant factor.]

The author now defines the scope of resemblance.

98. When the difference between the different individuals is kept down and the two (unity and diver-

sity) are understood together (*sakṛtpravṛttau*) there is the idea of collection, and when they are understood in turn, there is the idea of resemblance.

[Resemblance, collection and the universal are allied things, but there is difference between them. In the cognition of resemblance, both difference and identity figure. In the cognition of the universal, only identity figures. In the cognition of collection, unity mixed up with diversity figures. The two appear at the same time. In the cognition of resemblance, on the other hand, first difference figures and then resemblance.]

The author now explains the Bauddha view in regard to the universal.

99. Just as a cognition which is dissimilar appears to be uniform, similarly, an object also appears to be the same even though it is different.

[According to the Bauddhas, the cognition of Universal is an error. All cognitions are different from one another. There is no such thing as identity of cognition, but, due to an eternal *vāsanā*, cognitions appear to be identical and on that basis, the concept of universal in cognition arises. Objects are also essentially different from one another, but due to the same *vāsanā*, they appear to be identical and this unreal identity is called the universal.]

The author now considers whether there is any external basis for this cognition of identity.

100. Nor are there words expressive of the difference between objects which look like one another nor is the difference itself perceived.

101. Because of the difficulty in perceiving the difference in our cognitions, words and objects, we perceive them to be identical.

[Things are essentially different from one another. There is nothing in common between them. But we are not able to see this difference. As our words can only express what we see, they also do not express this difference. They express a certain identity which we see on account of resemblance. Thus, our cognitions of things (*prakhyā*) and our expression of them by means of words (*upākhyā*) proceed on the basis of an unreal identity based on resemblance. The meanings of words are based on convention and convention cannot rest on the own nature of things (*svalakṣaṇa*). Cognitions really differ from one another, because their objects are different. Words also differ from one another, even when they are perceived as identical. Objects of the same class also differ from one another, but we notice only the point in which they differ from things of another class. The subtle differences which exist in precious stones, pearls, corals etc. can be seen only by experts and not by everybody.]

Those who accept universals, however, declare—

102. There are universals in all cognitions as in objects and they prove the existence of universals in objects—such is the view of those who believe in connection. (*saṃsarga*).

[Those who believe in universals believe that there are universals of cognitions also. It is the existence of universals in our cognitions which prove the existence of universals in the objects of these cognitions. This is one view of those who maintain that objects are connected with difference and identity (*saṃsargadarśana*)].

The following is another view current in the same circles.

103. The universal which exists in the object serves the cognitions also. Cognition is not determined, like the object, by something which is external.

[Just as the object is given a form by the universal which is different from it, in the same way, one cannot say that cognition also is given a form by the universal which is different from it. Cognition never becomes an object. If one seems to perceive a universal in the cognitions, it is only due to the universal in the objects. Therefore, cognitions are endowed with a form (*sākārāḥ*), self-illuminating (*svaprakāśāḥ*) and devoid of universal (*niḥsāmānyāḥ*).]

How is cognition not determined by something external?

104. Just as light is not illuminated by another light, in the same way, the form of cognition is not determined by another cognition.

[A light which illuminates an object does not require another light to illuminate it. It is self-luminous. If the light is not self-luminous, it would not be able to illuminate the object either. The Vaiśeṣikas also accept that the universal in the object serves cognition also, but they do not believe in the self-luminousness of cognition. But the grammarians do not follow them in this respect.]

The author now points out the difference between the knowledge of an object and the knowledge of a knowledge.

105. The knowledge "this is a knowledge of the jar" is different from the knowledge "this is a jar". The knowledge "this is a jar" refers to an external object.

[Here a doubt arises: We can have two cognitions taking the forms 'this is a jar' and 'this is a knowledge of the jar.' In the former, the jar is the thing known. In the latter, however, the knowledge of the jar is not the thing known, because no knowledge can become the thing known. Knowledge illuminates something else and is self-luminous, but never the thing illuminated. This argument is not valid, because knowledge is not self-luminous. It has to be illumi-

nated by another knowledge. Nor need this lead to regressus ad infinitum

The above doubt is answered as follows— The knowledge 'this is a knowledge of the jar' is different from the knowledge "this is a jar", because the former is not produced directly by an external object. The jar which seems to figure in it has no reference to an external object. In other words, no object, different from external object, figures in it. Knowledge itself does not figure as an object.]

106. As the form of the knowledge is not cognised as an object, its form as distinct from that of the object is not grasped.

[Why not accept that in the knowledge 'this is a knowledge of the jar', just as the form of the external object figures, in the same way, the form of the knowledge itself, mixed up with the former, also figures? If that is so, it would mean that knowledge also becomes the object of knowledge. But this position is not valid. The external object figures in this knowledge, but not the knowledge itself, as the illuminator of the external object and as distinct from it. Therefore, what is regarded as the knowledge of a knowledge is really the knowledge of the external object that figures in that knowledge. A cognition having the form of another cognition figuring in it as its object does not arise. There can be no cognition which does not have an external object figuring in it. So, in the cognition *ghaṭam ahaṃ jānāmi,* it is the jar which figures on the object, not the knowledge of it.

Thus, it has been shown that the word conveys the universal which is capable of accomplishing worldly usage relating to visible and invisible things.]

SECTION 2

ON SUBSTANCE

Following Vyāḍi, the author now states that substance, which is the thing qualified, is the meaning of words, by first of all giving its synonyms.

1. The Self, the thing-in-itself, Being, the Body (Primordial matter), the Elements, these are synonyms of the word Substance and it has been declared to be eternal.

[According to Vājapyāyana, the universal is the meaning of every word and it figures in the mind as the attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) of substance which is also understood from the word by implication. According to Vyāḍi, substance is the meaning of every word and it figures in the mind as the thing qualified (*viśeṣya*). It is this which plays the chief part in purposive action and it is that, therefore, which prompts one to act. The word primarily conveys that. The universal is not conveyed by the expressive power (*abhidhā*) of words, but it specifies or determines the substance conveyed by it. Substance is of two kinds: real and expressional (*pāramārthika* and *sāṃvyavahārika*). It is the second which, according to Vyāḍi, is the meaning of all words or rather all things can be presented by words as substance. Here, in this chapter, we are concerned with the first kind of substance. It is called by different names in different systems. The monists call it *ātmā*, the Self. The same Self appears as different things through different limiting factors (*upādhi*) which are the immediate meanings of the different words. According to the Bauddhas, the thing-in-itself (*svalakṣaṇa*) is the real substance. Followers of *sattādvaita* consider that substance is nothing more than the Being which is the own essence of a thing (*svo bhāvaḥ*). When inner sequence is not meant to be conveyed, Being (*sattā*) becomes a thing (*sattva*) and this, differentiated by different limiting factors, in substance.

For others, the body or primordial matter (*prakṛti*) is substance. For the Cārvākas, the four elements, air, fire, water and earth, are the substance. They call it the reality (*tattva*). When these elements combine, the body, the sense and the object result. These words are synonyms of the word *dravya*, because they denote the ultimate substance, which words like jar (*ghaṭa*) cannot do. They can be applied to anything as in the statement: *eko' yam ātmā udakaṃ nāma* (M. Bhā. I. 1.1.). Here the word *ātmā* is used for water kept in a particular vessel. Other words denote substance through *ākṛti*. These, on the other hand, denote substance directly. Patañjali has declared in one place that while shape (*ākṛti*) constantly changes, substance remains the same. Thus, it is eternal. What the Bhāṣyakāra means by eternal is the fact of something not giving up its essence even while forms are changing and, in this sense, *dravya* is eternal even according to the Cārvākas.]

After having stated what substance is according to other systems, the author now shows the comprehensive nature of it according to Grammar.

2. Through the unreal forms, it is the ultimate Reality which is cognised. By the words which directly express the unreal limiting factors, it is really the ultimate which is expressed.

[Words are, by their very nature, incapable of expressing the ultimate reality directly. So they are seen actually to express it thorgh various limiting factors. These latter are impermanent. They come and go. It is they which fulfil the practical needs of people. Words, therefore, express the forms which are cognisable. They are applied to things as they are cognised and they are cognised through their forms. A formless thing cannot be conceived by the mind. Even though words directly express these forms, they also denote the ultimate through these forms.]

The author now shows how, if the words go beyond the limiting factors, the latter can be so considered at all.

3. It is like the house of Devadatta being recognised (or differentiated from other houses) by means of an impermanent feature of it and yet the word 'house' denoting only the bare house.

[Even though a crow sitting on Devadatta's house may help one in recognising it or distinguishing it from others, yet when one speaks about Devadatta's house, the crow is not included in it. It was just a temporary mark which served a particular purpose. When it flies away, one can still recognise the house with the help of some more permanent feature like a dais (*vedikā*) or white lotus (*puṇḍarīka*) (See M. Bhā on P. 1.1.26.), observed when the crow was still there. In the same way, the past passive suffix *ta* is distinguished from any other *ta'* by the '*k*' which is attached to it at the beginning. But that disappears in actual usage. Then, it is distinguished from any other '*ta*' by something more permanent like the accessory to action and the tense which it expresses. In the same way, words, while first expressing a mere impermanent limiting factor, can point to a permanent reality.]

As the crow is quite different from the house, it is natural that the house should not include it. The author, therefore, gives a better illustration.

4. (Or) it is like gold etc. which even though differentiated by different impermanent forms, remains in its pure form, the expressed meaning of words like *rucaka* and so on.

[Gold is one, but is differentiated by different forms such as '*rucaka*' (the name of an ornament). These forms, however, come and go, but the gold persists. The different practical purposes are not served by the perishable forms. There-

fore, words like *rucaka* do not express these forms but go beyond them and designate the permanent reality, that is, gold. Similarly, words express the ultimate reality by going beyond the plurality which is not ultimate. The impermanent forms are not the real expressed meanings of words. As they are not real, they cannot fulfil practical purposes. That is why they are not the expressed meaning of words. There is no harm in taking the view that words primarily denote the ultimate reality as *viśeṣya* and the impermanent forms as *viśeṣaṇa*. All that is emphasised here is that the impermanent forms or the limiting factors are not the real meaning of words.]

The author now explains how, if every word ultimately points to the ultimate reality, confusion does not result in usage.

5. Just as the capacity of the eye etc. is limited by the tube etc., so is the capacity of words to convey all meanings restricted by the particular forms which they bring to the mind.

[There would be no confusion because each word points to the substance Brahman through a particular form which that word and that word alone can bring to the mind. The word jar (*ghaṭa*), for instance, points to Brahman through the form of a jar. Just as one who looks through a tube sees only as much of reality as is visible through the hole of the tube, similarly, through each word, one can see only a particular form, limited by nescience and this form points to reality. Covers and impediments only restrict the power of the senses. They do not, in any way, affect reality. Similarly, nescience only restricts or limits the *jīva-s*, does not affect ultimate reality. It is not merely such things as tubes which restrict our vision. Attention concentrated on one thing takes it away from others. The particular beauty of a thing attracts our attention towards it and takes it away from others.]

The author now says something about words like *sannivesa* (=form, shape) which seem to denote attribute (*dharma*) only and not substance.

6. As for the word which conveys such (impermanent) forms, since these are essentially one with it (the Substance), it also conveys the eternal.

[Another name for the limiting factors (*upādhi*) is *dharma* (attribute). Words like *sanniveśa* mean form, shape, diposition of parts. It means that they denote something which is essentially *dharma*. How can they ultimately denote the substance? If they do not, the view that all words denote the *'dravya'* falls to the ground. This difficulty is removed as follows:— Really, these limiting factors are not different from the substance. If they were different, they would be nothing at all. They exist as one with the ultimate, the *upādhimat*. To be one with it is their essence. They are not the essence of the ultimate. The limiting factors are so when they are merged in the ultimate. The moment they are detached from the ultimate, they would cease to be limiting factors. They would acquire a kind of independence and themselves become *upādhimat*.]

7. The tradition which has come down from the elders is that there is no difference between the real and the unreal. The real, when not properly understood, is called the unreal.

[It might be said that, if, what is an attribute (*dharma*) now may, in other circumstances, become the *dharmin* and thus become real and eternal, the principle that the form is unreal and the substance real would break down. To meet this objection, it is pointed out that in monism, the real and the unreal are not two totally different things, because, if they were, monism itself would be undermined. There is only one ultimate reality, which, due to nescience, appears in many forms to different experiencers. The one

stands for knowledge and the many for nescience. When the one manifests itself as many, it is *prapañca*, which is wonderful as long as one does not probe too much into it.]

The author now states that it is Brahman which appears as differentiated.

8. The undifferentiated Reality appears to be differentiated. There is really no distinction of time within it and yet such a distinction is cognised.

[Thus, it is Brahman which manifests itself now as this and now as something else. Therefore, all words ultimately denote that. The Reality which is devoid of all differentiation appears to have it on account of nescience. Through the powers called *Dik* (Space) and *Kāla* (Time), this one Reality presents itself as having spatial and temporal sequence.]

The author now explains how the non-existent appears to have existence.

9. Just as the attributes of the object cannot belong to cognition at all and yet that which is not identical with it appears as one with it.

[According to the Vijñānavādins, the external world does not exist and yet objects appear in our mind as being external. Consciousness appears to have various forms which appear as external. In other words, the unreal appears in the real.]

10. In the same way, the forms of the transformations do not at all belong to the Reality and yet that which is not at all identical with it appears as one with it.

[Another illustration of the same would be this: Primordial matter, according to the Sāṅkhyas, contains within itself, the germs of all later transformations and yet, it is free in its own nature, of all these transformations. It consists of a balance or equillibrium of the *guṇas* and is, therefore, quite different from that state where there is disturbance of the equilibrium. But, in actual life, it can be cognised only through its transformations which have not the same reality. Thus Reality is manifested through the unreal. This principle is accepted by the Buddhists as well as the Sāṅkhyas.]

The author now states how we know that the forms are unreal and what is different from them is real.

11. That is real which persists till the end when all the forms disappear. It is eternal, it is expressed by the word and it is not different from the ultimate word-principle.

[It is stated in the M. Bhā: "That is also eternal which does not lose its identity" (*Tad api hi nityaṃ yasmiṃstattvam na vihanyate* (M. Bhā on Vā I, *paspaśāhnika*). The forms of the different ornaments vary and are impermanent, but the gold persists in all of them. Similarly, Brahman is eternal and real. The eternality of the universal and other things is only relative. Compared to the different individual cows, cow-ness is eternal. Compared to cow-ness, horse-ness etc., earthness (*pṛthivītva*) is eternal. Compared to that, the fact of being just a thing is eternal, an idea which can be conveyed by the pronoun '*tat*'. But, right through these more and more comprehensive and yet only relatively permanent things persists consciousness and, therefore, that is the real truth. And this consciousness is nothing more than *paśyantī* or *parā vāk*, or *śabdabrahman*. *Brahman* is not different from *śabda*. *Brahman* is the *vācya* of all words which are its *vācaka-s*. *Vācaka* and *vācya* are not different from each other. From the way Helarāja explains the *Kārikā*, his text probably was: *tacchabdatattvānna bhidyate*.]

The author now shows how the Reality is absolutely different from all appearances.

12. It does not exist nor does it not exist; it is not one nor is it different; it is not connected nor is it separated; it is not transformed nor is it not so.

[The Reality is beyond all transformations. It cannot, therefore, be identical with them. It is beyond all assertions. One cannot say that it exists nor that it does not exist. Nor can one say that it is one, because the Reality which is free from all limiting factors is without any inner differentiation and, therefore, it does not appear as one. Nor does difference add any peculiarity to it, because there is nothing different from it and whatever is different from it has no reality. Nor can connection or separation be its limiting factor because that presupposes the existence of something different from it and that cannot be proved. It cannot undergo any real transformation, because one does not accept such a thing; one accepts appearance instead (*vivarta*). And yet the whole wonderful universe is manifested, so that there is some kind of change. Thus it is not possible to make any positive assertion about the Reality.]

The author now says that everything is identical with it.

13. It does not exist and it does; it is one and it is many; it is connected and it is separated; it is transformed and it is not.

[And yet it is *Brahman* which appears as everything else. It appears as positive entities and as negative entities. It appears as one and as many (as one in the case of universals and as many in the case of the individuals. It appears as associated with other things and as separated from them. It appears as transformed and as not transformed.]

The author now says that, as everything is *Brahman*, even contradictory usages are resolved in it.

14. That one Reality is seen as the word, the meaning and their relation. It is the seen, the seeing the see-er and the fruit of the seeing.

[The expression, the expressed and their relation are one in the ultimate reality. In it, the power of the expression (*vācaka, śrutiśakti*) and that of the expressed (*vācya, arthaśakti*) are united. In the manifested state, it appears as two branches, the word and the meaning (*śruti* and *artha*). Manifestation as knowledge (*jñāna*) and the known (*jñeya*) separately is nescience. This has been explained in the *Brahmakāṇḍa*. It is the same reality which evolves as the see-er and the seen. What is called the seen, or the objective world figures in the consciousness. Its very essence is, therefore, consciousness. If it were not so, it could not be illuminated. It has also been declared that the see-er, the individual soul, limited by nescience, the transmigrator, is really *Brahman*, because, being conscious, cannot be really different from the ultimate reality. The mention of the two accessories (*kāraka*) namely, the agent and the object (*kartā* and *karma*, i.e. the see-er and the seen) is meant to include the other accessories also. Thus the whole of the objective world (*siddha*) is included. The word *darśana* refers to the main action and includes all other actions and so the whole of the world of processes (*sādhya*) is included. The manifestation called action is determined by the power called Time and the manifestation called concrete object or embodied object (*mūrtti*) is determined by the power called Space (*Dik*). Thus, the whole universe, consisting of things and processes (*mūrttivivarta* and *kriyāvivarta*) is set forth. The word *prayojana* in the verse stands for the fruit of all actions. Thus, all the three things, *sādhya, sādhana* and *phala* are included and it has been shown that the whole of it is a *vivarta* of Brahman. This has already been explained in Vāk. I. 4. The 'seen' and the 'seeing' are separately mentioned because usage consists of *prakhyā*, i.e., cognition or 'seeing' and *upākhyā*, i.e., giving expression to cognition by means of words involving *śabda, artha* and *sambandha* which together

stand for the 'seen'. All this, of course, is in the state of nescience. In reality, all this differentiation does not exist.]

The author now shows that when all the appearances disappear, something unchangeable does remain.

15. Just as, when forms disappear, it is the gold which is the truth (*satya*) in the ear-ring etc., in the same way, when transformations (like earth etc.) disappear, the primordial substance is the only thing which is real.

[That which persists when all the forms disappear has been declared to be real. But somebody might ask whether something does persist at all. In answer, it is said that when forms such as ear-ring (*kuṇḍala*) disappear, the gold remains. Similarly, when forms such as earth disappear, primordial substance, that is, *Brahman*, remains. For this, the authority is the written tradition (*āgama*). It would not be right to say that all this universe proceeds from something which is non-existent and inexpressible. Non-existence cannot produce existence. Nothing can come out of hare's horn. Consciousness persists in everything. Therefore, everything originally came out of it.]

The author now concludes by saying that all words express that.

16. The primordial substance is the expressed meaning of all words. The words themselves are not different from it. Though not different from one another, there is a relation between them as though they were different from one another.

[Thus, what is called substance (*dravya*) is really *Brahman*, the only persisting reality. It is that which is expressed by all words. All usage is based on differences brought about by limiting factors. It is based on nescience. All words

therefore, express *Brahman,* differentiated on the basis of limiting factors. Even words like *ātmā, brahman, tattva* express that primordial substance through some limiting factor or other. Because that which is beyond all limiting factor (*nirupādhi*) is also beyond the range of words. In comparison with words like *ghaṭa,* words like *ātmā* are much nearer to the ultimate reality. In fact, words themselves are not different from the ultimate Reality. In the world, one talks as if they were different from one another.]

The author now gives an illustration to show that the manifestations are unreal and only unity is real.

17-18. Just as, in a dream, the one mind appears in contradictory forms, as the self and the non-self, friend and foe, the speaker and the spoken and the purpose, in the same way, while the ultimate reality is unborn, eternal and devoid of inner sequence, we see it as having birth and other contradictory attributes.

[One should not wonder that all the plurality which we see before us is being denied and the unity which one does not see is being advocated. Because that kind of thing is happening all the time. The world which we see in our dreams is contradicted in the wakeful state. Similarly, the world which we see in the wakeful state does not persist in the *turīya* (the state beyond deep sleep). So that may also be looked upon as unreal. That which persists in all states is the only thing which is real. Consciousness is the only thing which so persists. The different states come and go and they, like pleasure and pain, do not affect the real nature of consciousness. The variety which one sees in a dream is confined to a particular experiencer. This experiencer, the transmigrator, being essentially consciousness, is *Brahman.* He creates things out of himself, without any other material and enjoys them. It is this idea which is conveyed in the following verse, quoted in the *Vṛtti* on Vāk. I. 127.

Pravibhajyātmanātmānaṃ sṛṣṭvā bhāvān pṛthagvidhān,
Sarveśvaraḥ sarvamayaḥ svapne bhoktā pravartate,

The word *bhoktā* refers to the creation of the individual self. As it is ultimately *Brahman,* it has the power to create. It does not require any external material for the purpose. As there is no real difference between the creator and the creation, it is said to be *vaikalpika.* The creation which takes place in the wakeful state depends upon external material and it is a creation which is common to all experiencers. The dream creation is impermanent, whereas the one in the wakeful state is relatively permanent. Both are unreal, because both are manifestations of nescience. In dream a further veil on consciousness, namely sleep, also takes place. On account of that, the average man looks upon the dream-creation only as unreal. But to those who know the truth, the whole universe, that of dream and that of the wakeful state, is unreal. Only the persisting consciousness is real, without sequence and eternal. But to nescience, it appears to have sequence. Therefore, it is the eternal *śakti* of Brahman which manifests the unreal world, the perceiver and the perceived and creates this world dream. It is the function of philosophers to remove this universe which is charming as long as we do not reflect.]

SECTION 3

ON RELATION

Unless there is a relation between the word and its meaning, any word would convey any meaning and that does not happen. So the relation between the two is now being explained—

1. From words which are uttered, the intention of the speaker, an external object and the form of the word itself are understood. Their relation is fixed.

[When words are uttered, three things are understood: (1) their own form; (2) an object which is a means to fulfil a certain purpose; (3) the intention of the speaker. The relation between these three things is fixed, that is, not made by man. Of these, the first is closest to the word (*antaraṅga*). That is why it is understood in any case. Between the own form of a word and its meaning, there is the relation of the expression and the thing expressed (*vācyavācakabhāva*). Between the speaker's intention and the word, there is the relation of cause and effect (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*). As the science of grammar is common to all systems (*sarvapārṣada*), the latter relation is also spoken of, in order to meet the view of those who hold that the meaning of a word is only what figures in the mind of the speaker. In that view, the relation between the intention and the word would naturally be that of cause and effect, because the intention would evoke particular words and not others. Whatever be the relation, there is superimposition of the word on the meaning (*adhyāsa*). By 'word', it is chiefly the sentence which is kept in mind, because, according to grammarians, the individual word is only an abstraction (*apoddhāra*).]

The author now says that the own form of a word is a meaning in a primary sense.

2. There is sometimes knowledge and sometimes doubt in regard to the meaning and the intention of the speaker. No mistake is possible about the forms of the words which are perceived.

[The word *gauḥ* and the object of which it is the name, both appear to us in the form *ayaṃ gauḥ*. That means that a word conveys an object (a meaning) and conveys its own form in the process. This process of conveying a meaning as one with itself is called expression (*abhidhāna*). That is how the convention is understood. The very purpose of convention is worldly usage and therefore, it has to follow worldly usage. In worldly usage, the word and the meaning are identified. The senses are only a means to cognition and do not become part of it The sense of vision, for instance, does not become part of our perception of an object. Certain things like signs enter into the cognition which they cause, but remain apart from it. For instance, the sign 'smoke' causes the inference of fire but remains apart. The word is also a means of cognition like the senses and signs, but there is this difference that the object whose cognition it causes appears as one with it.

One might here object to the last statement by saying, rather sarcastically, that the letters of the alphabet are not found reflected in the object. In other words, we do not see any identity between word and meaning. But this objection derives from an imperfect understanding of fundamental doctrines. That word is said to be expressive (*vācaka*) which is the function called '*vāk*' of the power of consciousness. This function is called verbal expression (*śabdana*). Even in silent recitation, it is so called. In its first stage, it is undifferentiated into word and meaning. It remains in the state of the supreme word. Afterwards, it enters into the region of the mind, and the breath (*prāṇavṛtti*) and becomes differentiated into the expressed and the expression (*vācya* and *vācaka*). In this state which is called the 'middle one' (*madhyamā*), the expressive word (*vācaka*), without aban-

doning the state of the supreme word which consists in undifferentiated consciousness, refers to form and meaning closely bound up and standing in apposition to each other in the form *gaur ayam arthaḥ*. There is said to be superimposition of one over the other (*adhyāsa*). There is differentiation between the expression and the expressed and yet the two are identified. In the next stage, the word, while still not giving up its basis in the previous stages, becomes audible through articulation in the mouth. The word, being thus a manifestation of the supreme word, retains its characteristic of identity between word and meaning (*śabdana*) even after the two have been differentiated. In one single operation, a complex meaning involving a qualifier and something qualified (*viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya*) is conveyed as one with the words which express it. For example, in the sentence *śuklaḥ paṭo'yam* = this white cloth, the cloth as qualified by the colour white, is conveyed as one single thing. The white colour is not understood as something quite distinct. Similarly, in *ghaṭo'yam* = this jar, the object jar is understood as qualified by the word jar, its *viśeṣaṇa*. This process of understanding the word and meaning as one is called *śabdana*. Sometimes, the meaning of the word is the form of the word itself as in *agnim antodāttam adhīṣva* = 'recite *agni*', with the *udātta* accent on the last syllable'. Where the meaning is an external object, the word and the meaning appear as one. They are not cognised separately. The word conveys both its own form and the meaning by its expressive power (*abhidhā*). Three things communicate themselves while communicating other things: Cognition, the word and the lamp. Thus, the word conveys its own form and its meaning as the expressed sense. It is not that its form merely becomes the object of the sense of hearing. Its form and its meaning become the contents of the same cognition. They are in apposition to each other (*samānādhikaraṇa*). The form as the expressed sense is different from the same thing as expressive of the meaning. In the latter capacity, the word is active (*kartṛbhūmim upārūḍha*), it is consciousness (*parāmarśa*), it is the supreme word (*parā vāk*), it is light

(*prakāśa*) and, therefore, it is different from the word as the expressed sense (*vācya*), as the thing one is conscious of (*parāmṛśyamāna*). When the hearer hears the words of others, he understands their meaning as identical with them and infers the meaning of the speaker also as identical with the words. Thus, there is superimposition, not only between the word and the meaning as understood by the hearer, but also as expressed by the speaker. So, from a word like *ghaṭa*, we understand three things all mixed up: the word, the meaning and the intention of the speaker. That is why the question *gaurityatra kaḥ śabdaḥ*, has been asked in the *Mahābhāṣya* in order to isolate the word from this complex cognition. Even the cognition of a new-born child is mixed up with the word. Thus, whether the relation is looked upon as fitness or causality, superimposition (*adhyāsa*) is involved in both.

Thus, due to the function called *śabdana*, which is the very life of what is called illumination (*prakāśa*), both the word and the meaning become the contents of this cognition and both are in apposition to each other and identity is superimposed on them (*abhedādhyāsa*). In '*Paśyantī*, where there is no differentiation, the question of differentiation does not arise at all. The word remains the very life of meaning even in the stage of verbal usage (*vyavahāra*) and that is why the whole universe is said to be a manifestation (*vivarta*) of the word.

The form of the word is its first expressed sense because it is part of the process (*antaraṅga*), it is unavoidable (*aheya*) and it is distinctive (*asādhāraṇa*). Here there is no dependence on convention. It may be looked upon as a universal or otherwise, as explained in the *Brahmakāṇḍa*.]

The author now says what the indication is of the existence of the fixed (*samavasthita*) relation between word and meaning.

3. That this word is expressive of that meaning, that this meaning is the expressed meaning of that

word, such a relation between word and meaning is understood from the genitive suffix. That is why they are understood as identical.

[That the relation between the word and the meaning is a natural one and not a mere matter of convention is inferred by us in the following way. We use such expressions as: This word is expressive of that meaning; that meaning is the expressed sense of this word. Here the use of the 'of' (*ṣaṣṭhī vibhakti*) can be explained only on the assumption that there is a natural relation between the word and the meaning. We never connect two such totally unconnected things as the jar and the cloth by means of the genitive suffix. Because of this natural connection it is that we identify the two in such expressions as *ayaṃ gauḥ* where the word *gauḥ* and its meaning are identified.]

4. There is no verbal element (besides the genitive suffix) which denotes this relation in its essential property. Being extremely dependent, its own form is never cognised.

[There is no word which directly denotes relation. Ordinarily we observe things and their properties and use appropriate words to define or describe them. We cannot do that in the case of relation, because we cannot observe it objectively (*idaṃtayā svarūpānavadhāraṇāt*). Qualities like 'white' reside in some substance or other and yet words like *śukla* sometimes express the whiteness in isolation. There is no word which can express this relation in isolation because it is always dependent on something (*nityaparatantra*). It is nothing more than a certain mutual requirement of two things (*saṃbandhinoḥ parasparaunmukhyasvabhāvaḥ*). It is a mere attribute (*dharma*). It has, therefore, no word of its own to express it. It has to be inferred from its effect (*kāryaikagamyaḥ*).]

5. Where there is service rendered, there an attribute (that is, relation) is understood. It is the power of powers, it is the attribute of attributes.

[Where one thing renders service to another, one can infer a relation between the two. Two unrelated things cannot render service to each other. Relation is not the same as power or capacity, because it is the former which regulates the production of a particular effect by power or capacity. Power resides in a particular thing and it is relation which regulates it. That qualities reside in substances is regulated by relation.]

The author now says why relation is being spoken of, considering that others have already spoken about relations such as conjunction and inherence.

6. Conjunction and inherence are called relations because they have the attribute thereof. They have definite conditions the purpose of which is to render service.

[Conjunction and inherence do possess the chief characteristic of relation, namely, dependence. The application of the word relation to them is really a case of secondary usage. Primarily, it is not they which constitute relation. When they themselves are conditioned by other things, the latter become dependent (*paratantra*) and they become *svatantra* and as dependence is the chief characteristic of relation, they cease to be so. They can have their own *upādhi* which render them service. When the relation between them and their *upādhi* is regulated by a relation, how can they be identified with something which is purely dependance?]

The limiting factor of conjunction is now being stated.

7. There is only one particular state in which the conjunction of one thing with another takes place and that is indicated by the effect.

[When the juxtaposition of parts results in their contact, the whole is produced. Thus, in order to explain the production of the whole, contact is taken to be the non-inherent cause. The fact of being confined to substances and connection with Being as a quality, this is the limiting factor (*upādhi*) of conjunction. It is relation which determines the service which it renders. That is why conjunction is not the same thing as relation. The latter can exist in substance, quality, action, universal etc., but conjunction is confined to substances. Conjunction has the effect of producing a positive concrete thing whereas relation only brings two things together.]

The difference between relation and inherence is now being pointed out.

8-11. It has been traditionally handed down from the elders that Relation is beyond the characteristics of all things (*padārtha*), that it is made known by everything (*sarvalakṣaṇa*) and that it favours that power called inherence (*samavāya*) by virtue of which the production of things (previously non-existent is restricted to a particular (cause) by which the effect is never separated from such a cause, there being no difference (from conjunction) in the matter of juxtaposition, by which the essence of something is cognised as that of something else, by which neither distinction nor identity of something is perceived, which renders assistance to other powers, which is beyond identity and difference and which is established differently from other things.

[According to *Satkāryavāda*, the effect already exists in the cause. Hence, it is the cause which becomes the effect. So particular effects can be found in particular causes only. According to the *'asatkāryavāda'* also, a particular effect like cloth can exist only in the threads and so on. Thus, the effect

is intimately associated with its cause, it is not separated from it even though they are different from each other. This is due to inherence (*samavāya*) and this is where it differs from *saṃyoga,* though the two resemble each other in one respect, namely, that they bring two things together. It is due to inherence that cause and effect, part and whole, the universal and the particular, the quality and substance, though different from each other, appear to be the same. They only appear to be the same, because there is difference between the two in each pair. It is because of this that thinkers hold different views on this matter. Some think that the parts and the whole are the same while others think that they are not. What all this means is that the fact of being found together, of being intimately united (*ayutasiddhi*) is the limiting factor of inherence. It causes the cognition of a particular substratum (*ihapratyaya*) between things which are intimately united (*ayutasiddha*) and not between others. It is Relation which determines this characteristic of inherence. Inherence does not appear to be different from the two things which are united by it, just as the two things themselves do not appear to be different from each other. All of them appear to be mixed up (*sammūrchitarūpatvenāvabhāsāt*). Inherence is inferred to exist from its effect, namely, the cognition of a particular substratum (*ihapratyaya*). Inherence is here called a power. As it renders service to things, it cannot be put in the same category as them. As it is a power, one cannot say whether it is identical with that of which it is the power or not. It is not a thing (*padārtha*), it has to be put in a different category. That is why it is said to be something which is established differently (*anyathaiva vyavasthitām*). Inherence renders service to the powers called *sādhana* by making them reside in their substrata. It is such an inherence which is helped by Relation which (1) is not a thing because it lacks that independence which exists in all things, (2) is made known by everything which needs help, and not by fixed things as inherence is, (3) confines inherence to things which are intimately united, (4) gives to inherence the name of relation

because of the common characteristic called dependence. Relation which does all these things must necessarily be different from the *padārtha-s*. That is why, in this *śāstra*, it is not merely conjunction and inherence which are relations.]

The author now explains this point further.

12. Others accept relation everywhere as a separate category. But that cannot explain the relation between word and meaning.

[The Vaiśeṣikas have put conjunction among the qualities, that is, it comes under one of their categories. They have made inherence into a separate category, even though it is a kind of power and, therefore, resides in something else. The fixed relation between word and meaning which finds expression in such statements as: 'this is the meaning of this word' cannot come under inherence. Therefore, there is incompleteness in the Vaiśeṣika conception of the categories.]

13. Through inherence, words convey their substratum and their universal. Through inherence in the same thing, they convey the qualities which exist in their substratum.

[Words like *kha, ākāśa, gagana* convey their meaning through the relation called inherence, because they are words and all words are qualities residing in *ākāśa* by inherence. All words convey the particular universal existing in them through inherence. As for the special qualities like *mahattva* which exist in *ākāśa*, words convey them through inherence in the same thing (*ekārthasamavāya*), because both words and these special qualities exist in the same thing, namely, *ākāśa*, by inherence.]

14. The universals 'substance-ness and Being and conjunction are linked to their own and other substrata. So are qualities like duality etc.

[A word like *dravyatva* conveys substanceness, the lower universal and Being, the higher universal through the relation of inherence in the same thing. They exist in *ākāśa*, the substratum of the word *dravyatva* as well as in earth etc. Thus the universals of words exist in their own substratum as well as elsewhere through inherence.]

15. Some objects are in conjunction with the substratum of their words, some, on the other hand, inhere in them; others still inhere in the things which inhere in those which are in conjunction.

[*Śabda*, being a quality, inheres in *ākāśa* which is, therefore, its substratum. Objects like chariot, jar etc., are connected with *ākāśa* by the relation of conjunction. These objects are conveyed by their words through *samavetasaṃyoga*, conjunction with the intimately united. The qualities and movements inhering in objects like a jar are conveyed by their words through *svāśrayasaṃyuktasamavāya*, inherence in what is in conjunction with one's own substratum (*svāśrayeṇa ākāśena saṃyukto yo ghaṭaḥ tatra rūpasya samavāyaśambadhena vṛttiḥ*). The quality of being colour (*rūpatva*) which exists in the colour which exists in the jar is conveyed by the word *rūpatva* by means of *svāśrayasaṃyuktasamavetasamavāya*, inherence in what is inherent in what is in conjunction with one's substratum.]

16. A word conveys an all-pervasive object which is in contact with what is in contact with its substratum. But no other relation is seen for inherence.

[Space, Time and Soul are all-pervasive. They cannot, therefore, come into any new and direct contact with *ākāśa* which is also all-pervasive. They are conveyed by their words (*Dik, kāla, ātmā*) by the relation of *svāśrayasaṃyuktasaṃyoga* in the following way: Earth etc. are in contact with *ākāśa*. Space, Time and Soul are in contact with earth etc. The qualities which inhere in all-pervasive objects are con-

veyed by their words by *śvāśrayasaṃyuktasamavāya.* The universal which inheres in these qualities is conveyed by *svāśrayasaṃyuktasamavetasamavāya.* Thus, how substance, quality, action and universal are conveyed by words has been shown. The word *viśeṣa* conveys the particularity (*viśeṣa*) inherent in atoms by *saṃyuktasamavāya.* It conveys the particularity inherent in *ākāśa* by inherence in the same thing. It conveys the particularity inherent in *Dik, kāla* and *ātmā* by *svāśrayasaṃyuktasamavāya.* Thus the way in which words convey five out of the six categories accepted by the *Vaiśeṣikas* has been explained. Nothing has been said about inherence, also one of their categories. It is not a substance and so cannot be related to anything by conjunction. Nor can there be another inherence. Nor can one argue as follows:— "The word *samavāya,* being a word, inheres in *ākāśa.* Jar etc. are in conjunction with *ākāśa* which is all-pervasive. Inherence exists in jar etc. Therefore, the word *samavāya* conveys its meaning by *śvāśrayasaṃyuktasambandha,* relation with what is in conjunction with one's own substratum". Inherence can exist in jar etc. only by inherence and there cannot be a second inherence.]

17. As there is no special relation, there would be no fixity (in the conveying of meaning by words). Therefore, relation (consisting of conjunction or inherence) is not applicable to words and meanings.

[If it is maintained that there is no special relation by which the word *samavāya* conveys its meaning, that would be impossible. There must be some relation. Otherwise, the word would become meaningless. If the word *samavāya* conveys that category without any special relation, any word would convey any meaning, because the absence of a special relation is not a bar to the conveying of a meaning. *Sambandhasyāviśiṣṭatvāt* may also mean: because the relation is the same as in other cases. That is, if the word *ākāśa* conveys its substratum (ether) through inherence, the word *ghaṭa* also should convey ether through inherence, because it is also a

word and, therefore, a quality of *ākāśa*. The word *ghaṭa* would also mean *paṭa*, because conjunction with the substratum *ākāśa* exists in the case of *paṭa* also. Thus, there would be both narrowness and excessive width (*avyāpti* and *ativyāpti*) in the relation between word and meaning. Therefore, the attempt to explain the way in which words convey their meaning by having recourse to conjunction and inherence is a failure.]

The author now hints at a possible justification of the Vaiśeṣika view on the basis of mere logic (*prauḍhivāda*).

18. Just as the Self, while it is connected (with everything) has the relation of ownership in regard to certain things only through *adṛṣṭa*, in the same way, elsewhere also the same thing holds good even though the relation is the same.

[Just as the all-pervasive Soul which is in contact with everything feels a sense of ownership only in regard to the body, in the same way, even though all words, being words, inhere in *ākāśa*, each one through *adṛṣṭa*, means some particular thing only. Thus there is no excessive width. One might argue thus from the Vaiśeṣika point of view, but it is not right. Even though the Self is all-pervasive and, therefore, in contact with everything, yet everything does not belong to the Self nor does the same thing belong to all the selves, because what belongs to which self is regulated by *adṛṣṭa*. In the same way, all things are not expressed by all words. Which word expresses which thing is regulated by usage and convention. The relation between word and meaning is fitness (*yogyatā*). There is, therefore, no use of thinking about conjunction and inherence in connection with word and meaning.]

The author really holds that inherence is not the expressed meaning of any word.

19. Neither the speaker nor the hearer can reach through words that juxtaposition (*prāpti*) called inherence which is beyond the attributes which things expressed have.

[All things like a cow which are expressed by words are characterised by some properties and are mixed up with them. These two things are their limiting factor. But for them, they could not be expressed by words. Inherence has no quality or universal as its limiting factor, according to the Vaiśeṣikas. Thus, it is beyond the range of what is characteristic of all that is expressible (*vācya*). The capacity to be referred to by a pronoun as 'this' or 'that' is the sign that something can be expressed by words. This is also absent in the case of inherence. It cannot be understood even from the word *samavāya* by the speaker or by the hearer. There is no word which can touch its essence. The word *samavāya* is not such a one, because it is also used to denote an assembly of men. It is only among the Vaiśeṣikas that it is used to denote this category].

Now the Naiyāyika indulges in some casuistry.

20. If what is said to be inexpressible is expressed as inexpressible, it would thereby become expressible.

[The Naiyāyika points out that to say that inherence is inexpressible (*avācya*) is a contradiction in terms because it comes within the range of the expression 'inexpressible' (*avācya*)].

21. If it is said to be not capable of being expressed even by the word 'inexpressible' the condition that is meant to be conveyed would not be understood.

[If it is maintained that it is not expressed even by the word 'inexpressible', then what is intended to be conveyed by all this is not understood, namely, that inherence does not come within the range of words].

22. If what is meant is that it is inexpressible in some aspect or other or in all aspects, even then those words would not deny that particular condition.

[If what is meant is that 'inherence' is not expressible in its nature as dependence (*pāratantrya*) it is as good as saying that it is not expressible at all. There cannot be a negation of an attribute (*dharma*) without there being a negation of that which has the attribute (*dharmin*). Therefore, even if only its dependence aspect is declared to be inexpressible, it itself becomes inexpressible. Even to deny any particular aspect of a thing, it has to become the object of verbal knowledge and if it becomes the object of verbal knowledge, it has become '*vācya*'. How can it then be said to be *avācya*'?]

The author now answers the casuistry employed by the *Naiyāyīka* by giving an example.

23. When knowledge in the form of doubt has assumed the form of *śeṣa* (meant for something else), it cannot become the object of another doubt without losing its original form.

[When the particular form of a thing like a post is not perceived, a doubt arises: is this a post or a human being? This cognition in the form of a doubt is chiefly concerned with finding out the true nature of the object which figures in it. Just at that time, another doubt, doubting this very doubt, cannot arise. The first doubt is concerned with finding out the nature of the object. Just at that time, it cannot become the object of another doubt. If it does, it would lose its former condition of being a doubt. As a doubt, it was *viṣayin* and as the object of another doubt, it would become *viṣaya* and one and the same thing cannot become *viṣaya* and *viṣayin* at the same time.]

The author now gives another example.

24. When, in a decisive cognition, decision as such takes place, then the cognition retains its characteristic.

[When a decisive cognition is engaged in clearly determining the nature of the object, it cannot become the object of another cognition. If it did, it would lose its proper nature and become the 'object' of another cognition. To be engaged in determining the nature of the external object is the nature of cognition. When it is so engaged, it cannot be the 'known' (*jñeya*). In the same way, the nature of a word is to convey a meaning, to bring the object within its range; to say about something that it is '*avācya*' which is a word and to say at the same time that the thing is inexpressible is a contradiction in terms.]

25. The sentence 'all that I am saying is wrong' is not literally meant. If what it says is wrong, the point in question would not be conveyed.

[When one says: 'all that I am saying is wrong', the incorrectness should not be applied to that very sentence. Otherwise, the incorrectness of what the person had been saying before — the point which is sought to be conveyed — would not be conveyed. On the other hand, if that sentence is held to be expressive even though it is incorrect, the same could be said of the previous sentences and that would mean that what was meant to be conveyed would not be conveyed.]

26. What is expressive cannot at the same time be the expressed. What conveys something else cannot at the same time be conveyed by something else.

[What is engaged in conveying something else cannot turn back and become the object of the expressive activity of something else. What is acting as the agent cannot at that very moment become the object. What is expressive

cannot at that very moment be the expressed. The following syllogism expresses the idea well.

Yat pratipādakam na tat pratipādyam,
Yathā saṃśayajñānaṃ nirṇayajñānaṃ vā

pratipādakaṃ cābhidhānam,
ato naitat pratipādyam.

"What conveys something else cannot itself be conveyed by something else.

As, for example, a doubt or a decisive cognition.

The word conveys something else,
And so it cannot itself be conveyed
(by something else).]

27. The statement: "a mere assertion does not prove the point" does not apply to that statement itself. Similarly, the property (incorrectness) is not understood as applicable to this sentence.

[It is true that incorrectness cannot be attributed to the meaning of the sentence *sarvaṃ mithyā bravīmi* without its giving up its expressivity (*vācakatva*) and becoming the expressed (*vācya*). But incorrectness may be attributed to it in another way. After all, it is also one of the sentences uttered by the person in question and if all that the person says is wrong, this sentence would also be wrong. To meet this objection, another illustration is given. *Sādhyanirdeśaḥ pratijñā sādhanāṅgam na bhavati* is a statement of the Bauddhas which means: "A statement of the thing to be proved is what is called assertion and it cannot become part of the proof." This does not apply to this very statement. Otherwise, it cannot convey what is intended to be conveyed. Therefore, the statement that assertion is not part of the proof does not apply to this assertion. It applies to others. In the same way, the incorrectness mentioned in the sentence; '*sarvaṃ mithyā bravīmi*' does not apply to that-

sentence itself. All this reasoning applies to the word *avācya* as applied to *samavāya*.]

28. Since one function has not another function, therefore one should not point out anywhere contradiction or *regressus ad infinitum*.

['Anywhere' means not only in the matter of being the expressed meaning, but also in regard to relation. Or it might be understood as relating to what was said in verses 25 and 27.]

The author now proceeds to explain relation as accepted in his own circle.

29. Just as the senses have an eternal fitness to perceive their objects, in the same way, the relation of words with their meanings is an eternal fitness in regard to them.

[Because we understand a meaning as soon as we hear words, a natural capacity in the words to convey the meaning must be presumed. This natural capacity is made known through convention (*saṅketa*). This capacity is as natural as that of the eye to perceive form and colour. This capacity has to be understood by us on the basis of the meaning which we understand from words. As words and their meanings are understood as one, there is a kind of mutual superimposition (*adhyāsa*): the word is understood as the meaning and the meaning is understood as the word. *Adhyāsa* or superimposition is the main relation between word and meaning. The senses are causes (*kāraka*) in the process of the production of the cognition of objects. The word, on the other hand, makes known (*jñāpaka*) the meaning. Being so, it must itself be known before it can cause the meaning to be known. The resemblance between the senses and the word is that their power or fitness is natural, not due to human effort.]

The author now points out that the meaning is not related to the corrupt form of a word.

30. The corrupt form, according to some, is expressive only through the inference (of its correct form). Even if its expressivity is equal (to that of the correct form) the *śāstra* makes a restriction in regard to usage keeping merit and demerit in view.

[This capacity belongs to the correct forms of words and not to their corrupt forms. People who know do not understand the meaning directly from the corrupt forms of words which have, therefore, no connection with meaning. They are not expressive (*vācaka*). They cause us to infer the correct words from which the meaning is understood. But corrupt forms of words have become current and ignorant people understand meanings directly from them. But merit comes only from the use of the correct forms. The correct form of a word is only one while its corruptions may be many. Just as Brahman is One and stands for *vidyā* and the multiplicity of the world for *avidyā*, in the same way, the correct word stands for *vidyā* and its corruptions for *avidyā*.]

31. The relation which the word relation expresses is this capacity (fitness) and it is through that that the word *yogyatā* itself conveys the meaning of fitness. This capacity is made known through convention just as the relationship between parent and child.

[It was pointed out before that if inherence (*samavāya*) is postulated as the relation between word and meaning, there would be difficulty of having to postulate another inherence for the word *samavāya* itself. This difficulty would not arise if fitness is accepted as the relation between word and meaning. The word '*saṃbandha*' would denote the relation consisting of fitness through its fitness to do so. Simi-

larly, the word *samavāya* would denote inherence through its fitness. Even the word *yogyatā* would denote its meaning through its fitness. This eternal fitness of words is made known through usage or convention, the uninterrupted practice of elders (*vṛddhavyavahāraparamparā*). Mere convention cannot give words that fitness if they did not already have it before, just as usage can only make known the relation of parent and child if it was already there. The sages also do no more than make known which word means what on the basis of this eternal fitness.]

The relation of cause and effect is now being stated.

32. The word is the cause of the meaning which is indeed produced by it. Similarly, it is from the meaning which is in the mind of the speaker) that the word (arises and) is heard (by the listener).

[Of the meaning which figures in the mind of the listener, the word is the cause. That meaning presents the thing as something external. The meaning which was in the mind of the speaker before he spoke is the cause of the word which he subsequently utters and which the listener hears. Thus the word and the meaning are causes of each other. They are conceived and perceived as mixed up, as identified with each other by both speaker and hearer. The meaning which the speaker intends to convey is already united with the word. It appears as inner speech. Even the cognition of animals is mixed with this eternal word (*anādiśabdabhāvanā*). The word which the hearer hears is mixed up with the form of the meaning and the meaning which he ultimately understands from it is mixed up with the form of the word. What is called verbal usage (*vyavahāra*) is the exchange of ideas between the speaker and the hearer. What the word does is to transfer to the hearer the meaning which was in the speaker's mind and which was already mixed up with the word.]

If the meaning of the word is mental, how does one say: 'he eats rice'?

33. The ideas of meal etc. which one considers to be impossible on the view that the meaning of a word is mental becomes possible when, after one mental meaning is understood, another one comes into existence.

[According to the *Vijñānavādins,* the external world does not exist. Both action and its accessories are mental. Therefore, the relation of accessory (*sādhana*) and action (*sādhya*) is also mental. On this view, the ideas of meal, eater and their relation which, at first seemed impossible, become possible. When? When, after the idea of cooked rice has arisen in the mind, another one, that of its being eaten, also arises in the mind. The meaning of one word in a sentence is necessarily incomplete. It becomes complete only when the meanings of other words are also understood. According to those Buddhists who accept the external world, the meaning of words is something mental.]

It is now stated that the meaning of a word has eternality in the sense of continuity.

34(a.b.) Even in impermanent things, there is eternality in the form of being the expressed meaning of words.

[From words, one understands always a meaning in which the form of something or other figures. That thing may or may not exist outside the mind but as the meanig expressed by a word, it is eternal. This eternality is continuity.]

It is now stated that it has eternality in the sense of unchangeability also (*kūṭasthanityatā*).

34(c.d.) What is called impermanence is nothing more than the power which is not different from the eternal reality.

[It is the power of *Brahman*, the ultimate reality, which causes things to appear as non-existent in the past or in the future. This power is not different from the Ultimate Reality. What is called impermanence or non-existence is only an appearance. Every word denotes this ultimate Reality through some limiting factor (*upādhi*) or other, as explained in the section on Substance. As every word ultimately denotes *Brahman* who is unchangeable (*kūṭasthanitya*), therefore, the relation between word and meaning is also unchangeable.]

It is now stated that, according to some, even meaningless words produce results.

35. (Even meaningless) words have an influence over objects leading to visible or invisible results. How is that possible unless there was a (natural) relation (between these words and the results)?

[Some people maintain that another proof that there is a natural relation between word and meaning is that words uttered by Śabaras, even though meaningless, cure cases of poisoning. Similarly, magical syllables (*bījākṣara*) known in the different sects (though meaningless) produce invisible results. All this shows that between words and things, there is a natural relation.]

But this is not right.

36. One does not invariably see such influence on objects conveyed by words. Nor is such a relation meant here.

[The meaning understood from words like *ghaṭa* does not produce the same result as the above mentioned words but that does not mean that there is no natural relation between words like *ghaṭa* and their meanings.]

37. The fact of particular words being the cause of the understanding of particular meanings can be explained only if there is a relation between the two. So it is presumed that there is such a relation.

[It is better to look at the whole thing as Grammarians do. In order to explain the fact that we understand a particular meaning from a particular word, we assume that there is a relation between them, a kind of fitness similar to what the senses have in regard to their objects. It is not that we infer the existence of such a relation on the basis of some visible or invisible result which words might produce. Such a result may be produced merely by the sequence of the phonemes of the words through the influence of a great personality. It is not due to their capacity to convey meanings.]

It is now stated that the relation cannot be mere convention.

38. Whether the expressed meaning of words is eternal or transitory, no human being can establish a relation (between words and meanings) with the help of words whose relation with their meanings has not yet been established.

[According to the view that the meaning of a word like the universal is eternal, nobody can establish a relation between word and meaning for the first time. According to the view that the things denoted by words are impermanent and that words are also impermanent, the position would be the same. The person who would like to establish a relation between particular words and particular meanings cannot, of course, see all things with his own eyes. Even if he sees them through their universals, many universals may exist in the same thing and it would be difficult to choose between them. Nor can inference be of much help because the thing inferred can only be understood as mixed up with

words and, therefore, it cannot be of much use in first establishing a relation between the two. By a process of elimination, he has to rely on words to do the job. He would have to determine things through words and then establish the relation. But the words used for determining things also depend upon convention (*saṅketa*) and, therefore, other such words would have to be brought in and thus there would be *regressus ad infinitum*. Nor can the nature of things be determined with the help of words the convention of which has not been established. Thus one has ultimately to depend on words which have a natural and eternal capacity to denote their meanings.]

The eternality of the relation between word and meaning is now explained in another way.

39. In verbal usage, there is another Being, a secondary one, which presents the real nature of things in all circumstances.

[When words convey objects the things so conveyed have a Being distinct from their external Being. It consists in their figuring in the mind. Such a Being is called *aupacārikī*, to distinguish it from Being outside the mind, in the external world. Through this Being, things are presented as past or as yet to come. That is how words like past (*atīta*) and future (*anāgata*) also convey a meaning. When words present things as standing in the relation of *viśesaṇa* and *viśeṣya*, it is this Being in which they participate. Things in the world exist in a mixed-up state, not *viśeṣaṇa* separately and *viśeṣya* separately, but words present them separately. This separation participates in this Being. The objects denoted by words are conceived in the mind and the mind can conceive objects which have no external Being and words convey them as they are conceived by the mind. That is why words like *alātacakra* and *śaśaviṣāṇa* have a meaning. They convey something conceived by the mind but having no external being. Thus words are never without a relation, with their meanings. Till something figures in the mind, its

existence or Being is a matter of faith only. In verbal usage, it is this secondary Being which plays the main part. Things come to be because of this Being. They do not assume their proper form till they are mixed up with words. When all usage can be explained in terms of this Being, if one still wants to think of some other kind of Being, consisting of fulfilling practical purposes (*arthakriyākaraṇa*), let one do so. But such a Being cannot enter into verbal usage. It is another matter if such a Being is also reflected in this one. That is what is now going to be shown by means of an example.]

Now follows the example.

40-41. Just as crystal etc., in association with objects of different colours, seem to become one with them on account of their power (of assuming different forms) in the same way, the word, taking its stand at first on this secondary Being, becomes related to various properties, contradictory and non-contradictory.

[The external object has its fixed form, it cannot co-exist with both existence and non-existence and, therefore, if that is the meaning of the word, it cannot enter into relation at the same time with the meaning of the words *'asti'* and *nāsti*. Therefore, the meanings of words have this secondary Being. The meaning of a word is capable of entering into association with the meanings of all other words. It is like the crystal, or glass or the sky. It is sometimes associated with the meaning of *'asti'* and sometimes with that of *nāsti*. An object like crystal is very clear and when in contact with, say, a blue object, does not give up its own clarity, but appears to be blue. Similarly, this secondary Being, when linked with such ideas as negation, becomes coloured by it, without giving up its own form. It appears to be identical with negation. The clarity of crystal consists in its being able to assume various forms and colours. That is its power. The power of this secondary Being also consists in its being able to assume the forms of all particulars. The word (*śabda*) is so called because the object is reflected in it (*arthaḥ śabdyate*

iti kṛtvā). The word has its footing in this secondary Being in the beginning (*pūrvam*), that is, when the meaning of the individual word is understood. At the time of the understanding of the meaning of the sentence, the meaning of the individual word which has its basis in this secondary Being, enters into relation with opposites and non-opposites. Positive objects are the non-opposites. They are favourable to this secondary Being, just as jasmine flowers are to crystal. That is why this Being assumes the form of these non-opposites in their presence. External Being is not opposed to it. In fact, it is very near to it. The opposites are the negative entities. Being negative in nature, they affect the nature of this secondary Being, just as a *japā* flower which is red affects the colour of crystal. It is due to this secondary Being that external objects which are combinations of substance and quality are presented by words separately as substance and quality.]

Association with opposites is now being shown.

42. Similarly, negation relates to the objects of negation, resorted to through secondary usage, in order that negation may be possible.

[It is only on the view that the object which figures in the mind is capable of assuming different forms that such expressions as non-brāhmin (*abrāhmaṇa*) can be explained, that the use of the negative particle in them can be accounted for. If words denote things which have an external Being, how can we say *abrāhmaṇa*? In the person to whom the word is applied, there is no brāhmaṇa-hood in reality. The word *brāhmaṇa* cannot, therefore, be applied to him. But if it is applied, the negative particle cannot be joined to it. But on the view that the meaning of words has a secondary Being, which is common to positive and negative objects, the expression *abrāhmaṇa* can be explained. The word *brāhmaṇa* would denote the quality of being a brahmin attributed, say, to a Kṣattriya on the basis of resemblance. This attribution is thus the object which is going to be negatived. It has come in through *upacāra*, secondary usage, which supplies the thing

to be negatived, without which there cannot be negation. So what happens in *abrāhmaṇa* is this—The negative particle denies real brāhmaṇahood attributed to somebody either through mistake or resemblance.]

See M. Bhā on P. 2.2.6 and the Pradīpa thereon. The difficulty which arises if words denote things having external reality only is now pointed out.

43. Birth means attaining one's own form, what already exists attains what is to be attained. If it (already) exists, why should it be born and if it does not, how can it be born.

Remarks. *sattā labhyaṃ ca labhyate* is a doubtful text. *sattā* should probably be *labdhā*. *labhyate* may be an error for *lābhaśca*.

[If words denote things having external Being, expressions like *aṅkuro jāyate* would be impossible. *Jāyate* stands for birth. Birth means the assumption of its form by something. There is the thing which assumes its form, the form which it assumes and the act of assumption itself. All the three exist. That is why one cannot speak about a thing being born, as in *aṅkuro jāyate*. That which already exists cannot be born. If it does not exist who is the agent denoted by the suffix of the verb expressive of the act of being born? If it already exists, how can it be born? The meaning of the root also becomes impossible.]

Another illustration of the same difficulty is given.

44. If the go-er exists and if there is a destination, the going can take place. If the one who is born is like the go-er, he cannot be born at all. If he is not, there cannot be birth at all.

[The act of going is like that of being born. Only that which already exists can go, provided that there is a destination as distinct from that which goes. But if one who takes

birth already exists like the one who goes, he cannot be born at all. Secondly, as birth means 'attaining one's self', there is no object as distinct from the agent as in the case of going. These are the difficulties if words are taken as denoting things having external Being.]

It is now stated that the difficulties are removed on the basis of secondary Being.

45-46. By conceiving it as agent in order that the name (sprout) may be given to it, by further conceiving it as the object and by postulating the action (of being born) based on it there results the secondary Being. The suffixes '*la*' etc. (the verbal suffixes) can be applied to it. But there is no primary Being here because it would conflict with the idea of birth.

[The secondary 'Being' is capable of assuming all forms. What already exists in its finished form cannot be said to be born, nor what is totally non-existent. About something which neither is nor is not, which participates in the former and later condition and is about to attain a Being, one can say that it is being born. When one says that 'the sprout comes out', what one means is that when the causes are about to produce their effect, what is yet to be is thought of as being already there and to that we give the name of sprout and it is presented as the agent of the action of being born. There is further secondary usage when the agent becomes the object of the action of attaining one's form which is the meaning of being born. The agent which thus becomes the object through secondary usage is said to be born, that is, it is the agent of a process the parts of which are arranged in a sequence. Explained in this way, the expression *aṅkuro jāyate* is seen to rest in secondary Being. The agent, the object and the action are all the result of *upacāra*: There is *kartṛkalpanā, karmakalpanā* and *kriyākalpanā*.]

It is now pointed out that the expression '*asti*' which expresses the state coming after being born, is also based on secondary Being.

47. One says about a thing that it exists when it 'maintains itself'. As the object (of the action of maintaining) is included in the meaning of the root, the latter is not a transitive one.

[Similarly, the expression *aṅkuro'sti'* can be explained only on the basis of this secondary Being. When one says: *aṅkuro'sti'* 'the sprout exists', what is meant is that the sprout maintains itself. In this meaning of the root '*as*', the agent and the object of the action are the same. The agent itself becomes the object (*karma*) in the explanation of the meaning of the root itself. That is why the root '*as*' is said to be intransitive.]

.48. Before connection with existence, how can there be primary Being ? What does not exist cannot be the the agent of 'to exist'. But there is secondary usage as before.

[The verb 'to exist' denotes existence conceived as a process, the parts of which are arranged in a sequence. In this state, there cannot be an agent in a finished form. Nor can there be the action of existence if there is no connection with the agent of that action. Nor does one see any other accessory here. Being itself cannot really become both accessory and action. The accessory has to be something that is completed, accomplished (*siddha*). What is in the process of being '*sattā*' (existence) cannot be something that is completed. What has already assumed existence cannot be a process (*sādhya*). Therefore, what has attained its form (born) is conceived mentally as having existence, the parts of which are arranged in a sequence. The first part of it is the agent, the latter part is a process, the object is included in the action based on both. Thus, as in the case of birth, the expression 'it exists' is based on an agent which has only secondary Being. Thus the expressions *asti, nāsti* and *jāyate* have been explained on the basis of secondary Being. These stand for three out of the six transformations of Being (*ṣaḍ bhāvavi-*

kārāḥ). The other three are included in them. What is called growth or increase of parts is included in birth. What is called change or the appearance of new properties is also included in birth. What is called decay (*apaksīyate*) is included in destruction (*nāsti*). As all actions come under the six transformations of Being, they have all to be explained on the basis of secondary Being.]

It is now stated that this secondary Being is all-pervasive.

49-51. No meaning of a word can go beyond this secondary Being which is not opposed to things which are opposed to one another, which is resorted to by different words in order to present difference and opposition, which has no temporal distinction but exists in things belonging to different times, which is the cause of the use of all words. It has been shown as something different from primary Being in the *Bhāṣya*.

[Things which are opposed to one another have no opposition in this secondary Being. It is on the basis of this that words present difference where there is no difference in reality. For example, words present the jar and its blueness as two separate things, whereas in reality, the two exist as one concrete thing. Words like past and future present things which are opposed to and different from what words like *vartamāna* denote. This secondary Being presents as separate what is really united, but only to unite it again. It extends to all things, present, past and future. It is the cause of the use of all words, because we first conceive things in our mind and then give expression to them in words. What has not yet been mentally conceived cannot be expressed. Even what is actually present cannot be expressed unless it has been conceived by the mind. To conceive of things as related to one another by the relation of action and accessory is also a case of seconadry Being, because it is the work of the mind. When we utter a sentence consisting of nouns and verbs and expressive of an action which is being done,

the action is not there yet and nothing can, therefore, be an accessory in realtion to it. Therefore, the meanings of the verbs and nouns in that sentence have an existence only in the mind. Thus, all words move in the realm of this secondary Being. What is called non-existence is also something which can be conceived by the mind. No word is separated from its meaning understood as something moving in this secondary Being. This is accepted by the *Bhāṣyakāra* when he says: *na sattāṃ padārtho vyabhicarati* (M. Bhā on P. 5.2.94). The past and the future have no outside reality, but they have this Being. When we use the word *'asti'* in regard to a thing, what we are doing is to say that it has outside reality in addition to having secondary Being. Even external Being becomes capable of being expressed by words only when it is grasped by the mind. Past and future Being have an existence only in the mind.]

See Kaiyyaṭa's Pradīpa on the Bhaṣya sentence "*na sattāṃ padārtho vyabhicarati*", on P. 5.2.94. What is stated in detail on *'upacārasattā'* in this section of Helārāja's commentary is stated there briefly.

It is now shown that all words positive or negative are in the same position.

52. Verbal communication relates only to a part of an aspect of reality or to the determination by means of an external factor or to a reversal of reality or to an absence of it.

[No word expresses reality faithfully. Words like 'past' and 'future' also express things which do not exist and so do not express reality faithfully. Thus words expressive of positive and negative entities are all in the same position. No word can express the full reality. All words express only a part of it, because everything in this world is only a part or an aspect of the Ultimate Reality. In fact, no word can fully express even that part. A word like *ghaṭa* cannot express even that part of reality fully. It just expresses a part of

that part, namely, the universal in it. Anything else which that thing may possess requires another word to express it. If it is red in colour, the word *rakta* has to be used to express it. A thing can be expressed in words only through some such property as the universal which exists in it. A thing as such cannot be expressed at all. The One Brahman is presented by words as many on the basis of different limiting factors or they present what is within us as external to us. They are responsible for *viparītakkhyāti.* According to the *Śūnyavādins,* there is no external reality at all. The different forms which occur in our consciousness cannot have reality. They are mere dreams and it is these unreal forms which words present. In other words, they present what does not exist (*abhāva*). As words can present only one of these four distortions of reality, as stated by (1) grammarians (2) *saṃsargadarśana* (3) *Vijñānavādins* (4) *Śūnyavādins,* there cannot be an eternal relation between words and the actual reality.]

53. Just as, through a defect in our senses, objects produce cognitions in which something is superimposed, as it were, such is the nature of cognitions producd by words.

[In this matter of presenting reality in a mutilated form, words are like defective senses. With a defective eye, one sees two moons instead of one; with jaundice, one sees the conch as yellow. Objects produce cognitions in which a form different from what they actually have figures. Words also produce a cognition in which a non-existing form figures.]

54. Words are based on cognitions which do not reveal the full reality and so present things in another form, not determined by their real form.

[Effects correspond to their causes. The cause of words is our cognitions of things (*nirūpaṇāpratyaya*). Cognitions are in the nature of mental constructs (*vikalpa*) which never

perceive things in all their aspects. How they present only a part of reality was mentioned before (verse 52). Due to the relation of causality, the cognition which arises from a word is a *vikalpa*. Our determinate cognitions are based on words and vice versa. Therefore, due to a certain incapacity born of *avidyā*, our determinate cognitions are not capable of seeing things as they are. They see them in an unreal form according to all thinkers and words convey these unreal forms. All words do this, words which convey positive things like *ghaṭa* and those which convey negative things like 'past'. 'future' (*atīta, anāgata.*)]

55. The child and the scholar, when they are both at the worldly level, see things and communicate them. Therefore, they are in the same position as far as cognitions and words are concerned.

[It might be said that those whose vision is not blurred and who, therefore, see the full reality express it through words and we learn words from them. Why should not words then express the full reality? The answer is: What is called social intercourse means exchange of ideas. Therefore, even those whose vision is not blurred are not different from ordinary people at that level. They also observe objects and give expression to what they see. In other words, their words also express their determinate cognitions and, therefore, present only a part of reality.]

As cognition always relates to limited objects, in what its purity consists is now stated.

56. Purity of knowledge consists in its embracing all objects and not having (sense-contact as its) basis. When no form of objects figures in it, purity, some say, reaches a still higher stage.

[When sages go beyond the worldly level, there comes a certain purity in their cognitions. Purity is of two kinds,

initial and final. The knowledge of the omniscient which embraces all objects and which does not arise through sense-contact has initial purity. Dependence on the senses is itself an impurity. In its finished form, it is free from the appearance of the forms of objects or of any differentiation, it is pure Consciousness like the sea without the slightest ripple on its surface. It is the supreme Brahman.]

57. When knowledge exhibits the forms of external objects, it is a kind of disturbance, a kind of impurity consisting in its being mixed up with them as a result of contact.

[When pure consciousness comes into contact with objects and gets mixed up with them, a certain impurity results, a certain proneness towards outside objects, just as pure water is tainted when it comes into contact with dust. When this impurity goes away, the consciousness is restored to its original purity.]

58. Just as knowledge becomes impure through being coloured by the object, in the same way, an object falls form its real form when it is expressed through some limiting factor.

[The object also is susceptible to impurity. A thing can be spoken of only through some characteristic of it, some limiting factor such as the universal. This is a limitation of the object and so it constitutes a kind of impurity of the object.]

59. The object, the word and the cognition being thus distorted, existence and non-existence thus enter into verbal or worldly usage in an identical manner.

[The impurity of the object consists in its being coloured by the universal and the like, that of the word in not being

able to express the whole object, but only as coloured by some limiting factor or other and that of cognition in being coloured by the external object. Thus any positive entity, when expressed by words or cognised by the mind, appears in the form of some limiting factor. In this respect, it is like a negative entity, which cannot be cognised as such. It can be cognised only as the negation of something. In other words, its nature is determined by something extraneous to itself. It can never be cognised in its own real form. Even though an error is a defect of the perceiver, the fact remains that, in an error, three things, the word, the object and the cognition appear in an erroneous form.]

60. Just as the non-existence of a thing is cognised on the basis of its existence, similarly the existence of a thing is conceived on the basis of its non-existence.

[Non-existence, unless related to some positive entity, cannot enter into usage. Positive entities also exist only during the middle stage, between previous non-existence and later destruction. Even eternal things are as good as non-existent till they are manifested. Being thus mutually dependent, they are similar in their position in worldly usage. All this has been said on the assumption that positive and negative entities are two different things.]

61. It is not non-existence that is transformed into existence nor existence which becomes non-existence. Existence and non-existence are two appearances (*vikalpita*) and are not different from the one Self.

[According to dualists, existence comes into being after having destroyed non-existence and non-existence comes into being after having suppressed existence. This position is untenable, because existence and non-existence can merge into each other. If they were totally different from each other, one cannot be cognised in terms of the other. The fact is that the Self, the only Reality, manifests itself now as *bhāva*

and now as *abhāva* which are thus two limiting factors of one reality. This only reality is in the nature of light and always remains so. When, through nescience, it manifests itself as the external object, is associated with the present time and has causal efficiency, it is said to be a positive entity (*bhāva*). When it is associated with past and future time, it is in the form of a residual trace only and then it is said to be a negative entity (*abhāva*). But it is not absolute non-being because it is remembered if it is associated with past time and imagined if it is associated with future time. In this condition, it is not perceptible to the senses. There is no non-existence which has not even got the form of residual trace (*saṃskāra*) and is devoid of all powers. Things are either present and can be perceived by the senses or they are past or yet to come and are, therefore, remembered or imagined. That is why things are said to be *traiyyadhvikāḥ*, that is, belonging to three paths, the present, past and future. Thus absolute non-existence does not exist.]

The untenability of the relation of causality is now stated.

62. Non-existence being intangible, cause cannot bring it about. Nor can cause do anything to what is already tangible.

[It might be said: why look upon existence and non-existence as mere mental constructs? Why not look upon them as two different effects, due to different causes? The reason is that the relation of causality itself in untenable. Causes are supposed to act in such a manner that effects come into being. How can causes act keeping in view something which does not exist yet? It is true that it exists in the form of the universal, but the universal, being eternal, cannot be an effect. Nor would it do to say that the universal and the particular are identical and as the particular is not eternal, it can be an effect. Because how can the causes work keeping the particular in view? Moreover, if the causes work for the coming into being of the non-existent effect, why should the latter come from one particular cause rather than another.

Why should oil, for instance. come from sesame-seeds and not from sand, considering that it was non-existent in regard to both? Nor can one argue that the power of causes to produce effects is limited. We see that when something is there, something else is produced and not otherwise. Well, it is only a matter of our understanding such a connection between two things. There is really speaking no such connection. *Satkāryavāda* is also not tenable. If the effect is already there, the cause cannot be said to produce it. The idea that the already existing effect is merely manifested by the cause is also not tenable. The manifested effect is either different from the cause or it is not. If it is different, it either existed or did not exist before manifestation. If it did not, then there can be birth of what did not exist and that is not possible. And so on. The net result of this argument is that causality as understood by others is not possible and that it is based on the notion of existence and non-existence as two distinct things.]

63. Therefore, everythng is either existence or non-existence. There is no other state which proceeds from the one Reality.

[The fact is that they are not two distinct things. They are only two unreal appearances of one ultimate Reality (*vivarta*). due to nescience. As this does not appear as it is, the whole of the phenomenal world is a kind of non-existence, *aparamārtha*.]

64. Those who believe in a positive reality do not accept non-existence and those who believe in non-existence only do not accept any positive entity.

[The sages hold the view that birth and death are nothing more than the manifestation and the hiding of the real. What is called non-existence is not something distinct from existence. It is nothing more than the previous and later conditions of existence. The previous non-existence of

a jar is clay and its later non-existence is potsherds (*kapāla*). The *Śūnyavādins* consider non-existence alone to be the truth. But even they have to admit existence at the worldly level. Thus through '*saṃvṛti*' or hiding of reality at the worldly level, everything can be explained.]

How the distinction between existence and non-existence arises, is now explained.

65. While all this visible world is naturally one, there is an extraordinary order in this multiplicity.

[All this variety is really pervaded by a certain unity, namely, Brahman. But due to nescience. this unity appears as multiplicity. It is this very unity which appears as existence and non-existence; but, of course, this distinction is unreal.]

66. Just as four states are postulated in what is intangible (*nirupākhya*), in the same way is this twofold division into existence and non-existence postulated.

[If non-existence which is intangible can have such artificial divisions as previous non-existence, non-existence after destruction, absolute non-existence and mutual non-existence, the ultimate Reality also can have artificial distinctions. What is called existence is the fact of being cognisable to the external senses and fulfilling some purpose or other. What is called non-existence is the fact of being imperceptible and not fulfilling some purpose.]

It is now stated that neither existence nor non-existence has separate Being.

67. Non-existence can rationally be neither opposed nor non-opposed (to existence) can be neither existent nor non-existent, neither have sequence nor not have it.

[As non-existence in intangible, there cannot be opposition between it and existence. Non-existence neither helps

nor hinders existence. One cannot predicate existence about it, because what exists cannot be non-existent and what has already attained its form cannot get anything further. Nor can it have a separate form because, in that way, there would be no difference between it and existence. Sequence is an attribute of existent entities and, therefore, non-existence cannot have it. Nor can there be absence of sequence, that is, simultaneity, because that depends upon something external.]

68. Existence which is opposed or otherwise, existent or non-existent, sequenceful or sequenceless, does not, therefore, exist.

69. There cannot be any division within non-existence on the basis of the three divisions of time and, if that is not possible, there cannot be triple time for existence either.

70. Abandoning one's own essence due to something external is not possible, nor is it possible to maintain that one's own essence depends upon oneself or something external.

71. There is contradiction in identity (between existence and non-existence) and if they are different, they cannot render service (to each other). If both are abandoned, all usage would cease.

[Verses 67-71 are intended to show on the basis of logic, that really speaking it is not possible to show the validity of existence or non-existence. They are no more than appearance and disappearance or hiding of something unreal. The ultimate Reality is eternal and is not affected by its appearance and disappearance as unreal forms of something which is eternal and quite free from these unreal forms.]

The truth is now stated.

72. Those who know the final portion of the Vedas have declared that entity alone to be real which is differentiated into the see-er, the seen and the seeing.

If the text is: *'vā avikalpitām'*, the translation should be: 'in which there is no real differentiation into'.

[Knowers of Brahman have declared that the world consisting of the perceiver and the perceived, brought about through differentiation is not real. What is real is beyond all differentiation, beyond the range of words and mind, with no beginning and no end. The final portion of the Vedas, consisting of *Ṛk, Yajus,* and *Sāman,* is the *Upaniṣad* where the essential truth is propounded. Those who know this portion have declared that monism is the truth and not dualism suggested by the performance of actions. Differentiation is due to *avidyā* which is neither identical with nor different from the ultimate reality.]

It is now stated that words move about in the world of unreal differentiation.

73. Inasmuch as words express the universal or the particular as differentiated, they move about in the world of unreal differences.

[Words express the unreal which appears in our cognition and do not touch the undifferentiated reality but move about in the world of differentiation. Words express even universals as distinct from other universals. That is, even when they express universals which stand for unity, they are still associated with differentiation. Similarly, a *viśeṣa* (particularity) is dfferent from other *vśeṣas,* as expressed by words.]

The author now says somethng about non-existence as understood by the *Vaiśeṣikas.*

74. When non-existence is brought about, existence cannot be destroyed nor can existence be brought when

non-existence is destroyed (if non-existence is also a separate category).

[So far, all reasoning has been going on on the basis of the view that non-existence is something intangible. But, for the *Vaiśeṣikas*, it is a separate category. That means that it is something tangible. If that is so and it is different from '*bhāva*', how can *bhāva* be destroyed when *abhāva* is produced and how can *bhāva* be produced when *abhāva* is destroyed?]

75. The existence of *śābaleya* does not prevent that of *bāhuleya*, nor does the non-existence of *śābaleya* bring about the existence of *bāhuleya*.

[Just as the existence of *śābaleya* does not prevent that of *bāhuleya* and vice-versa, in the same way, if *abhāva* is also a separate category, its existence or non-existence would not bring about the non-existence or existence of *bhāva*.]

76. Such considerations would arise if non-existence were a positive entity and in regard to its own non-existence, the whole question would arise again.

77. Therefore, being a non-entity, it is beyond the scope of verbal communication and variation within it does not deserve to be explained.

[If we proceed on the Buddhist assumption that what is called non-existence is only the disappearance of a positive entity, and, therefore, something intangible, all these considerations would not arise at all. The objection that when non-existence is destroyed, why should a positive entity come to be, would not be raised. If the object comes into existence when its previous non-existence is removed, it is because of its nature to come to be. Therefore, non-existence is something intangible and does not deserve to be classed into a

separate category. It is intangible and it cannot be thought of in the same way as *bhāva.*]

The untenability of causality, already stated, is now repeated and *vivartavāda,* the final doctrine, is expounded.

78. There is no such thing as the cause working towards something which has not even a word to express it. Even when the cause is present, there is the absence of the effect (before it is born).

[As the effect does not exist before it comes into existence, it has no word to express it. The cause, therefore, cannot work towards it. A cause operates in relation to an effect which is fit to be born and which is something positive. So unless the effect exists already, the cause cannot work towards it. Causes do not work towards something which is nothing. That which does not exist cannot be an aim and if it already exists, there is no need for a cause. If, by what is called the cause working towards the effect, it is the agent's plan which is meant, that is also not possible. An insentient cause can work still less towards the effect. So what is called causality is nothing more than something appearing to come into existence only when something else is present.]

79. 'What is its previous condition' is a question which relates to something which exists. Both the ideas of 'previous' and condition are inapplicable to something which does not exist.

[No one can say that because, before its production, there is its previous condition, therefore, it is not right to say that there is no word to express it. Because, one can legitimately ask 'what is this previous condition' only in regard to something which exists. Neither the idea of previous nor that of condition applies to something which is nothing. Something which is devoid of form or shape cannot be said to be previous' either spatially or temporally. The idea of condition pre-

supposes one who is in that condition and no such thing is visible. Thus, both according to *asatkāryavāda* and *satkāryavāda,* there cannot be a previous condition of the effect.]

80. After destruction, one cannot say about a thing that it exists or does not exist, because of the absence of any ground for doing so. It is beyond the range of words:

[After destruction, one cannot say of a thing whether it exists or not. The *Sānkhyas* affirm that it does exist, but that is not right. The fact of being cognised is the basis of such statements and that cannot happen with something which has been destroyed. Therefore, before it is produced and after it is destroyed, one cannot speak about a thing at all.]

It is now stated that it is only in the middle stage that it is visible.

81. It is indeed a wonderful activity by virtue of which the indivisible and sequenceless essence of previously non-existent things manifests itself.

[Causality has already been shown to be unsound. So the effect, previously non-existent, suddenly appears under certain conditions, that is, when something else is present. It only appears to be an effect, but it is not so. People, blinded by nescience, imagine it in many ways. It is only a *vivarta.* When the one, without ceasing to be one, assumes different unreal forms, there is *vivarta.*]

Helārāja here quotes the definition of *vivarta* found in the *vṛtti* on Vāk. I. 1.

82. All worldly usage is carried out with objects created by mental construction as with primary objects.

[After having seen the object during the middle stage, one imagines a previous and a posterior stage for it and thus

it becomes endowed with sequence and then one postulates a relation of causality and talks about *bhāva* and *abhāva*. This is worldly usage which is the result of nescience.]

83. Those who believe in the Eternal (Brahman) look upon this as the power of the only Reality. They declare sequence to be the same as the objects and not as something apart from them.

[In reality, the plurality which is visible is not the truth. Only monism is the truth. It is seen as plurality by those whose eyes are dimmed by nescience. The one sequenceless Brahman appears as many and as possessing sequence because of the power called *svātantrya*. These two powers, that by which the one appears as many and the sequenceless appears as having sequence are not really different from Brahman. Nothing besides Brahman can shine and that which shines cannot be different from Brahman. Sequence appears as conditioned by objects which are identical with Brahman. So sequence is really not different from what has sequence.]

84. In reality, simultaneity is not different from sequence just as non-existence is not different from existence.

[The opposite of sequence is simultaneity and that is also a mere appearance. The One Reality cannot be cognised as such by ordinary people. It manifests itself as having spatial and temporal sequence. When two or more things appear together, they seem to have simultaneity. But squence and simultaneity are not different from the things themselves. It has been said before that *abhāva* is not different from *bhāva* and that it is not anything positive. Simultaneity is only absence of sequence. Association in time with something else is not different from that which so associates.]

85. People of the world speak about time within time. But one cannot bring about a distinction by merely speaking about it.

[By speaking about time which exists to-day and time which will exist tomorrow, some people make a distinction within time. They speak of time as *ādhāra* or as *ādheya*. But Time is One. Similarly, sequence and simultaneity do not differ from each other nor from the things which are sequential or simultaneous.]

86. Even if non-existence is imagined to be a substratum, nothing can really exist in it. Nobody can be prevented from imagining totally non-existent things.

[When we say *śatror abhāve sukham* the use of the locative case seems to imply that non-existence can be a substratum. But that is not right. It is a mere fiction. There is nothing which one cannot imagine.]

87. Therefore, the one eternal Reality, consisting of existence and non-existence, shines through its different powers, in many forms when conveyed by words.

[The substance of this section can be stated as follows— The ultimate Reality is beyond all differentiation. It is endowed with all powers. Words express this Reality, according to occasion, either as a positive entity or as a negation and as having this or that limiting factor. Those words which express negative things are similar to words expressive of positive things as far as their relation to their meanings are concerned. This ultimate Reality is one, because there is no differentiation within it. It is eternal, because there is no such thing as *abhāva*, non-existence.]

88. Verbal communication in the world is done with meanings of words fashioned by the mind and in the science of grammar, it is the meanings adopted in the world on the basis of which the work (of explaining the forms) is done.

[Therefore, in everyday life, it is the norm for words to express the limited reality and it has been so stated in this *śāstra*. Therefore, all the different views of the *tārkikas* are out of place. Ordinary people do not follow the conclusions which may have been reached by different thinkers. In the matter of using words in accordance with our cognitions, both the scholar and the child are equal. On that basis, they proceed to exchange views. Ordinary people understand things in a superficial manner and use words accordingly. This *śastra* is an attempt to explain words as used by ordinary people. In this attempt, one should take the help of the ordinary man's view of the world. From the indivisible sentence-meaning, by a process of abstraction, one derives the root expressive of action, the nouns expressive of things, the suffix which conveys its own meaning for the sake of explaining the forms. The notions of action, substance, quality and so on, used by the science of grammar, are worldly notions. In worldly usages, all words whether expressive of positive or negative things, are in the same position. Therefore, the meanings of words have continuity. Thus the relation between word and meaning is eternal.]

SECTION 4

FURTHER STATEMENT ON SUBSTANCE

1-2. Some meanings of words which exist in the sentence looked upon as interconnection (*ṣaṃsargarūpāt saṃbhūtāḥ*) which are isolated by a process of abstraction (*samvidrūpād apoddhṛtāḥ*) which are separated from the meaning of a sentence like the meanings of the stem and the suffix (from that of a word), which are the basis of the correctness of words and which are inferred from indications in the Science of Grammar, will now be explained according to Tradition.

[The previous section ended with the remark that, in the Science of Grammar, meanings of words, agreeing with worldly usage, are isolated for the purpose of explaining the formation of words. The sentence is indivisible and so is its meaning. For the purpose of conveniently explaining the forms of the language both are artificially divided. These divisions become the means of the derivation of the forms of the language. For the purpose of this division, the meaning of the sentence is looked upon as connection (*saṃsarga*). In that way, the meanings of the individual words whose connection the sentence-meaning is, can be separated. They exist only if the sentence-meaning is looked upon as a combination. If they do not exist at all or if they are like bits of iron, they cannot combine and there cannot be any question of analysis. Of course, the sentence and its meaning are indivisible. So there are no word-meanings. There cannot be any question of their previous separate existence. The hearer does not understand the meaning of the whole sentence all at once. He understands it little by little, part by part and then joins the parts together. The taste of 'sharbat' (*pānaka*) is really an indivisible whole, but those

who drink it can, if they make an effort, taste each ingradient separately and assess the part played by it in making up the taste of the whole. As the indivisible sentence—meaning cannot be understood in a flash all at once, the unreal word-meanings are abstracted in the middle as mere means to an end. Once the sentence-meaning is understood, they disappear. This artificial division is done with a purpose. It is to facilitate the teaching of forms, so that each form may be made in its own meaning. These meanings are not taught in the *śāstra,* they are not *'vidheya'*. They are natural and they are made use of to teach forms. This is the meaning of the M. Bhā. statement: *svābhāvikam ity āha. Kuta etat. arthānādeśanāt*="It is declared that it is natural. Why so? Because meaning has not been taught." (M.Bhā. I, p. 363, 1.8). The mention of meaning in a grammatical *sūtra* is only by the way. It is only a means to an end. The artificial division of a sentence is like the division of a word like a noun or a verb into parts and assigning a meaning to each, though a word is really indivisible. These artificial meanings are indications of the correctness of the word. That is why they are analysed. They are of two kinds: (1) those which are known in the world, (2) those which are known in particular *śāstras.* These latter are defined by grammarians in their own way. These definitions are inferred from Pāṇini's practice. For example, from the *sūtra* which teaches *'ekaśeṣa'* (P. 1.2.64) we gather that the individual or the particular (*dravya*) can be the meaning of a word and that it means something which is to be differentiated (*bhedya*). From the *vārttika*—*"yasya guṇasya hi bhāvād dravye śabdaniveśaḥ* etc." (Vā. 5 on P. 5.1.119), we understand that *guṇa* is something which rests on something else. Even the universal (*jāti*) can be said to be *guṇa* when it is expressed by an abstract suffix (*bhāvapratyaya*). Words like *śukla* in *śuklaḥ paṭah'* denote an object having white as its quality. That what is called time is essentially action is known from the fact that Pāṇini has used such words as *'bhūta', 'vartamāne', 'bhavisyati'* as expressive of the limiting factor of the meaning of the root which is action. That

number is something which enables us to count difference is made clear in the *sūtra-'jātyākhyām ekasmin'* etc. (P. 1.2.57). The *Vaiśeṣika* conception of number is that it is a quality which inheres in a substance. We gather that *saṃstyāna, prasava* and *sthiti* constitute the nature of the genders from the expressions *'striyām'*, *'puṃsi'*, and *'napuṃsakhe'* which are found in connection with the explanation of the forms of words. Gender cannot mean sex because such things as a *'khaṭvā'* cannot have sex in the ordinary sense of the term. That it is power or capacity (*śakti*) which is the real accessory (*sādhana*) and not substance can be gathered from these indications: (1) from the fact that an accessory can sometimes be *śeṣa* (2) from the fact that the object can sometimes become agent — changes which substance, being uniform, cannot undergo — (3) from the fact that an *'avyayībhāva'* compound has been taught in the sense of a case-ending. The concepts of *'puruṣa'* and *'upagraha'* have been taken from previous grammarians. Space and action are well-known in the world. Action has been defined as a process the parts of which are arranged in a temporal sequence. One and the same word can convey many of the things mentioned above, but one of them as the main thing and the others as subordinate to it. Thus, the verb denotes action, time, accessory, number, person and aspect. The noun denotes substance, gender, number, accessories, action and time. All these things have been explained according to the tradition of the grammarians.]

As quality etc. depend upon substance, the latter is first defined.

3. That in reference to which a pronoun can be used is substance, presented as something to be differentiated.

[Pronouns can do one of two things. Some merely denote things in general, like *'sarva'*. Others denote particular things like *'anyatara'*. It is the former which are used to refer to substance. In fact, that is just the characteristic

of substance, namely, that it can be referred to by a pronoun (*sarvanāmapratyavamarśayogyatvam*). Pronouns refer to things in general either as present or as past. When the element of present or past is discarded, what remains is just the thing in general and that is substance. It is presented as something to be qualified by such limiting factors as the universal. What is meant by 'presented' is that what is being defined is not external reality, but reality as presented by words. Thus, even a universal, when presented as something to be qualified, becomes substance. This conception of substance is quite different from that of other schools. In this way, anything can be presented by words as substance, as something to be differentiated. This is true of the other conception also, namely, that of Vājapyāyana who held that all words denote the universal i.e. something which is the cause of the same cognition arising and the same word being applied to something. Such a universal exists in action also. That is why we cognise every step in the process of cooking as cooking. If only the last stage in the process, that is, the softening of the substance cooked, were the meaning of the root 'to cook' (*pac*), then the other stages would have to be understood through inference or implication and would not be the actions of the cook. If the activity of the agent is not expressed by the root, but is understood by inference or implication, then there would be no connection between the meaning of the suffix, namely, the agent and his activity which would not be expressed by the root but only understood by implication. If the root '*pac*' denotes only the softening of the material (*viklitti*), then the material can only be *kartā* or *karmakartā,* but never the object. In other words, we would never be able to say—*devadattaḥ odanaṃ pacati.* Secondly the softening is only the last stage or moment. So it cannot be the action at all. Action is a process of which the parts are arranged in a sequence. The action of cooking is in the same position. Such moments as putting the vessel on the fire must be part of that process, because at these moments also we get the idea of cooking. So there is such

a thing as the universal of cooking inhering in every moment of the process. This is true of all actions. Even though every verb denotes the universal aspect of action, the accessories become connected with the individual aspect which is something to be accomplished (*sādhya*) and only *sādhya* can be connected with '*sādhana*' (the means).

Just as it has been shown that action is a universal, it can also be shown that it is a substance. Even according to the view that the verb denotes action primarily, it must denote substance, that is, the accessory secondarily. Otherwise, in regard to what would action be the primary meaning? Would it not be simpler to say that the verb denotes primarily the accessory in activity? Even according to the other view, the accessory comes in secondarily. Otherwise, the expression '*devadattaḥ pacati*' where the word expressive of action and the word expressive of accessory are in apposition to each other, would be inexplicable. Action, the meaning of the verb, can be referred to by a pronoun, characteristic of substance. In the expression '*sādhu pacati*' we see that the meaning of the verb is modified or differentiated by the word '*sādhu*'. Similarly, the verb '*āsyate*' can be qualified by the word '*sukham*' and so its meaning becomes '*bhedya*', a characteristic of substance, as stated in the verse under consideration.

The Mīmāṃsakas argue that the verb expresses 'bringing about' (*bhāvanā*) and that substance is understood by implication only and is not the expressed meaning of the verb. This is wrong. It is the root which expresses *bhāvanā*. The suffix denotes the accessory. Thus the former expresses the *sādhya* and the latter the '*sādhana*' and that is how the two are correlated. If '*sādhana*' is understood only by implication, there would be no relation between the two].

Now the definition of quality (*guṇa*), based on indications found in the *śāstra*, is being given.

SECTION 5

ON QUALITY (GUṆA)

1. Whatever rests on something else (*saṃsargi*) differentiates it (*bhedaka*) and is understood in that function (*savyāpāra*), is, being dependent, called 'quality' in the *śāstra.*

[Quality is said to rest on its substratum, because the forms of the two are mixed up, as it were. That is why it distinguishes its substratum from other substrata. The force of the repetition of the relative pronoun (*yad yad*) is that anything, even a universal, can become a quality, if it is understood as something which distinguishes the substratum. This is the implication of the *M.Bhā.* on *Vā* 21 on P. 2.1.1. This definition of *guṇa* follows worldly notions. Vā 5 on P. 5.1.119 also stands for the worldly notion of *guṇa*. That *vārttika* says something about the meaning of the suffixes '*tva*' and '*tal*' when added to stems. If the stem stands for something to be distinguished (*viśeṣya*), these suffixes express the distinguishing quality (*viśeṣana*). When a stem like '*go*' stands for the individual characterised by class or universal, the suffix added to it stands for the class or universal. When the stem stands for the class only, then the suffix stands for the form of the word itself. That the form of the word also is the expressed sense of the word has already been explained. It can also be looked upon as a quality which qualifies the meaning of the stem. It is superimposed on it, it is identified with it. When a stem like '*śukla*' stands for the individual qualified by the quality 'white' the suffix '*tva*' added to it stands for the quality. If the stem stands for the quality the suffix denotes the universal inhering in it. If it stands for the universal, the suffix stands for the form of the word as before. Even when the suffix '*tva*' is applied to a proper name like 'Ḍittha', it denotes the universal, that element which persists in the individual named, through all the changes which he undergoes.

In words like *rājapuruṣatva, pācakatva, aupagavatva,* the suffix denotes relation. The word *rājapuruṣa*' denotes a person qualified by a relation with the king and the suffix denotes that relation. In '*hastitva*' and *kumbhakāratva*' the suffix denotes classes, relation being the basis of the formation of the stem itself. From all this, it is clear that in P. 5.1.119, the word '*bhāva*' stands for something which qualifies something else, due to which a thing appears as what it is (*bhavaty asmāt tenākāreṇa dravyam iti*). This conception of quality (*guṇa*) has been adopted by the Science of Grammar. Sometimes, however, rules have been framed on the basis of other notions of quality. For example, P. 4.1.44. Here the word '*guṇavacana*' means a word expressive of substance to which an attribute is subordinate and the feminine suffix comes after such a word. The word *guṇa*' in this *sūtra* cannot mean what is defined in the present verse because then the feminine suffix would have to be added even to a word expressive of the universal. It stands for the *Vaiśeṣika* notion of *guṇa,* mentioned in the verse "*sattve niviśate*" etc. given in the *M.Bhā.* under P. 4.1.44. This definition would not include the universal. The other verse given in *M.Bhā.* under P. 4.1.44, namely, '*upaity anyaj jahāty anyad*' etc. also gives the *Vaiśeṣika* definition of *guṇa.* According to some, these two verses are not meant to define '*guṇa*' but to say what kind of word '*guṇavacana*' is. *M.Bhā.* on P. 1.4.1. denies the name '*guṇavacana*' to a compound word, a word ending in a primary or secondary suffix, a pronoun, an indeclinable, a proper name and a word expressive of universal. It is a word which denotes a thing qualified by an attribute. After such a word, the suffix '*ṣyañ*' can come according to P. 5.1.124. Thus, this *sūtra* is also based on the *Vaiśeṣika* conception of *guṇa,* though not in a consistent manner.

In P. 5.2.94 and P. 8.1.12, a word which denotes a thing to which a quality is subordinate, is *guṇavacana.* For example, the word '*śukla*' which means not 'white' but 'that which is white'. Or the word '*paṭu*' which does not mean cleverness, but one who is clever. A word which denotes quality only is not '*guṇavacana*'. For example, '*kārṣṇyam*'. In P. 5.2.47 the

word *guṇa* stands for an equal part. The meaning of the word *'guṇa'* in P. 2.2.11 has to be clarified. The *vārttikas'*: *tatsthaiś ca guṇaih* and *'na tu tadviśeṣaṇaih'*, given under P. 2.2.8 must be taken together with P. 2.2.11. In the last *sūtra,* the compounding of a word ending in the genitive case affix with a word expressive of *guṇa* is prohibited. There the word *guṇa* is used in the *Vaiśeṣika* sense. So we cannot have a compound word for *kākasya kārṣṇyam'*. This prohibition is set aside in some cases. Words express *guṇa* in two ways. Sometimes they present it as quite separate from the thing in which it exists as in *candanasya gandhaḥ'*. We cannot say *'candanam gandhaḥ'* because the word *'gandhaḥ'* denotes smell itself and not smell as existing in sandal wood. When we say *'śuklaḥ paṭaḥ'* the word *'śukla'* denotes 'white' as an attribute of cloth. It means something that is white and not whiteness itself. *'Gandhaḥ'* is what is called *'tatstha guṇa'* that is, *guṇa* which is presented as something separate from its substratum. A word ending in the sixth case affix can be compounded with such a word. That is why we can say: *candanagandhaḥ*. A word which presents a quality sometimes as separate and sometimes as one with its substratum cannot be compounded. We can say *'paṭasya śuklaḥ'* and *'suklaḥ paṭah'*. In the former expression 'white' is presented as something separate; in the latter, it is presented as existing in the cloth. Therefore, we cannot have the compound word *paṭaśukla*. So the word *'guṇa'* in P. 2.2.11 means, not a word which means a thing to which a quality is subordinate, but a word which presents a quality as something separate and independent, though elsewhere it might be dependent. In Vā. 1. on P. 2.2.7 and in P. 5.3.58, the word *guṇa* has the *Vaiśeṣika* sense. In P. 6.2.155, it has the meaning given to it in the present verse. From all this it follows that the meaning of the word *guṇa* varies in the *śāstra* and that the meaning given to it in the present verse is the special grammarian's meaning.]

Here certain doubts arise. Why is it that only quality admits of degree and not the thing itself? How is it that when degree is expressed in regard to quality, degree in

regard to the thing is also understood? How can one say that everywhere some quality is present which brings about difference of degree in the thing, considering that qualities cannot have qualities, universals cannot have universals and actions can have no qualities? How can excellence in one thing bring about excellence in something else? An attempt is made in the following verses to remove some of these doubts.

2. Whatever distinguishing quality is adopted to determine a thing which is otherwise indeterminable, any excellence caused by it is expressed (by the suffix).

[A thing cannot be determined except with the help of its quality. If a thing cannot even be determined in its own form, there cannot be any degree in it except through some quality or other. Through it, a thing can be distinguished from other things. Only that quality can distinguish which is actually mentioned, and not those which are understood. There are too many of the latter and one would not know which one to take. Degree comes as a kind of excellence of the meaning of the stem and only that which is expressed can be the meaning of the stem and degree in it is expressed by the suffix. In this verse, the word *guṇa* stands for the notion defined in the previous verse. Even a stick can be a quality, because it can distinguish one with it from one who does not have it.]

It is now stated that just as difference in degree in a thing cannot exist except through a quality, in the same way, when a word presents an attribute as apart from the thing in which it exists, as something independent, difference in degree in it can be expressed only through another quality.

3. Without a distinguishing quality, that which is (presented as) the main thing cannot admit of degree nor come within the range of words.

[That quality through which it comes within the range of words is the very one through which difference of degree is also expressed. The universal becomes the cause of something being expressed by words, but not of difference of degree in it, because it exists everywhere in the same degree. It does not admit of difference in degree. It exists from the very time when a thing comes into existence. So some other quality co-existing in a thing with the universal, becomes the cause of difference of degree in it. Similarly, when a word presents a quality as the main thing, difference in degree in it can be expressed only through another quality, as in *'śuklataram rūpam'* where it is some such quality as 'brightness' (*bhāsuratva*), or purity (*vaimalya*) through which degree is expressed. If brightness is presented as something independent, that is, as a thing, it would require another quality to express degree in it, as in *bhāsuratara*. The idea has already been set forth in Vāk. I.64.]

It is now declared that 'brightness' is actually conveyed by the word *'śukla'*.

4. All the attributes present in the (main) thing do not serve to distinguish it. They are conveyed by special words expressive of some distinguishing mark.

[It cannot be said that 'brightness' through which degree is expressed is not directly conveyed by the word *'śukla'*. The fact is that there is no one word which can express all the distinguishing qualities which exist in a thing. Each word expresses only one of them. Difference of degree can be expressed only through an attribute actually expressed by the word. 'Brightness' is actually expressed by the word *'śukla'*. This word cannot be applied to any object which is not bright. If we say *'śuklatara'*, it is because there is a greater degree of brightness. Therefore, one must assume that 'brightness' is actually conveyed by the word *'śukla'*.]

The very attribute which brings an object within the range of words can also be the cause of the expression of degree.

5. If a special attribute is useful only for making a thing namable, then difference of degree would remain without a cause to make it known, as there would be no restriction (as to which other attribute should do it).

[One cannot argue that, even though a thing may come within the range of words through some attribute, the latter cannot serve to express degree also. If it serves only to bring the object within the range of words, then we would see difference of degree being expressed through some other attribute such as weight. But that is not what happens. We understand difference of degree through the first attribute itself as in *'śuklatara'*. Therefore, we must conclude that the very attribute which gives something a name serves also to express degree in it.]

It is now explained how expressions like *nikṛṣṭataraḥ prakṛṣṭataraḥ'* are possible.

6. Everything can differ in degree from everything else (of the same kind) either on the basis of an attribute of inferiority or of superiority.

[When there is excellence of that which is the cause of something coming within the range of words, there is excellence of the thing itself. When the cause is of an inferior nature, the degree relates to inferiority and when it is of a suerior nature, it relates to sueriority. Thus within the same kind, there can be difference of degree.]

Expressions like *'gotara'* are now being explained.

7. If the object does not require a basis (*nimitta*) for the expression of degree, its mention, when degree is to be expressed, would be useless.

[In the expression *gotara,* difference in degree cannot be due to the universal and there is no word expressive of any

quality. Difference in degree is, however, understood. Why then insist that in '*śuklatara*' it is understood through a quality? The fact is that it cannot be understood from the object itself. And if the attribute also is not the basis of the cognition of degree, there would be no point in mentioning it. But it is actually mentioned in *śuklatara*. The reason is that the attribute is the basis of the difference in degree. In '*śuklatara*', the attribute is brightness. In '*gotara*', it would be some such attribute as superiority in carrying loads or in giving milk.]

8. Therefore, quality, performing its function (*savyāpāra*) and based on its own difference in degree, involves the object (*dravya*) also in such difference and distinguishes it from others.

[The object, in itself, does not admit of any degree. Therefore, quality, by expressing quality within itself, serves to distinguish its substratum from others.]

It is now stated how difference of degree in one thing results in difference of degree in another.

9. Just as the formless object is expressed through the form of another (its quality), in the same way, being itself devoid of difference in degree, it acquires it through such a difference in its quality.

[An object, in isolation from its attributes, cannot come within the range of speech. When qualified by an attribute it can be expressed in words. It is also difficult to distinguish a thing from its attribute. Therefore, excellence of the attribute results in the excellence of the object. It is not confined to its own excellence, isolated from the object, nor to that of the object, isolated from its attribute.]

SECTION 6

ON POSITION (DIRECTION)

1. The words Direction (*dik*), Means (*sādhanam*) Action (*kriyā*) and Time (*Kāla*), (if taken) as expressive of things, would not refer to their nature as powers of things.

[Words like Direction (*Dik*) convey a meaning which is an attribute of things having an independent character. They do not express independent things. The four words Direction, Means, Action and Time stand for power, capacity and not for independent entities. They are dependent on something else. The *Vaiśeṣikas* look upon *Dik* as an independent entity, a *dravya*. That is not right. It is something to be inferred from its effect, from the service which it renders to positive entities. Words which express an accomplished thing cannot convey it directly. Its definition must be made on the basis of indications in the *śāstra* as in P. 5.3.27.]

The definition of Direction (*Dik*), based on inference, is as follows:

2-3. Direction is that power which is the cause of the opposition of the limit (*avadhi*) and the limited (*pratipādya*) of the cognition of straight without the help of anything else, of the manifestation of the minor universals of action and which is divided through its contingents.

[We make statements like this: 'This is to the east of that', 'this is to the west of that'. Here, 'that' is the starting point and 'this' is what is determined by it. One has to explain such expressions. It is the notion of Direction (*dik*) which explains them. Universals etc. which exist in objects cannot explain them. As we have to infer its nature from its effects and as, in linguistic expressions, it always

appears as an attribute of something else and not as something independent, we conclude that it is a power. The same is true of Time and Inherence. When we say 'this bamboo is straight', we are giving expression to a cognition which does not involve the notion of limit (*avadhi*) and limited (*avadhimat*) and does not depend on something else. It is caused by the notion of Direction. The idea of something being bent can also be explained by the same notion only. It is this very notion which manifests universals like *bhramaṇatva*' and '*utkṣepaṇatva*' which exist in particular actions like 'turning' and 'raising'. This Direction is one, but due to particular associations it is looked upon as ten in number. That particular region which is in contact with the sun daily at the beginning of the day is called the East. The West, the North and the South are similarly named. The intermediate regions are called by their respective names because of the association of the Sun with the regions looked after by the Guardians. A particular association with the Sun is the auxiliary cause which brings about the apparent division of what is One.]

4. The notion of 'first' and 'next' in regard to concrete limited objects is based on regional distinction. The notion of earlier and later, consisting of sequence, arises on account of time.

[Form (*mūrti*) means measurement of things which are limited in extent. Things having form are here referred to as concrete and limited (*mūrta*). The all-pervasive entities such as space (*ākāśa*) has no prior-posterior distinction. It is about limited objects that we use such expression as 'first' and 'next' on the basis of their contact with the first or the next region. Priority or posteriority of a region is based on Direction. The notion of 'earlier' and 'later' amounts to sequence which is an effect of the Time-Power of *Brahman*. Thus Direction and Time are two distinct things.]

It is now pointed out that immaterial things can also have artificial distinctions of priority and posteriority.

5. Direction becomes the basis (*upādhi*) for the contacts and separations of Space with its divisions and of parts of other objects with them.

[Even all-pervasive entities can have artificial divisions such as 'first' and 'next' or 'farther' and 'nearer'. It has already been pointed out that space can have artificial divisions on the basis of objects which are in contact with it. This contact takes place in a particular region (*deśa*). That region is an artificial division of space. There is contact between such regions and parts of the objects which are on them. These objects are also described as 'first' or 'next' and 'farther' or 'nearer' on the basis of such a description of the divisions of space. Direction becomes the basis for the contact between objects.]

Remarks. The words *Ākāśa, Dik* and *Deśa* occur in the *Vākyapadīya.* It is, therefore, necessary to try to understand the three notions for which they stand. In *Vaiśeṣika, Ākāśa* and *Dik* come under the category of Substance. The former is defined as that Substance which is the substratum of the quality called sound. It is an all-pervading substance and is the medium for the propagation of sound. It is usually translated as 'ether'. It fills the whole of Space and is, therefore, different from it. In the *Upaniṣads,* however, *Ākāśa* often means Space itself and not a substance which fills space. In the *Vākyapadīya Ākāśa* is looked upon as One without any real division of its own. In this sense, it is equal to space. That is why it is in contact with all the objects of the world to which it provides room or accommodation. Helārāja actually says that *ākāśa* is so called because it provides room (*avakāśa*) to everything: *avakāśadānāddhi tadākāśam.* (Vāk. III. Jā. 15). Even though One, it can be looked upon as many in terms of the various objects of the world which occupy space. The space occupied by each object is a part or a portion of the one Space. Each of these parts or portions is a region (*deśa*) within Space. Moreover, these regions have a position in the scheme of things. We can say of a particular region that it is to the right of an object or to the

left of it. There is something which is the cause of such notions as right and left and that is called *Dik* (Direction). According to the *Vākyapadīya,* it is not a separate entity. It is only a power or capacity of what is real. To say, therefore, that *Bhartṛhari* does not make any distinction between *Ākāśa* and *Dik* would not be correct. *Ākāśa* is Space and *Dik* is position or Direction. In this translation, I have used the word Direction for *Dīk.*

6. Regions are regulated through Direction and nothing regulates 'Direction. Powers of objects are postulated on the basis of the service which they render.

[The nature of a region is to be the substratum of things. Whatever distinction of priority or posteriority there is among regions cannot arise out of their own nature. That depends upon some other factor and that is called *Dik.* Thus, we postulate the existence of *Dik* because of the service which it renders. Being a power it rests on something else (*paratantra*). That being so, there cannot be another power to regulate it. If another power is postulated, Direction (*Dik*) would cease to be 'power', because it would become *'saktimat',* the one having power. The quality of being prior, posterior etc. is inherent in *Dik.* Contact with the Sun only manifests it.]

7. What is called the East is something imposed on objects. That due to which the notion of priority arises is Direction. Otherwise, it would be a mere name.

[What is called East is an attribute imposed on objects. It is because of Direction that things are talked of as being in the cast or as being 'prior'. If it is not so regarded, it would be a mere name, there being no independent entity like that. So it should be looked upon as a power, postulated on the basis of its effects.]

It is now shown that expressions like prior and posterior cannot be based on one's own body.

8. The Directions would not be fixed if they were based on one's body. What is behind when one faces west would be in front when one faces the other way.

[It has been said so far that *Dik* has to be postulated in order to explain the notions of the prior, posterior, etc. But cannot they be explained in relation to one's own body? What is in front of one's body would be 'prior' (*pūrva*) and what is behind would be posterior (*paścāt*). We also use such expressions as *hastadakṣiṇa* and *hastavāma* (*M. Bhā.* I. p. 118, l. 23.) to designate what is on our right or on our left, showing that our own body can be the basis of the expression. This view is not correct, because there would be no fixity in our notions of *pūrva, para* etc., because one would be constantly changing the position which one faces. Therefore, it is better to accept the view that notions of priority and posteriority are based on *Dik* which has come down from time immemorial.]

9. The determination of the regions is not based on the notion of Directions (*dikṣu*). One does refer to as '*pūrva*' what has been long known as *apara*.

[It has been stated that the notions of East, West etc. are based on *Dik* (Direction). Here a difficulty arises. Sometimes we apply the term '*pūrva*' to what from the point of view of *Dik*, is '*pāścātya*'. When we face west, the region in front of us is in the west but we use the expression '*pūrva*' for it. When one goes from the South (*Dakṣiṇāpatha*) to the Eastern country, one is said to go to '*pūrva*', but he is really going north (*uttara*). Thus, it is clear that we sometimes use the expressions *pūrva, para* etc. without meaning *Dik* by them. In other words, the notions of '*pūrva*' (in front) and *paścāt* (behind) are not based on *Dik*. The remark of the M. Bhā. on '*pūrvasmin deśe vasati*' confirms this. The M. Bhā. is trying to explain why the suffix '*astāti*' cannot come after

the word *'pūrva'* in *'purvasmin deśe vasati'*. The reason is that the suffix in question is taught after words like *pūrva* when they directly express *deśa* (region) whereas, in the expression in question, the word *'pūrva'* is only an adjective qualifying the word *'deśa'* which is the word expressive of region. The word *'pūrva'* is not a *'dikśabda'* expressive of *'deśa'* as required by the *sūtra* P. 5.3.27. Those who maintain that the word here specifies the particular direction (*digviśeṣāvaccheda*) where the region is, are wrong. The conclusion is that in applying the words *pūrva* etc. to *Dik*, there is no *upādhi* or underlying notion, because they are *rūḍhi* words, that is, words based on immemorial usage. In applying the words to *deśa* (regions), *dik* (direction) is the underlying notion.]

It is now shown that this conclusion is supported by the *M. Bhā.*

10. It is because the words (*dakṣiṇa* and *uttara*) have not the same meaning when they are in the masculine gender that they cannot take the masculine form (*puṃvadbhāva*). In this sense (of *dik*), the masculine gender (*prasavaḥ*) is never expressed by the words.

[That is why there cannot be assumption of the masculine form by the words *dakṣiṇā* and *uttarā* when the suffix *'atasuc'* (P. 5.3.28) is added to them. These two words have a masculine form also, but with a difference in meaning. When they are masculine, they express *'vyavasthā'* and not *dik*. Unless the meaning is absolutely the same whether the word be masculine or feminine, there cannot be assumption of the masculine form (*puṃvadbhāva*). If it is held that even when these words express Direction (*dik*), the idea of *vyavasthā* (limit, mutual requirement, starting-point) is present, there would still be difference between *'diksabda'* and *deśasabda*.]

11. Words like *pūrva* are invariably used in the sense of Direction (*Dik*). It is like the word *ṣaṣṭi* (in

the word *ṣāṣṭika*) which denotes time when duration of life is measured.

[The words East (Pūrva), etc., are applied to the direction (*Dik*) irrespective of any other implication. But when they are applied to the Regions or to the divisions of Time, they are based on '*vyavasthā*' (mutual requirement). When applied to Directions, these words are really proper names. The notion of limit or mutual requirement may be there in a completely hidden form. In the expression '*pūrvo ghaṭaḥ*' the word '*ghaṭa*', conveys its own meaning and the word '*pūrva*' provokes the question: in relation to what? Thus there is a clear difference between *pūrva*, etc. as applied to Direction and as applied to the Regions and the Divisions of Time. Because of resemblance, they appear to be the same. But they cannot be the same. What is based on mere immemorial usage cannot be the same as something based on a cause. In the case of Regions and Time, the words only look like *dikśabda* but are really not so. Such words are used in a fixed meaning. It is like the word *ṣaṣṭi* in *ṣāṣṭika*. Though a numeral, it denotes time here without the help of any other word, by mere usage. Similarly, *pūrva*, etc., denote Directions (*Dik*) by long usage, even though they may denote *vyavasthā* elsewhere. That is why they are not '*bhāṣitapuṃska*'.]

12. (It is on account of Direction that) division based on light and shade is possible in mountains etc. Such a division is not possible in things which do not have that attribute.

[Another effect of what is called *Dik* is that things like mountains seem to be illuminated by the light of the sun on one side and to be covered with darkness on another. Without *Dik*, this division of parts would not be possible. It serves as an indication for the inference of *Dik*.]

13. It is through *Dik* that division is made in the indivisible atom. That indeed has been declared to be the first power for effecting all division.

[Division of parts in limited material objects is due to Direction (*Dik*). Even in atoms which are supposed to be indivisible, one can imagine four sides, a top and a bottom on the basis of *Dik.* Other atoms can come into contact with these six parts and produce such things as binaries, etc. It is because of this division into parts from the very beginning. that it continues in all the later products. So division of all material objects into parts in the first service which *Dik* renders. Some explain this and the previous verse as follows :— "In all divisible objects, division into parts is due to light and shade. In all indivisible objects like the atom, division is imaginary and it is brought about by *Dik.*" What they mean is this: Where there is some basis for the division of parts such as light and shade as in the case of divisible objects, that is the basis of the division. Where there is none as in the case of indivisible objects like atoms, there it is *Dik* which is the cause of such division. But all this is wrong. It is due to *Dik* that division in any object is possible, not merely in the indivisible atom.]

14. Objects are (in themselves) without regions, divisions, sequence and contingencies. Variation in their power takes place because of difference in their associations.

[Why not assume that things have a special disposition of parts in their own nature? Why bring in *Dik* to explain this ? The answer is: Things like *ākāśa* which are all-pervasive have no divisions at all. Material wholes have no divisions which are part of their own nature. In both cases, parts are artificially made. If they have no parts, there cannot be any question of sequence of these parts. Because of difference in their associations, they seem to have varia-

tion of power and so appear to have divisions and sequence. In the same way, when divisions in them are brought about by *Dik,* we describe them as prior and posterior.]

It is now explained how visible material wholes are really partless.

15. Indivisibility is the same in an atom and in a jar. What is called their division is only a power and so is their dimension.

[One might here ask: 'One does see objects like jars, associated with different regions, having visible parts and magnitude. How can they be looked upon as indivisible? The answer is this: A jar and an atom are alike in that neither has any parts in its own nature. Divisions having sequence are imagined in them on the basis of the power called *Dik*. These parts are not different from the wholes. Because of the relation of inherence (*samavāya*)) between the whole and the parts, they do not appear to be different from one another. If objects had parts in their own nature their unity would be destroyed. Division based on association with an external thing is not real division. Otherwise, even the atom would become divisible. Nor can one say that division is real because it is caused by dimension. Dimension is a power and it is the cause of the cognition of the 'smallness' or 'bigness' of things.]

16. That by which a division is made is also susceptible of division. And a division which has no end has been said to be improper.

Remark. The last *pāda* of this verse, printed *'ato yuktataraṃ viduḥ'* should really read as *'ato' yuktataram viduḥ*. There is elision of the initial 'a' of *'ayuktataram'*.

[No division artificially made through an external factor is part of the nature of a thing. An artificially made part

can also be artificially divided into further parts, until one reaches the atom. Even there, one can imagine parts on the basis of *Dik*. Unless *Dik* itself has parts, it cannot cause parts in other things. Divisions in *Dik* are based on association with the Sun. Association with the Sun is based on differences in the regions of Mount *Meru* and that also on something else. There would be no end to this process. Division which does not come to an end is unacceptable. Thus things are indivisible in themselves and they are divided on the basis of limiting external factors. All divisions have, therefore, only a relative reality.]

17. Because its effects can be seen everywhere, it is said to be all–pervasive. Its all–pervasiveness consists just in this. It is otherwise with corporeal things.

[The effects of *Dik*, previously explained are found everywhere. That is why it is said to be all-pervasive. The all pervasiveness of immaterial things consists just in their producing effects everywhere, whereas that of material corporeal things consists in their occupying extensive space with their parts.]

18. The assumption of the existence of Direction (*Dik*) and Time (*Kāla*) is as established as that of Consciousness. Who indeed would order otherwise that which is the very nature of living beings?

[Even a thing which exists is as good as non-existent if it is not cognised, because it cannot fulfil any purpose. Consciousness is, therefore, accepted by all disputants. The self is of the nature of consciousness. Similarly, Direction and Time are based on our cognitions. As explained before, things have neither difference nor identity, neither existence nor non-existence. They appear in many colours on account of beginningless *avidyā*. All experiences take place in time and direction. Otherwise they would not lead to any pur-

poseful activity. It is the nature of beings (*prakṛtiṃ prāṇinām*) to have experiences in *dik* and *kāla*.]

19. There would be confusion of activities if this nature were not accepted. Therefore, even while abandoning these things, one has again recourse to them.

[If this conception of *Dik* and *Kāla* is not accepted, if this assumption of *Dik* and *Kāla* which has become our nature is abandoned, there would be confusion in regard to the observance of Vedic injunctions. Even though the Universe is without sequence spatially and temporally, still even one who knows the truth must act on the basis of the assumption of *Dik* and *Kāla*. Even he can cognise things only as having sequence.]

It is now stated that *Dik* performs a function parallel to that of *Kālā*.

20. From that Power, distinctions such as East etc. arise on the basis of association with other things. Thus differentiated, *Dik* brings about differentiation in the cognition of things.

[Just as Time, the power of *Brahman*, exercising the functions of permission and prevention, brings about temporal sequence, in the same way *Dik* is also the cause of the notion of spatial sequence among objects, due to association with other things. By 'other things', contacts with the sun are meant. *Dik* brings about cognitions of objects as qualified by itself. It is then that *Dik* which is One, appears to be many.]

The result of the notion of *Dik* in grammar is now set forth.

21. When the idea of limit (starting point) is to be expressed it is the ablative of position which is used. When some other idea (as that of part and whole) is to be expressed, it is the genitive case which is seen as in: 'the upper part of this' (*pūrvam asya*).

[Certain operations in grammar are based on the notion of *Dik*. In the world, there is the idea of limit: 'this is on the east of that' and so on. There one uses the ablative case. Where some other idea such as that of part and whole is to be expressed, the genitive case is used according to P. 2.2.1.]

It is now explained why the notion of prior and posterior is not based on one's own body.

22. Where there is no confusion in regard to the limit, there cannot be any mistake in the use of the expressions prior (or east) etc. Nor does an indication like the expression 'this is straight' become false.

[Where there is fixity in regard to the starting point, there is no confusion in the meaning of words like prior, eastern etc. Notions of prior etc. if based on *Dik* (Direction) are fixed. What is prior to (to the east of) something cannot be posterior to (or to the west of) the same thing. Also, such an expression as 'the base of this bamboo is straight' is a clear indication of the notion of *Dik* and is not liable to confusion. It does not depend on any notion of starting-point. If it did, there might be occasion for confusion. If one has to have a starting point, it is better to take contacts of the Sun as such.]

It is now stated that *Dik* is something internal.

23. It is an internal function (*dharma*) which appears to be external. Or rather, according to this mode of thought, there is neither internal nor external.

[According to those who hold that it is an internal function, the universe is manifested within the consciousness itself, though on account of an eternal metaphysical limitation, it appears to be external to it. *Dik* is in the same position. It is something which exists within. There is nothing corresponding to it outside. In fact, notions of internal and external are relative. In reality, there is neither the one nor the other. Notions such as prior and posterior proceed from *avidyā*. There is no such thing as *Dik* as an external entity.]

It is now stated that it is really useless to discuss whether *Dik* is one or many.

24. Knowing that the notion of unity and plurality in regard to these powers are speculative and have no relation to the thing itself, one must not take them to be real.

[The powers of *Dik* are primarily one but appear to be many due to association. Or they are primarily many, being eternal and inferred from their many effects. Both these views are only speculations and have no relation to the thing itself. One must not take them to be real.]

25. In regard to objects whose reality is beyond speculations, the world follows the usages based upon conventions.

[Things in the world are quite different from what the different thinkers (*tīrthika*) speculate them to be. They obviously cannot have the contradictory characteristics which thinkers attribute to them. Therefore, one has to follow the usages based on convention. Even thinkers have to do it. This applies to the ten Directions (*Dik*) current in the world.]

26. There is no unity and no multiplicity and without unity there cannot be multiplicity. In reality, there is no difference between the two.

[If things are mutually dependent, the disproving of one would disprove the other. Thus neither multiplicity nor unity of *Dik* would stand examination. Worldly usage is based upon what appears to the mind. In reality, both multiplicity and unity are unreal.]

It is now stated that unity and multiplicity cannot be predicated of Power.

27. There is not the same difference between the powers as between objects having power. Nor is there any worldly unity in their nature.

[Objects having power can be cognised as something distinct. But powers which can only appear as resting and dependent upon their substrata, do not appear as distinct from one another, nor from their substrata. Powers are really indefinable.]

28. Unity cannot be explained if multiplicity is not conceived nor would multiplicity stand if unity is not conceived.

[If plurality is not conceived, there would be no unity. If unity is not conceived, there would be no plurality. They are mutually dependent. The best thing then is to accept the worldly notion of *Dik*.]

SECTION 7

ON THE MEANS (*SĀDHANA*)

1. What is called 'Means' is the Power of a thing to accomplish actions, inherent in its own Substratum or in other substrata.

[The power of a substance to bring about an action is what is called 'means' by the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* and others. In the *M. Bhā* on P. 3.2.115, it has been declared that what is called *sādhana* is a *guṇa*. It is power which is called *guṇa*, here, because it helps to distinguish a thing from other things (*bhedaka*). A power is dependent upon what has power and it also helps to distinguish its substratum from other things. So it is a *guṇa* as defined here in the *guṇa-samuddeśa*, verse 1. There is a *M. Bhā* passage in the context where a distinction is sought to be made between *bhāva* as conveyed by a primary suffix (*kṛt*) and *bhāva* as conveyed by a verbal suffix (*tiṅ*). It runs as follows: "*dravyam kriyābhinirvṛttim prati sādhanabhāvam upaiti*" (M. Bhā. II, p. 57, l. 9) = 'Substance (*dravya*) becomes the means of the accomplishment of action'. There is no contradiction between this statement and the present verse which declares 'power' to be the means. What is meant in the *M.Bhā.* passage is that substance is the means inasmuch as it is the substratum of power. A substance or a thing having power is the means. A power must always have a substratum. The same interpretation must be given to the *M. Bhā.* passage on P. 3.2.115 *M. Bhā* I, p. 120. 1.11:—*yadi guṇasamudāyah sādhanam sādhanam apy anumānagamyam. atha anyad guṇebhyaḥ sādhanam bhavati pratyakṣa-paroksatāyāḥ saṃbhavaḥ* = 'If what is called means is a collection of qualities (powers) then its existence is to be inferred. If it is something else, one can discuss whether it is *pratyakṣa* or *parokṣa*. What is called 'power' is invisible. In the *M. Bhā*. on P. 5.1.118 (*upasargāc chandasi dhātvarthe*) *dhātvartha*' is explained as 'means'

(*sādhana*) or substance qualified by power (*śaktiviśiṣṭam dravyam*). When the *M.Bhā.* on P. 5.3.55 (*Atiśāyane tamab iṣṭhanau*) says:—'*sādhanam vai dravyam, na dravyasya prakarṣāpakarṣau staḥ*' = 'it is substance which is the means and there cannot be greater or lesser degree in substance', it is because power and what has power are taken as one. A given action inheres in the agent or the object. They are both 'means' (*kāraka*). Instrument (*karaṇa*) is a means of an action which does not inhere in itself, but in the agent or the object.]

How we know that power is the means and not substance is now stated.

2. Since the universe which is a bundle of powers is always there in all its aspects, some power or other is intended to be conveyed in a particular context.

[Objects like a jar are bundles of powers to perform such actions as holding water. These powers are parts (*mātrā, bhāga*) as it were, of the objects. They are of many kinds. Some arise spontaneously, like the power of light or of knowledge to illuminate and they disappear when their substrata disappear. Some are of human origin and disappear even when the substratum continues to exist. For example, physical strength which can increase through exercise and nourishing food. Some are checked by the efforts of others, even when the substratum exists. For example, the power of poison to kill or the power of seed to produce the sprout. Some are changed by persons having great personal gifts. A yogi can, for instance, change the form of anything and everything. Some are manifested by the passage of time, like *dharma* and *adharma*. Thus, powers being many, one can explain the variety which one sees in the effects. If the thing itself, apart from its power, is the means, one cannot explain the diversity of effects, because a thing is one and simple. That is why a thing is said to be a bundle of powers. The

main action cannot be brought about individually by any one power. That is why the word *samudāya* has been used in the *M. Bhā.* A subordinate action can be accomplished by some one power individually. If the thing, apart from its power were the means, it could not become, now agent (*kartā*), now instrument (*karaṇa*), now starting point (*apādāna*) and so on, because it is, in itself, uniform in nature.]

3. Speaking of something as the Means is a matter of the speaker's intention. Difference in things, whether real or unreal, is conceived by the intelligence.

[Here a question arises: If a thing has powers, it is natural that one or more of them should become the means; but if it has not got any, how can it become the means? In such sentences as *śaktiṃ ādadhāti, śaktyā sādhayati*, etc., *śakti*=power has become a means, even though *śakti* cannot have *śakti*. Similarly, in '*dhanavināśaṃ karoti*' *dhanābhāvo na yuktaḥ* destruction or non-existence has become a means, even though, being nothing, it cannot have power. This doubt is answered as follows: The use of words depends more on the speaker's intention than on outside reality. Words follow cognition. A thing may actually exist, but if it is not cognised, it does not become the object of verbal knowledge. Similarly, even what does not exist may become the object of verbal usage, provided it has become the object of cognition and the speaker's intention. When power which is ordinarily a property of things in itself thought of as a thing, there is no contradiction in thinking of it as having power. Similarly, we can think of non-existence as a thing (*dravya*), in which case it can also have power. Everything is a matter of the speaker's intention and cognition. That is why expressions such as '*hanty ātmānamātmanā*' in which one and the same thing is agent and instrument are possible. Ordinarily one thinks of a cooking pot (*sthālī*) as a vessel in which to cook something, as a receptacle (*adhikaraṇa*). But when it is made of thin material and so what is

put in it cooks quickly, one may want to emphasize that point and speak of the pot itself as the agent of cooking: *sthālī pacati.* Here through the speaker's intention what is ordinarily a receptacle has become an agent. Similarly, if we want to emphasize that it is more through the quality of the pot than through fuel 'that the cooking has been done quickly, we could say '*sthālyā pacati*' in which case the pot has become an instrument. Similarly, when we say: *ātmanaḥ svātmany avasthānam,* one and the same thing is presented as the agent and the abode (*adhikaraṇa*) when one wants to emphasize that nothing else can be the agent or the abode. Even though a stone statue is no more than a body and is not different from it, we talk as if they were different from each other when we say: *śilāputrakasya śarīram.* Thus the position is this: when grammar explains the formation of words abstracted from the sentence, when no other word of the sentence has been uttered and one is not conscious of the particularity which one may be intending to convey, it is possible to have a mode of formation which does not consider the sentence, but takes into account only the individual word. Word formation taking into account only the individual word is recognised in the *śāstra.* This does not mean that a word can have any form. It can only have a form abstracted from a real sentence. Grammar is not called upon to explain the formation of a form abstracted from something which is not a real sentence at all like the following: *sthālīm odanena kāṣṭhe pacati.* Such strings of words are not sentences at all.]

That the 'means' is something essentially mental is now confirmed.

4. When the speaker first unites the Pāñcālas and Kurus mentally and then divides them, we understand what separation is.

[It is because everything is a matter of cognition and intention that separation can be purely mental. Separation is taking apart preceded by joining (*saṁśleṣapūrvako viśleṣaḥ*).

In *Kurubhyaḥ pāñcālā abhirūpatarāḥ*', there is, first of all, a bringing together (*saṃśleṣa*) of *Kurus* and *Pāñcālās* mentally on the basis of their resemblance in good looks and then their separation (*viśleṣa*) on account of the superiority of one over the other. The whole thing is mental. Even what is purely mental is quite enough to explain verbal usage. In the section dealing with the cases (*kāraka*), maximum degree is not ordinarily very important, because where it is important, Pāṇini tells us so in some way, as by the use of the suffix '*tamap*' in the *sūtra*: *sādhakatamamaṃ karaṇam* (P. 1.4.42)]

Another confirmation of the *M. Bhā.* view follows.

5. One considers Kaṃsa and others whose form is presented to us by words and who become the object of our mental perception to be the means (of the accomplishment of the action) as though they mere present before the eyes.

[Another proof that everything in language is a matter of cognition and intention is that the *Vārttikas* on the *sūtra* '*Hetumati ca*' (P. 3.1.26), namely, '*Dṛśyarthāyāṃ ca pravṛttau*' (Vā. 8) *Āṅlopaśca kālātyantasaṃyoge maryādāyām* (Vā. 9), '*Citrīkaraṇe prāpi*' (Vā. 10) '*Nakṣatrayoge jñi*' (Vā. 11) have been declared to be unnecessary by the *M. Bhā.* The cases which are meant to be explained by these *vārttikas* can be explained by the *sūtra* itself. When story-tellers tell an old story, they sometimes use the present tense: *Kaṃsaṃ ghātayati, baliṃ bandhayati.* That is because the whole story is present in the mind of the tellers at the time of telling and it is evoked in the mind of the hearers also. What figures in the mind is the meaning of words and not outside reality. Thus the story-tellers cause the mental Vāsudeva to kill the mental Kaṃsa. In the section dealing with cases (*kāraka*), maximum degree is not important. The name of a particular *kāraka* can be applied to something which is really so as well as to something which is not fully so, that is, something which only figures in the mind as such.]

6. Thus speakers impose on objects a form which is the creation of their own mind and thus difference of powers is brought about.

[One and the same thing can figure in the mind as having many powers. When outside reality and what figures in the mind appear as one, a variety of powers figuring in the mind appears to be eternal. What appears to have many powers also appears to be different means (*sādhana*).]

Another advantage in looking upon 'means' as a matter of the speaker's intention is now stated.

7. According to the view that the meaning of the word is the particular, the character of being the means of sounds and the like yet to be produced becomes possible on the basis of the idea thereof.

[In the sentence '*ghaṭam karoti*', '*ghaṭa*' is a 'means' in the process of making it. But how can it be so considering that it is not there yet? It was said in the *jātisamuddeśa*, 27, that the *jāti* aspect in the 'means' (*sādhana*) and the '*vyakti*' aspect of it is the object to be brought about (*nirvartya karma*). But the expression can be explained from the point of view of the *vyaktivāda* also, the view that the meaning of a word is the particular. The particular *ghaṭa* can come into existence only after it is made. How then can it be a 'means' in the process of its being made? The answer is that the idea of the *ghaṭa* to be made is already in the mind of the maker and that is the 'means' (*sādhana*). The *ghaṭa* which is actually made becomes the object accomplished (*nirvartya karma*).]

8. It has been shown that independence and dependence and sequence of objects which are devoid of all movement are based on mental construction (*kalpanopanibandhanam*).

[It is not only the object (*karma*) called *nirvartya* (to be made, brought about) which thus becomes the 'means' by figuring in the mind of the person who is going to make it. The *vikārya* (to be modified) and *prāpya* (to be reached) kinds of objects (*karma*) are also in the same position. The causal relation has previously been shown to be a mere mental construct. All things in the world are devoid of motion or activity. Certain things appear to be intimately connected with the action and others seem to be remotely so. Some appear to be agents (*kartā*) and others present themselves as objects (*karma*). All this is really illusion. The whole of what is called '*kiryākārakabhāva*' is really an illusion. For Advaita, all except the ultimate Reality is an illusion. All verbal usage is based on '*vikalpa*' which is only a mental construct. What was said earlier about *Dik* applies to *sādhana* also. It is a wonderful thing only as long as we do not reflect upon it.]

Thus the idea of '*sādhana*' as a power distinct from the thing in which it resides has been explained. Now it is going to be explained as a power not distinct from the thing itself.

9. According to the *Saṃsargavādins*, all objects are powers and things having powers. The fact of their being the means is not conveyed by their own words.

Remark. The meaning of "*teṣv asvaśabdeṣu sādhanatvam nirūpyate*" is not clear. The translation is tentative.

[The Vaisesikas maintain that due to the relation called 'inherence' (*samavāya*) things which are different from each other appear to be the same. For example, the whole and its parts. That is why they are called '*samsargavādinaḥ*'. They believe that things produce their effects through their own name helped by auxiliary factors. The thing itself would be the cause and the auxiliary factors their power in producing the effect. Or the thing itself may be looked upon as the power of the auxiliary factors in producing their effects.

What it all amounts to is that things themselves are powers of one another. There is no such thing as Power, apart from the things themselves, as the *Mīmāṃsakas* believe. This character of things, namely, that they can be powers of one another, cannot be conveyed by words like '*apādana*'. That can be conveyed only by the case-endings. In the sentence '*ghaṭam paśyati*', the second case-ending conveys the power of the jar, co-existent in it with bigness. It is then that *ghaṭa* becomes the means (*sādhana*). When a thing is conceived as helping something else, it is a power (*śakti*). When it is conceived as being helped by something else, it is *śaktimat*. And this *śakti* is not over and above the thing of which it is the *śakti*.]

10. It is magnitude etc. which are the means whereby a jar becomes the object of vision and it is the quality of being colour and the like which are the means whereby colour becomes the object of vision.

[In the expression '*ghaṭam paśyati*' = 'he sees the jar', *ghaṭa* has become the object of the action of seeing. The qualities of being 'big' and of being made up of compound things which inhere in the jar are the means whereby the jar has become the object of the action of seeing. Kaṇāda has said; "Things having magnitude are perceived because they are made up of compound things and have colour." (*Vai. Sū.* 4.1.6). A binary (*dvyaṇuka*) is called a compound because it is made up of more than one thing and a tertiary and other things are said to be made up of compounds. The atom (*paramāṇu*) has colour, but it cannot be perceived because it is not made up of more than one thing. A binary is not perceptible because it is not made up of compounds. What is said of the atom is applicable to other imperceptible things also. The fact of having colour is a second cause. Air has magnitude, is made up of compounds, but is not perceptible because it has no colour. Though magnitude is not a cause of perceptibility, it is connected with it, because what is perceptible has magnitude. That is why we have the plural

number in *'mahattvādīni'* occurring in the verse. Or it may be because the author wants to include such universals as dravyatva among the causes of perceptibility. Universals are causes of perceptibility because it is because of them that we perceive things as different from other things. That the fact of being made up of compound things is a cause of perceptibility implies that a thing must be a whole having parts before it can be perceived. The quality of being colour (*rūpatva*) is a means of perceiving colour, Colour is perceptible because it inheres in an object which is a whole having parts and also because it is in a manifested state. The colour of the ocular ray is not perceptible because it is not in a manifested state. The colour of the atom is not perceptible because it does not inhere in a whole having part.]

11. Taste etc. have powers in the form of their own universals by means of which alone they are perceived. These powers are similarly perceived through their substrata.

[It is not only in the case of colour that its universal (*rūpatva*) is a cause of perception. That is true of other qualities also. In the cognition of taste, the quality of being taste is a means. So is the case with smell. In fact, they can be cognised only in that way. Substance, on the other hand, can be cognised through other factors also. It can be cognised through its universal, its quality or its action. Universals, on the other hand, depend upon their substrata for their cognition. When the universal *'rasatva'* is cognised, the *rasa* in which it inheres is the means or power by which it is cognised. So is the substance in which the *rasa* is found one of the factors or the means by which *rasatva* is cognised. What it all amounts to is that things are powers to one another, powers which help the thing having the power to produce its effect. Therefore, the power of a thing is not something fixed.]

12. The contact between the sense. the object, the mind and the agent sometimes constitutes the means, i.e. the power. Whatever helps anything at any time is its means or power for that time.

[Objects like colour are perceived because of contact between the soul, the mind, the senses and the object and this contact thus becomes the means or the power by which the perception takes place. Whatever helps something else in producing its effect becomes its power or its means. Thus all things are power to one another. In short, power may be defined as: *paropakāri paratantraṃ sarvaṃ śaktilakṣaṇam*= Anything that helps another and is subordinate to it is its power.]

It is now stated that it is the case-ending which expresses this power.

13. When its own words are used, that attribute is not expressed. It is through the case-endings etc. that this service is conveyed.

[Words like do-er (*kāraka*), means (*sādhana*), starting point (*apādāna*) denote primarily things which help in the accomplishment of the action. They do not express the power of those things to help. That is done by the case- endings. Sometimes also by the secondary nominal affixes as in *śatena krītaḥ śatyaḥ*. In *yatra* and *tatra*, it is the suffix *tral* which expresses it. In *antarā māṃ ca tvāṃ ca kamaṇḍaluḥ*, the indeclinable '*antarā*' expresses location.]

14. It is for the sake of rendering help (to the action) that finished objects are looked upon as cause (*nimitta*). It is an inclination to render service (*nati*) or self-surrender. Thus what is a finished thing (*siddha*) becomes the means (*sādhana*).

[Actions are yet to be accomplished and things which are already there help in their accomplishment. Anything which is already accomplished and is inclined to help in an action becomes means (*sādhana*).]

It is now stated that grammar is indifferent on the question whether a power is different from the object of the same.

15. Others consider this causal power to be either different from the objects or to be identical with them. (Here), on the basis of difference, it is considered to be the means.

[Some think that the powers of objects to accomplish actions to be different from the objects themselves and to be invisible. Others on the other hand, do not believe it, but consider that things themselves, helped by the accessories, produce their effects. To Grammarians, it is immaterial whether power (*śakti*) is considered to be different from or identical with objects. They are only concerned with how words present the matter and they see that words present things and their powers as distinct. In other words, they are not expressed by the same elements in the word or the sentence. The stem expresses the thing and the suffix expresses the power: *tathā ca prātipadikena dravye 'bhihite śaktau kṛtapadabandhā vibhaktiḥ pravartate.*]

The view of the Bhāṣyakāra that action can also become the means in the accomplishment of other actions is now explained.

16-17. Seeing leads to desire, the latter to decision and decision to effort.

That which was action before becomes the means in the next stage. As far as seeing is concerned, it is the self which must be considered to be the special means.

[It has been said that whatever helps another is its means or power. It is not merely things which can be means or power for the accomplishment of actions. Action itself can be so. It has been said in the *M. Bhā.* that, not only that for which the object (*Karma*) is destined is the recipient (*sampradāna*) but also that for which action is desined as in *patye śete*'. Somebody sees a thing, then desires it, decides on a course of action, then acts, completes his action and attains the object. Each previous act becomes the means for the accomplishment of the succeeding one. The agent attains each succeeding act by his previous act. By seeing (*saṃdarśana*) he attains desiring; by desiring (*prārthanā*) he attains decision (*vyavasāya*) and so on. Thus each later stage comes under the definition of '*karma*'. That is what the *M. Bhā.* means by saying: *kriyāpi kṛtrimam karma* (*M. Bhā.* I. p. 330. l.21). Seeing well or seeing all round is what is meant by *saṃdarśana.* It is a kind of contemplation of the ultimate fruit. It becomes the means for the accomplishment of *prārthanā,* desire relating to the means of obtaining the fruit. Desire does arise when the object is seen. The next stage is the decision that a particular action will lead to the attainment of the fruit. It is the previous act of desiring which leds to this. Desire leads to decision and the latter to activity, because it is due to decision that one begins purposeful activity. That which was action in the previous stage becomes the means (*sādhana*) in the next stage. As far as the action of seeing itself is concerned, it is the self who experiences the objects that is the *sādhana,* the self that is capable of desiring the fruit. Even though action is a process and not an accomplished thing, yet it becomes a thing as soon as it is completed and so it can be a *sādhana*].

It is now stated that the word do-er (*kāraka*) has been applied to the agent (*kartā*) etc. in accordance with the true meaning of the root in that word.

18. The quality of merely bringing about exists in all the accessories: It is when the particular function of

each is desired to be known that the quality of being instrument etc. is recognised.

[All actions are brought about by a set of accessories. All of them thus become agents. If one wants to know how each one becomes the agent, it is like this: Each of them performs a particular function in regard to the main action and thus acquires a special name such as instrument (*karaṇa*). That which sets the other accessories in motion is the real Agent (*kartā*). That which the Agent seeks to reach by his action, to make, to mar or to modify, is called the object (*karma*) and so on. All these functions having a special name come under the general heading of do-er (*kāraka*). The word *kāraka* and the special names can be used in apposition to each other for this reason. Nothing which is not already a *kāraka* can get one of the special names. Of the six *kārakas*, one is the Agent (*kartā*) and three more can be treated as such. The starting point (*apādāna*) and the recipien (*saṃpradāna*) cannot be so treated. We can never say *rāmo dadāti* for *rāmāya dadāti* or *vṛkṣaḥ patati* for *vṛkṣāt patati*. But in certain circumstances, we can say *odanaḥ pacyate*, '*kāṣṭhāni*' *pacanti* and *sthālī pacati*. In other words, '*karma*', '*karaṇa*' and '*adhikaraṇa*' can be sometimes treated as agents (*kartā*).]

An illustration is now given.

19. As far as the birth of the son is conconcerned, both the parents are said to be agents. When one wishes, there can be distinction and (then one would say): he, in her and she, from him.

[Both the parents are responsible for the birth of a child and as long as one does not want to make any distinction, one looks upon both as agents (*kartā*) in the act of procreation. When distinction is sought to be made, one says that the father sows the seed in the mother and the mother receives

the seed from the father. Speaking generally, the root '*jan*' means 'to bring into existence'. But when it is applied to particular cases, the particular function may vary.]

The author now elucidates the *Bhāṣya* passage about the main action and the subordinate actions.

20-21. The agents of the minor actions subordinate their functions to the Agent (of the main action). Even in the state of subordination, they retain fully their activities. According to the differences in these activities, they are known as instrument (*karaṇa*) etc. After having attained independence (in regard to their own activities) they become agents of the main action.

[So far, it has been shown that one and the same thing can be *kartā* (*kāraka*) in a general sense in regard to the main action and *karaṇa* etc. in a special sense. As Kaiyaṭa puts it: *sarveṣām kārakāṇāṃ sādhyatvena sādhāraṇī kriyā tatasca sarveṣām tasyāṃ kartṛtvam. Avāntaravyāpāravivakṣāyāṃ tu karaṇādirūpatvam* (*Kaiyaṭa* on P. 1.4.23). It is now stated that a thing may be dependent in regard to the main action, but independent in regard to its own minor action. There is no contradiction between the two. This is another way of understanding the *M. Bhā.* statement: *sāmānyabhūtā kriyā vartate* (*M. Bhā.* I, p. 326, l. 15). The accessories other than the Agent are independent in regard to the minor actions such as the burning of the wood. In regard to the main action they are under the agent who employs them. That is why they are said to be '*nyakkṛtaśaktayaḥ*'. But they do not lose their independence as far as their own minor action is concerned. Nor can anything be considered to be the cause of an action if it does nothing, that is, if it has not some kind of independence. So, by each one doing its own minor action, all become accessories of the main action. Even though they are under the agent, they are independent as far as their own minor action is concerned.

So they acquire special names such as '*karaṇa*' according to the nature of their own minor acts. While retaining this character or rather because of that, they participate in the accomplishment of the main action, that is, they are *kāraka* in addition to being '*karaṇa*' etc. Under the direction of the agent (*kartā*) they perform their own minor actions and thus become *karaṇa* etc. as well as *kāraka*. It is only when they become *kāraṇa* etc. that the agent attains his '*kartṛtva*'. Thus, there is no contradiction between their independence, in regard to their own minor action and dependence in regard to the main action. In fact, what is independence in regard to one's own minor action is the same thing as dependence in regard to the main action. In fact, the former materialises only after the accessories have been employed by the agent. Till then, it was only a potential state. Thus, every accessory is a do-er (*kāraka, kartā*). That is why we can sometimes say *sthālī pacati, edhāṃsi pacanti, odanaḥ pacyate*. It has been shown in the *M. Bhā.* that one can even say: *valāhako vidyotate* instead of *valahakād vidyotate,* that is, the starting-point (*apādāna*) has become the agent (*kartā*). But ordinarily, the root is not in a position to express the activity of the *apādāna* or the *saṃpradāna*. One cannot say '*vrkṣaḥ patati*' for *vrkṣāt patati* nor *rāmo dadāti* for *rāmāya dadāti*. Thus, *karaṇa, adhikaraṇa* and *karaṇa* can also be called *kartā*. And yet they are not so called, because their independence is only relative. It is mixed up with dependence. Only the Agent (*kartā*) has independence unmixed with dependence. So the name has been reserved for that.]

An illustration is now given.

22-23. Just as the quality of being fighters is in the soldiers appointed by the king and the king obtains victory or sustains defeat according to the way in which they fulfil their duty, in the same way, as long as the accessories appointed by the main agent work towards

the same object, there is no opposition between the agent and the instrument etc.

[An illustration is now given of the principle that only that which is independent in regard to the minor action can become dependent in regard to the main action (*svavyāpāre svatantrāṇam eva pradhānavyāpāre pāratantryam*). The king orders his soldiers to fight and the fighting is done by them. According to the way they fight, the king attains victory or sustains defeat. Before the command, the soldiers were already potentially fighters. When the king commands them, they come under him and so lose their independence. But, after all, the fighting is done entirely by them and they do not ask at every step how they should fight. The same is the case with the instrument etc. in a sentence.]

The difference between *'hetu'* (cause) and *sādhana* (means) is now pointed out.

24. The circumstance (*nimitta*) which works without depending upon any particular operation is called cause. That which assumes the form of a limit is called a sign (*laksaṇa*).

[If all that helps in the accomplishment of the action is *kāraka* or *sādhana*, the cause (*hetu*) would also come under it and the third case-affix would be added to it by the *sūtras*: *kartṛkaraṇayos tṛtīyā* (P. 2.3.18) and P. 2.3.24 would become unnecessary. To meet this difficulty, the difference between means (*sādhana*) and cause (*hetu*) is pointed out. By *'hetu'* is meant anything which is looked upon as the cause of something irrespective of whether it performs a function or operation or not. It should take a case-ending which is not connected with a means (*kārakavibhakti*). Such a case-ending is the sixth one (*ṣaṣṭhī*), but the *sūtra 'hetau'* (P. 2.3.23) prescribes the third case-ending instead. For example: *adhyayanena vasati* = He resides for study. Here study (*adhyayana*) is the cause (*hetu*) and residence (*vāsa*) is the

effect (*hetumat*). *Naiyāyikas* say that only that which causes a substance or a quality can be called '*hetu*' and that takes a case-ending not connected with a 'means' (*Kārakavibhakti*). That which is the cause of an action expressed by an action word is *kāraka*. Ex. *vidyayā vasati*, In the *sūtra* '*anur lakṣaṇe*' (P. 1.4.84), the word '*lakṣaṇa*' can means '*hetu*' also. But there is a difference between the two. That cause in which there is also the quality of being the limit is *lakṣaṇa*. Others distinguish between the two by saying that cause (*hetu*) is that which produces an effect and '*lakṣaṇa*' is that which makes known something, or produces knowledge. That is not right because *hetu* also produces knowledge. When a person lives on his knowledge, the latter produces the knowledge as to how he lives (*vidyāder api vāsādiniścaye vyāpārāt*). In *vṛkṣam anu vidyotate vidyut*, *vṛkṣa* is a *lakṣaṇa*. Irrespective of the consideration whether it produces lightning or not, it is taken as the point of indicatiion of lightning, Lightning flashes from the tree, after reaching the tree. But this is an example of P. 1.4.90. For P. 1.4.84, the example is: *śākalyasya saṃhitām anu prāvarṣat* = It rained after (*anu*) the recitation of the *Saṃhitā* by Śākalya. Here the *Samhitā* is not only the point of indication, but also the cause (*hetu*). It is called *lakṣana*, because this *hetu* is also something which makes known (*jnāpaka*). Similarly, smoke is the sign (*lakṣaṇa*) of fire because the sight of it leads to the inference of fire. One has seen the two together so many times that when one sees it alone, one infers the existence of the other. It is true that one does not see rain following *saṃhitā* so often in real life. But if one has understood that a certain thing has the power to produce a certain effect it can become its sign (*lakṣaṇa*) also. The rising of the clouds becomes the cause of our understanding that it will rain. One might argue that invariable concomittance is understood only after seeing two things together many times and not just once. One has not seen *saṃhitā* followed by rain many times. It may be the cause but seeing them together just once does not enable us to decide. So it cannot be a sign (*lakṣaṇa*) of rain just

as the rising of clouds can be. To this the answer is that sometimes we decide that there is a relation of cause and effect between two things even after seeing their sequence just once. The reason is that if a thing is not the cause, the effect will not follow it even once. A rice plant will not come out of barley seed even once. To think of something else as the cause would upset the whole scheme of casuality. Nor can it be an accident because what is not the cause cannot produce the effect even once. If we see the *saṃhitā* produce rain definitely even once, we conclude that it is the cause. As the cause is also something which makes known, it has been called *'lakṣaṇa'* in P. 1.4.84. The *M. Bhā.* says that *laksaṇa* includes *hetu.* The rising of the clouds is not only the cause of rain, it is also an indication, a sign of it. Even that which is a limit (*avadhi*) becomes a sign only if it causes the knowledge of something. The fact is that a sign (*lakṣaṇa*) is of many kinds. Sometimes, a thing is a *laksaṇa,* because it is a limit (*avadhi*) as the tree in the case of lightning. Sometimes, it makes the cause to be known, as in the case of the smoke. Sometimes, it makes the effect to be known, as in the case of clouds. *Saṃhitā* is both the cause and the sign of rain. P. 1.4.90 makes *'anu'* a *karmapravacanīya* (post-position) in the sense of 'sign' which includes cause also. P. 1.4.84 has been given in order to exclude the third case-affix expressive of cause (P. 2.3.23). 'Anu' has been given the name of *karmapravacanīya* twice, once in P. 1.4.84 to exclude the third case-affix and again in P. 1.4.90 to bring in the second case-affix.

The conclusion is: A do-er (*kāraka*) is that which helps in the accomplishment of an action by assuming different forms; that which helps in a general way is cause (*hetu*) and that which makes something else known is a sign (*laksaṇa*).]

The author now points out the difference in the scope of *'hetu'* and *'sādhana'* though they both produce effects.

25. The cause (*hetu*) has substance etc. as its scope whereas an accessory (*kāraka*) is restricted to action. When an agent depends upon another for the accomplishment of the action, it is also called cause (*hetu*).

[The difference between '*hetu*' and *kāraka* is this. That which can bring about a substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*) or action (*kriyā*) is *hetu*, as in the following sentences: *bījenaṅkuraḥ* = 'through the seed, the sprout,' *dhanena kulam* = 'through wealth, the family, *vidyayā yaśaḥ* = 'through learning, fame, *śilpābhyāsena naipuṇyam* = 'through practice of a craft, skill,' *agninā pākaḥ* = through fire, cooking. That which helps in the accomplishment of the action but is not presented as performing any operation is called '*hetu*'. That is why fire is the '*hetu*' of cooking (*pāka*) and takes the third case-ending. The same is true of the other sentences. An accessory (*kāraka*) can bring about action only. Each one performs some operation or other. There is only one thing which performs some operation and is yet called '*hetu*': that which prompts another to do something (P. 1.4.55).]

The difference between '*hetu*' and *karaṇa*' is now stated.

26. The instrument is for the sake of action, hence a substitute for it is allowed. Action exists for its purpose; therefore no substitute for the latter is allowed.

[That which helps most in the accomplishment of the action is called instrument (*karaṇa*). It is subordinate to action which is the more important of the two. That is why if the prescribed instrument is not available a substitute can be used. The action being the chief thing, it would demand some intrument or other. If the prescribed one is not available a substitute can be used without violating the injunction. According to some, this applies to all the accessories (*kāraka*). In the sentence '*adhyayanena vasati*' = he resides for study, the third case-ending has been used, not because study is an

instrument (*karaṇa*) but because it is a cause (*hetu*). The action understood from the verb '*vasati*' is subordinate to study. Residing somewhere is for the purpose of study and, therefore, subordinate to it and not *vice versa*. There cannot be a substitute for the main purpose. Thus '*hetu*' (cause, purpose) is more important than action, whereas instrument (*karaṇa*) is always subordinate to action.]

The difference between '*hetu*' and '*tādarthya*' is now pointed out.

27. A cause (*hetu*) brings about an effect either in favourable or unfavourable circumstances; what is for the purpose of something else works in favourable circumstances. It has the quality of a *hetu*.

[There is a difference between '*hetu*' and '*tādarthya*' (what is meant for something else) also. A cause brings about its effect in two ways: either in unfavourable circumstances or in favourable circumstances. If it is in a declining condition, it produces an effect which is also in a declining condition. When water comes into contact with the heat of the sun, it decreases and continues to decrease. When, on the other hand, a cause gets the help of other things, its strength increases and the effect also correspondingly increases. For example, when the seed is strengthened by water and sunshine, it is capable of producing a stronger seedling. What is called '*tādarthya*' (what is meant for something else) is a cause of the latter type. It is a fully manifested state of causality. The fourth case-affix (dative case) is used in order to express it, as in *kuṇḍalāya hiraṇyam* = 'gold for ear-rings'. The word *tādarthya* is formed by combining *tadartha* and *ya*. *Tadartha* means '*tasmai idam tadartham*'. Here *idam* stands for the *upakāraka*, that which is going to help something else, meant for something else and *tasmai*' stands for that which is going to be helped. The suffix '*ya*' which comes after the compound *tadartha* expresses the manifested state of the relation of causality existing between what '*tasmai*' and '*idam*' stand for. As the main purpose of the compound '*kuṇḍala-*

hiraṇyam' is to convey the idea that *hiraṇya* (gold) is the material cause of *kuṇḍala* (ear-ring) the meaning of the second part of the compound is more important than that of the first part.]

Now that the difference between *kāraka, hetu, laksaṇa* and *tādarthya* has been stated, consideration of *kāraka* is continued.

28. Power is inborn and lasts as long as the object itself. As it is manifested at the time of action, it is useful (to the latter).

[Things which have the requisite power come into existence out of their causes. Power is not something which is added to them after they come into exisence. The power exists in the object. It cannot exist without a substratum. The power of an object is manifested when it is about to produce its effect. It is then that it is called the means (*sādhana*).]

29. The power of a wall to screen and of sword etc. to cut is always there and is manifested at the time of action.

[The power of a wall to screen and of a sword to cut is seen when the thing to be screened and the thing to be cut are present. The power is already there but it requires the presence of the object to become manifest. Though it exists at all times, it can be seen only then by ordinary people.]

The same idea is now elaborated.

30. Just as the *vāruṇa* nooses of *Daityas* are always united to their bodies but are manifested only when they desire victory, so are the powers of objects.

[It is like the powers of *Daityas*, their *vāruṇa Paśas* (Nooses acquired through the favour of God *Varuṇa*) which according to tradition, always exist in their hands but become manifest only when they have to overcome an enemy.]

31. When the sword, endowed with its sharpness, heaviness, hardness and particular shape is directed towards the thing to be cut, it is perceived as something having power (*śaktimān*).

[When the sword possessing sharpness, heaviness, hardness and a particular shape, is directed towards the thing to be cut, it is seen to be something having power. Sharpness is the climax of the tendency to become gradually thinner of the closely-knit parts of an object. The cohesive nature of metals heated to a high degree is called hardness. It affects the nature of the blows delivered with them. The shape of a sword enables one to distinguish it from other swords and to use it in a particular manner. A sword having these qualities is seen as something having power only when it is operated. This is true of other objects also.]

Other views on the topic of 'means' (*sādhana*) are now stated.

32. Some are of the opinion that power is produced in a thing before action through other causes; others say that it is inborn in a thing; others still that action takes place first.

[There are some other views concerning 'means'. The question of manifesting something arises only when it is already there. As the existence of power is inferred from its effects, it is not known before the action which produces the effects. We conclude, therefore, that the powers of things favourable to action, are produced by the circumstances which must be presumed to have existed before the action. Even when it does exist, there must be something to manifest it and that would be the cause. Things become causes when the accompanying circumstances are present, that is, they lend their powers to one another for producing the effect. By themselves, they cannot produce it. That which produced the substratum of power cannot produce the power also.

Some other circumstance must have done it. Before power is generated and after, the thing remains the same. This is one view. Others believe that the power of a thing is not different from it. It is a thing's nature to have a certain power or not to have it. Others think that the power of a thing is born with it and thus support the previous view. Others still are of the view that the cause of action is not the same as that of the power of a thing to act but different. The different things which cooperate to produce an action lend their powers to one another. Therefore the powers and action are produced at the same time. In that sense the powers are *sahaja*. As the powers produce action in the next moment after their own production, the relation of *sādhya* and *sādhana* between the two is not impaired.]

How some consider that action preexists power is now stated.

33. It is the creative force which, not residing anywhere in particular, brings together, like a stream, all the powers (required for producing an action) in a particular substratum.

Remark. In the second line of this verse, the reading should be *'śaktīre'°* not *'śakire°*.

[According to some, what is called *pravṛtti*, a force leading to action, eternal, exists before everything. In that condition, it exists in nothing in particular. It is *'anapāśritā'*. It is this force which gives to different things in the world their power to do particular actions. In this sense, *'pravṛtti'* or 'action' in a very general form is there before particular actions. This is the view of the old Mīmāṃsakas. The *Sāṅkhyas* think that what is called *'pravṛtti'* is *'rajoguṇa'* existing in everything in an eternal form and it is this which enables a thing to do particular actions.]

Other views on 'means' are now given.

34. Others maintain somehow or other that it is *apūrva* (the previously non-existing, new factor, that is, merit (*dharma*) or demerit (*adharma*) or the power of Time or action or Time itself which is such a factor.

Remark. From here till the words *nà kācit kṣatiḥ* in the commentary on the verse 49, the commentary of Helāraja is not available. The text gives that of one Phullarāja.

[What is this creative force which resides nowhere in particular? Some think that it is *adṛṣṭa,* in the form of *dharma* or *adharma.* It is due to this that things happen or do not happen. Others think that it is Time or the power of Time which exists in *Brahman.* Nothing can act in order to produce its effect except according to Time.]

Something is now being said about number in regard to this power.

35. According to others, there reside, like the universals, in all objects, six powers leading to action, different and yet not so from the objects.

[Now the question arises: how many powers (that is 'means' considered as a power) are there? Some think that, like the universals, six powers inhere in all things. They are called *karma* (object or the accusative function) etc. They are neither identical nor non-identical with the objects whose powers they are. They are really infinite in number, but for convenience, they are classed under six headings.]

36. These powers seem to be unlimited according to the shape etc. of objects. The truth about them is that it does not go beyond the number six.

[The same power varies according to the thing in which it resides. For example, the power to cut varies according as

it exists in a knife or a sword. And yet, speaking generally, it is of six kinds and no more.]

37. Or rather, power is one but appears to be divided into six kinds according to circumstances. It is the fact of being an agent (*kartā*) which is the basis (of all the varied activities).

[Or rather one might say that power is one and that it assumes six forms according to circumstances. That one power is the power of being an agent which is called by different names under different circumstances.]

After having considered whether power is one or many, something is being said as to whether it is different or not from its substratum.

38. As to whether it (power) is identical with or different from (its substratum), it is held that it is different. For the world, the word is the authority and the *śāstra* (that is, Grammar) follows it too.

[The next question is whether power is different from its substratum or identical with it. It is difficult to say definitely what it is. In grammar, it is held to be different. The world goes by the word and the *śāstra* also follows it. On the basis of the word, the world looks upon the power which leads to action as different from its substratum. Otherwise, the latter would always lead to action.]

39. In reality, identity is not different from distinction. It is unity (*tattva*) which shines as distinction and identity.

[If one wants to go to the bottom of this matter, the position is that there is no identity apart from difference. Truth or Unity (*tattva*) shines, now as identity and now as

difference. In the phenomenal stage, it appears as difference. When *'avidyā'* disappears, it shines as Unity.]

40. Difference, clearly conceived, is not apart from Unity and unity (identity), clearly conceived, is not different from difference.

41. Heaven (space), Earth, Air, Sun, Oceans, Rivers, Positions (Directions) are all parts of an inner Reality, manifested externally.

[When unity or identity reaches its climax, one comes to the Ultimate which it is that manifests itself as the different things of the Universe. The whole universe is an external manifestation of an inner Reality. Really speaking, even the distinction between internal and external does not exist. An inner Reality, of the nature of Consciousness, called *Śabdaṭattva-brahman,* shines now as this and now as that. This is the meaning of the verse.]

After having stated that it is the One Reality which manifests itself as the great Elements (Mahābhūta) and the Directions (*Dik*), it is now stated that it manifests itself as Time also.

42. That One Reality shines with the divisions of Time. It is an entity without priority and posteriority, but shines as having sequence.

Remarks. The second line should read: *sa hy apūrvāparo bhāvaḥ kramarupeṇa lakṣyate.*

[This One Reality is without any inner temporal differentiation. But due to *kālaśakti,* things appear to have temporal sequence.

To sum up the discussion in the foregoing verses: following worldly usage, for the grammarians, what is called

'means' (*sādhana*) is a certain power existing in things. According to the *vijñānavādins,* it is a mere construction of the mind. According to the *Mīmāṃsakas,* it is an invisible force (*adṛṣṭa*) called '*apūrva*'. According to *Saṃsargavāda* (*Vaiśeṣika*), it exists in a thing, but is different from it. According to *Advaitins,* it is the power of *Brahman* called Time. According to the *Sāṅkhyas,* it is *rajas,* activity, one of the three qualities existing in all things. According to those who look upon time as an eternal substance, it is that.

While considering the nature of *sādhana* (means), the meaning of the word *kāraka* was discussed and that led to an explanation of the difference between *hetu, lakṣaṇa, tādarthya, karaṇa* and *kāraka.* Then the question arose as to whether 'power' precedes or follows action or is produced at the same time as action. Next the point whether power is one or many was discussed. And lastly the question whether it was identical with or different from its substratum was discussed. All that led to a statement of the nature of *Brahman.*]

As a preliminary to the establishment of difference, the author now shows the existence of 'power'.

43. When the meaning of the stem is the same, that of the suffix is seen to vary. When (the meaning of the suffix) is not the same, that of a stem like *vṛkṣa* remains the same. Therefore, the meaning of the suffix is said to be different.

[Even when the stem with its meaning remains the same, the suffix, with its meaning varies and when the suffix varies, the stem, with its meaning remains the same. For example, *Vṛkṣaḥ, vṛkṣam, vṛkṣeṇa, vṛkṣāya* and so on. One can, therefore, conclude that there does exist something called '*śakti*' expressed by the suffix, different from the meaning of the stem and constituting the means whereby action is accomplished.]

The author now concludes what has been said so far and introduces the next topic.

44. What is called '*kāraka*' is of a general nature. It has seven main (*ādyāḥ*) sources of distinction. Six beginning with the object and the seventh is what is called 'the rest'.

[*Kāraka* or 'means' in general has so far been explained. It has seven main sources of distinction, six beginning with the object (*karma*) and the seventh called 'the rest' (*śeṣa*).]

Of the seven kinds of *kāraka* referred to, what is called 'object' (*karma*) is being dealt with first.

45. Of these (*tatra*), the object called 'that which is most desired to be attained' (*īpsitatama*) is of three kinds: product (*nirvartya*), modification (*vikārya*) destination (*prāpya*). The rest has been thought of as of four kinds.

[The order in which the *kārakas* are dealt with here is that in which the case-endings are taught in P. 2 3. In P. 1.4 on the other hand, the *kāraka* called *apādāna* is taught first and then *sampradāna* and so on. *Kāraka* is of two kinds: 'already expressed' (*abhihita*) and not yet expressed (*anabhihita*). The first case-ending stands for whatever *kāraka* is already expressed. It is taught in the sense of the meaning of the stem only. The case ending from the second onwards express the *kārakas* like *karma* which have not yet been expressed. The object (*karma*) is what the agent seeks to attain most by his action. It is of three kinds: product, modification and destination. Besides these three, there are four other kinds.]

What the other four kinds are is now explained.

46. (1) That which is attained indifferently, (2) that which the agent dislikes, (3) that to which the

name of any other *kāraka* cannot be given and (4) that which had another name before.

[They are: (1) that which the agent attains, though he is indifferent to it, as grass (*tṛṇa*) in the sentence: *grāmaṃ gacchans tṛṇam spṛśati;* (2) that which he positively dislikes as in the following sentences: *coraṃ paśyati, viṣaṃ bhuṅkte;* (3) that which helps in the accomplishment of the action but does not come under the definition of any other *kāraka*, as in *māṇavakaṃ panthānam pṛcchati* and (4) that which was some other *kāraka* before but has now become *karma* because of the presence of some preposition, as *māṇavaka* in the sentence: *māṇavakam abhikrudhyati.*]

The three varieties of the main object (*karma*) are now explained.

47. That object is called product (*nirvartya*) the transforming material cause of which, whether existing or not, is not presented as identical with it.

[Of the three varieties of the main *karma*, product (*nirvartya*) is that which is presented by language as different from its material cause as '*ghaṭa*' in the sentence: *mṛdā ghaṭam karoti.* Here the jar (*ghaṭa*) is presented as something made out of mud and different from it. In '*mṛdam ghaṭam karoti* = he makes the mud into a jar, the jar and the mud are presented as the same. It is a question of presentation by language.]

48. When the material cause is intended (to be so presented), the object (*karma*) is called modification (*vikārya*). Others, however, define product and modification differently in the *śāstra.*

[Where the product is meant to be presented as a transformation of the original material, as identical with it, as in

the sentence: *mṛdam ghaṭam karoti*, the object (*karma*) is called modification (*vikārya*). Some, however, define the *nirvartya* and *vikārya* objects differently as will be shown below.]

49. That non-existent thing which comes into existence or that existing thing which is manifested by its birth, in the *karma* called product. Modification has been established (*vikārya*) to be of two kinds.

[That object (*karma*) is called product (*nirvartya*) which did not exist before. That which existed before and is manifested by its birth is called *vikārya*. In other words, according to this view, the distinction between the two is based on *satkāryavada* and *asatkāryavāda*. But this is not right.]

50. One kind of modification (*vikārya*) is the result of the destruction of the original material as ashes from (burnt) wood. Another kind is the result of the coming of a new property as the transformation of gold (into ornaments).

[A general definition of modification (*vikārya*) has been given. It is of two kinds and they are defined in this verse. When the original material is completely destroyed, we have one kind of modification. For example, ashes when the wood is completely burnt out. In the sentence: *kāṣṭhāni bhasma karoti* = 'he makes the wood into ashes, if wood is not presented as identical with the ashes, the latter would be product (*nirvartya*) according to the previous definition and modification (*vikārya*) if it is so presented. According to the present definition that object (*karma*) is modification (*vikārya*) which is left behind after the original material is completely destroyed. '*Bhasma*' is *vikārya* because ashes can result only when the wood is completely destroyed. According to the previous definition, in this sentence, it is the wood

(*kāṣṭhāni*) which is primarily the *vikārya* and *bhasma* is so secondarily as it is presented as identical with *kāṣṭhāni*. According to the present definition, it is '*bhasma*' which is primarily the *vikārya*. In *kāṣṭhāni dahanti* = 'wood burns', *kāṣṭhāni* is *vikārya*, because that is the only thing which is mentioned. Sometimes, the material remains intact, but changes shape as in the sentence: *suvarnaṃ kuṇḍale karoti* = he makes the gold into ear-rings. Here also, the object is a modification (*vikārya*).]

The object called 'destination', or 'thing to be attained' is now explained.

51. That object is called destination (or thing to be attained) on which the accomplishment of the effects of the action cannot be seen or inferred.

[As far as '*nirvartya*' is concerned, the very coming into being of the product is the result of action and it can be directly perceived. Similarly, in *vikārya* also, the effect of action, the coming in of a particular property can be seen. Sometimes, the effect of action cannot be perceived, but can be inferred as when we infer other people's happiness by observing their facial expression or when we conclude that the growth of the tree is due to previous watering and other care. This is not the case in such sentences as *ādityaṃ paśyati, nagaram upasarpati, vedam adhīte*. Here one neither sees nor infers 'any effect' on the object by the action mentioned in each sentence. Such an object is called '*prāpya*'. It merely becomes the object (*viṣaya*) of the action, without undergoing any change and becomes technically also the object (*karma*) of the *prāpya* type.]

Some do not admit that '*prāpya*' is a separate kind of object.

52. Actions like seeing make some difference everywhere, according to some. It is clearly mani-

fested and proved in the case of snakes having poison in their vision.

[Some do not admit a separate kind of object called '*prāpya*', because they maintain that all actions like seeing do produce some effect or other on the object, whether that effect is perceptible or not. In some cases, the effect can be actually seen. For example, who do see things being burnt up when looked at by snakes having poison in their vision (*dṛṣṭiviṣa*). On that analogy we can conclude that other actions also have their effects. But this view is not endorsed by the author. We do not see the effect of actions everywhere. In the case of snakes, in addition to the fact that the sense of vision itself is a kind of fire, there is also poison in it and so it burns up the object. The burning is not due to the action of seeing. Therefore, a separate object (*karma*) called '*prāpya*' must be recognised.]

It is now stated how a '*prāpya*' object becomes the 'means' of an action (*sādhana*) if the action has no effect on it.

53. Being in the right place (*ābhāsopagamaḥ*), being illuminated (*vyaktiḥ*) and having natural fitness (*soḍhatva*) these are the properties of a *prāpya* object connecting it with the accomplishment of an action.

Remark. The word '*soḍhatva*' occurs in Vāk. I, 82 also. There it means: well-fixed in the mind.

[If the action has no effect on the *prāpya* object, how can it be considered to be a means (*sādhana*) of the action? The answer is, that it can be connected with action in one of three ways. Taking an action like seeing, an object can be helpful (1) by being in the right place, (2) by being illuminated by a light when vision is obstructed by some such thing as fog, (3) by having natural fitness to be seen. Unless a thing is in the right place, it cannot be seen. Light is a well-known condition for seeing something. Lastly, only visible things can

be seen and not invisible things like ghosts. But these are causal factors of the action of seeing and not its effects. Such factors exist for other actions also and through them a *prāpya* type of object becomes the 'means' (*sādhana*) of an action.]

The author now introduces the subject of *karma-kartā* (object–subject).

54. After having enjoyed independence at first in regard to actions like coming into being (*nirvṛtti*), they become the object in regard to the actions of other agents.

Remark. The reading should be *nirvṛttyādiṣu,* instead of *nirvartyādiṣu.*

[It was remarked before that all accessories (*kāraka*) are agents as far as their minor actions are concerned. How then can they become object (*karma*)? They can, when, instead of their minor actions being emphasised, that of the main agent is emphasised and the main agent wants to reach them by his action. They then become subordinate to the main agent and become object (*karma*). They were agents at first and become object, etc. (*karma*) etc. later.]

How what was *karma* at first becomes '*kartā*' later is now explained.

55. When the activity of the main agent is not meant to be expressed, then the object attains the status of agent in regard to its own activity and the *śāstra* prescribes that the word expressive of it (that is, the verb) should possess the marks which it would have if it expressed the object.

[The previous verse spoke about agents of minor actions becoming object, etc. in regard to the main agent. How some-

thing becomes agent (*kartā*) after having been *karma* is now explained. When the activity of the main agent is not meant to be expressed as in '*bhidyate kusūlaḥ svayam eva* = 'the granary breaks by itself' in order to emphasise the rickety nature of the granary or as in '*pacyate odanaḥ svayam eva*' = 'the rice cooks by itself', in order to emphasise the extreme facility with which a particular kind of rice cooks, the granary and rice which would have been objects in sentences where the activity of the main agent is meant to be expressed, become agents and the suffix in the verb expresses the activity of the new agents. But the verb shows also elements like '*yak*' which it normally takes when it expresses the object and not the agent. This happens only, in the case of verbs made from roots which are *karmasthabhāvaka* or *karmasthakriya* and not *kartṛsthabhāvaka* or *kartṛsthakriya*. Examples of these four kinds of roots are given in the following verse.

karmasthaḥ pacater bhāvaḥ karmasthā ca bhideḥ kriyā/
māsāsibhāvaḥ kartṛsthaḥ kartṛsthā ca gameḥ kriyā//
(Kāsikā on P. 3.1.87).]

56. When the object is free from any prompting, it is connected with its own action. When it is no longer the object, it becomes agent in regard to its own action.

[A thing is said to be object (*karma*) in regard to the activity of the main agent and if that is not meant to be expressed, it cannot become object at all. But how can it be called agent for that reason? When the verbal suffix does not express the main agent, the root cannot do so. That is what happens in the sentence: *pacyate odanah svayam* eva = 'the rice cooks by itself'. Here the verbal suffix expresses the activity, not of the main agent, but of the rice which has become agent now but which was '*karma*' before. It has become agent as far as its own activity is concerned, but as it was '*karma*' before, it is called *karmakartā* = object-agent. Thus two conditions have to be fulfilled before a '*karma*' can become '*karma-kartā*' (1) the activity of the main agent should not

be meant to be expressed, (2) the object should be presented as independent and, therefore, the agent in regard to its own action. All this is made clear by P. 3.1.87 and the *Vārttikas* thereon. In *'bhidyate kusūlaḥ svayam eva'*, all the usual causes of the breakdown of a granary are excluded and its own susceptibility to breakdown is emphasised. In this way, instrument (*kāraṇa*), location (*adhikaraṇa*) can also become agent in a sentence, but not object-agent (*karma-kartā*). Only the object can become *karma-kartā* and the verb in the sentence would show signs of both the agent and the object.]

57. It has been said that they (the different uses of a root) are as different from one another as the root *'pac'* and *'sidh'*. Though they are different, they are imagined to be the same because of the similarity in the sounds.

[How can one and the same root denote sometimes a thing which is subordinate to the activity of the main agent and sometimes denote a thing which is not so subordinate but stands, on its own, as in the two following sentences: *'devadatta odanaṃ pacati'* and *pacyata odanaḥ svayam eva*. The fact is that they must be looked upon as two different roots, as different as *'pac'* and *'sidh'* from each other. Though different, they are looked upon as the same, because they have been so treated. But where there is something to be gained by looking upon them as different, that also has been done. For example, the root *'kṣi'* comes in *'bhvādi'*, *'tudādi'*, *'divādi'* and *'kryādi'* groups of roots.]

The question is now considered according to the view that the word is the same even when it has more than one meaning.

58. Roots like *'pac'* denote a part or all the activities spontaneously, even when their forms remains the same.

Others, on the other hand, maintain, that even when the meanings are different, the word is the same, if the sounds are the same. In other words, they maintain that the same word can have more than one meaning. We do perceive the word as the same and nothing contradicts this. The plurality of meaning can be explained on the basis of difference of powers of the same word. In fact, a large number of words in the language have more than one meaning. Even a word like "*grāma*" stands for different things in different contexts. When in a sentence, the former object of the root 'to cook' now becomes the agent the root only means the material becoming soft, as in *pacyata, odanaḥ svayam eva.* Here the activity of the main agent is not expressed at all. In '*devadatta odanaṃ pacati*', the verb expresses primarily the activity of Devadatta (making the rice soft) and secondarily that of the rice (becoming soft).]

Now something further is going to be said about a direct object becoming an agent.

59-60. From the pure root '*ruḥ*', both 'causing to bend' and '*bending*' are understood. From the root with the causative affix '*ṇic*' also, both 'causing to bend' and bending are understood. When the object (*karma*) becomes agent and the causative affix is also used, there is a fifth condition. When the root does not express the idea of somebody causing an action to be done (*preṣaṇa*), the causative affix is used to express the original meaning (of the root).

Remark. In explaining these two stanzas, Helārāja takes the root *ruh* as an example. Though this root is ordinarily considered to be *kartṛsthakriya,* Helārāja treats it as *karmasthakriya* on the authority of Kātyāyana and brings it within the scope of *karmavadbhāva* according to P. 3.1.87.

[In the sentence *ārohanti hastinaṃ hastipakaḥ* = 'the elephant–keepers mount the elephant', the meaning involved is

that the elephant keepers cause to bend (*nyagbhāvana*) the elephant which is bending (*nyagbhavana*). When there is a desire to emphasise the docility of the elephant, the function of the elephant-keepers is not mentioned at all. The sentence would then be: *āruhyate hastī svayam eva* = the elephant bends of its own accord'. Here the root only stands for bending and not for causing to bend. This is the second stage. So far the root is in its pure condition, that is, the causative affix has not been added to it. In this pure state, it expresses *nyagbhāvana* (causing to bend) in the first stage and *nyagbhavana* (bending) in the second stage. Now if the function of the keepers is meant to be conveyed, the causative affix *ṇic* would be added to the root and we would get the sentence: *ārohayanti hastinam hastipakāḥ* = 'the elephant keepers mount the elephant. This is the third stage and the meaning is the same as in the first stage even though the causative affix has been used here. When there is again a desire to emphasise the docility of the elephant and dispense with the function of the keepers, the root would stand for bending only and we would get *ārohayate hastī svayam eva* = 'the elephant bends of its own accord'. This is the fourth stage and the meaning is the same as in the second stage. Thus, in the last two stages also where the *ṇic* is used we understand both *nyaghbhāvanam* (causing to bend) and *nyagbhavanam* (bending). When the function of the keepers, namely, *preṣaṇam* = prompting is dispensed with *nivṛtta-preṣaṇād dhātoḥ*) what remains is the activity of the elephant only and that becomes the meaning of the root. It is to such a root that the *ṇic* is added.

In this connection, Helārāja speaks about a fifth stage. There is no separate sentence expressive of this stage. It consists in looking upon the activity of the elephant itself as the prompter because of its extreme docility and the consequent dispensing with any other prompter. See Nāgeśaś *Udyota* on the M.Bhā. on P. 1.3.67.]

An example is now given of roots with and without the suffix '*ṇic*' conveying the same meaning.

61. The root *'sidhyati'* cannot express the meaning of the root *'pac'* without the causative affix. But when it takes the causative affix (*ṇic*), it expresses the original meaning of the root *'pac'*.

[We sometimes see that roots ending in the causative affix have the same meaning as others not having a similar ending. In *'sidhyaty odanaḥ'*, the root *'sidh'* means only 'becoming soft'. But the same root with *'ṇic'*, that is, *'sādhayati'*, means 'making soft' to which becoming soft is subordinate. In the same way, the root *'ruh'* can have the same meaning whether it has *'ṇic'* or not.]

It is now stated that the object becomes agent when the initiative (*preṣaṇa*) of the latter is not meant.

62. According to some, the function of an agent like Devadatta in regard to the action (of making a mat) denoted by a transitive verb, is, when without Devadatta etc. attributed to the object of action, mat etc.

[It has been shown so far that when what was formerly the object now becomes the agent, there has been an abandonment of the idea of somebody making somebody else do something. Sometimes, the same result is attained when such a function is attributed to something. In *'Devadattaḥ kaṭam karoti'*, there is the idea that Devadatta gets something done by employing or setting in motion various accessories. Sometimes, however, we want to give expression to the idea that, due to the existence of special facilities, it is very easy to get the mat made. We, then, suppress the part that Devadatta normally plays, that of being the agent. We attribute it to the mat itself and say: *kārayati kaṭaḥ devadattena* = The mat gets itself made by Devadatta. In the next stage, when we completely suppress the idea of somebody getting somebody else to do something we get *kārayate kaṭaḥ svayam eva.*]

63. When the organising activity of the agent is not meant to be expressed and is superimposed on its object, the latter, as the prompter of its former agent, is expressed by the verbal suffix when the verb has the causative affix expressive of the superimposed organising activity.

[In '*kārayate kaṭah svayam eva*', the activity of the agent is not mentioned at all, in order to convey the idea that there are special facilities for making the mat, so that the mat is said to prompt itself to be made. This prompting itself of the mat or rather the superimposition of prompting on the mat is different from the maker's acivity and it is conveyed by the causative affix and the atmanepada. All this happens when what was object before becomes the agent in another context, when prompting is superimposed on the object.]

Remarks. All that is said in this context about "*Karmakartā*" is based on the two sūtras: *ṇer aṇau yat karma ṇau cet sa kartā anādhyāne* (P. 1.3.67) and *karmavat karmaṇā tulyakriyaḥ* (P. 3.1.87). These two *sūtras* are connected. Both teach the use of the ātmanepada when, in a sentence, what was at first the object becomes the agent. There are, however, differences in the scope of the two *sūtras*. The first one teaches the use of the *ātmanepada* even when the fruit of the action does not accrue to the agent. When it does accrue to the agent, *ātmanepada* would come according to P. 1.3.74. Secondly, the first *sūtra* teaches *ātmanepada* when the causative affix *ṇic* is used. Thirdly, the root must be *kartṛsthabhāvaka* as '*dṛs*' or '*kartrsthakriya*' as '*ruh*'. As against this, the second *sūtra* teaches '*yak*', '*ātmanepada*' and '*ciṇ*' when what was *karma* becomes '*kartā*'. Here there is no question of the use of the causative affix '*ṇic*', at all. The root must be '*karmasthabhāvaka*' like '*pac*' or '*karmasthakriya*' like '*bhid*'. This distinction in roots is set forth in the following stanza:—

'karmasthaḥ pacater bhāvaḥ karmasthā ca bhideḥ kriyā/
Māsāsibhāvaḥ kartṛsthaḥ kartṛsthā ca gameh kriyā//
(*Kāśikā* on P. 3.1.87)

It is to be noted that what is called '*karmavadbhāva*' does not take place in the case of roots to which '*ṇic*' is added nor in the case of roots which are '*kartṛsthabhāvaka*' or '*kartṛstha-kriya*'. Though in the case of the two latter kinds of roots, when *ṇic* is added to them what was '*karma*' becomes '*kartā*', still there is no real '*karmavadbhāva*' because '*yak*' and '*cin*' cannot come. Only '*ātmanepada*' can come. In the example given under P. 1.3.67 in the *Kāśikā*, namely, '*ārohanti hastinaṃ hastipakāḥ*' '*arohayate hastī śvayam eva*', what was an object in the first sentence has become *kartā* in the next sentence but this is not what is technically called '*karmavad-bhāva*'. That is taught in P. 3.1.87. But there is a kind of '*karmavadbhāva*' here also, but '*yak*' and '*ciṇ*' do not result.]

64. In words like '*sadṛśa*' where a 'former' object becomes the agent, 'becoming' and 'causing to become' are the two actions involved (when something becomes) the object (of the action of seeing).

[In this section devoted to a consideration of the topic of *karma* (object), something was said about the object sometimes becoming an agent. That led to a consideration of P. 1.3.67, because that is also connected with the idea of the object becoming the agent. The *sūtra* "*tyadādiṣu dṛśo 'nālocane kañ ca*' (P. 3.2.60) is also connected with the same idea. Words like *tādṛk*' formed according to this *sūtra*, express the idea of similarity and not the agent of the action of seeing and yet that is what they should express, because they have the suffix '*kañ*', which being a *Kṛt*, denotes the agent. Nor can such forms come under '*ive pratikṛtau*' (P. 5.3.96) as suggested by the *Vārttikakāra*. The Bhāṣyakāra explains it as *karmakartā*. It can be so according to the principle enunciated in stanza 56. For this, it is necessary to look upon the root *dṛś* as expressive of an action involving *āpatti* and *āpādanam*. In the sentence, *ghaṭaṃ paśyati*, *āpatti* 'becoming' is the activity of the jar and 'causing to become' *āpādana*, the activity of the person who sees. The sentence really means: helps something which becomes the object of seeing to become it. When caus-

ing to become' is not meant to be conveyed, becoming becomes the chief thing. In other words, the jar becomes the object-agent (*karmakartā*). Applying the same principle to the word '*tādṛk*' the word would mean: *tamivemaṃ paśyanti janāḥ so 'yam sa iva dṛśyamānas tam ivātmānaṃ paśyati iti tādṛk* = 'people see him as the other; he, being seen as the other, sees himself as the other (thus, he is) *tādṛk* = that-like.]

It is now being shown that this way of explaining it is not right.

65. If one explains by bringing some extraneous word from somewhere, even roots, having the meaning of 'seeing' would become *karmasthabhāvaka* (that is, roots the action denoted by which resides in the object).

[This way of explaining *tādṛk*' is not right, because the root *dṛś* does not involve 'becoming' and 'causing to become'. All that it means is: Knowledge of one who sees (*kartṛstham darśanamātram*). One does not think of something becoming the object of seeing. If one begins to analyse the meaning of roots in this way, all roots would become *karmasthabhāvaka* or *karmasthakriya* and there would be no *kartṛsthabhāvaka* or *kartṛsthakriya* roots at all and that is against facts.]

The author now draws a line of demarcation between these two kinds of roots.

66. According (to some) action resides where its effect is seen. According to others, where it resides is revealed by the words themselves.

[Some say that whether a root is '*kartṛsthabhāvaka*' or '*karmasthabhāvaka*' depends on the effect of where the action is found. They make no distinction between *bhāva* and *kriyā*. Bu the idea that action rests on where its effect is found does not work. According to that, the root '*pac*' would be *karmasthabhāvaka*', because the effect of the action of cooking is found in the thing cooked. But the action is not without effect

on the person who cooks. Therefore, it would be better to rely on another principle and that is the way words present the matter. In *ghaṭam paśyati,* the words present the *ghaṭa* as unaffected by the action of seeing, but in *kāṣṭhaṃ bhinatti,* they present the object, namely, the wood as affected by the action of cutting. Therefore, the root *dṛś* is *kartṛsthabhāvaka* and the root *bhid* is *karmasthabhāvaka.*]

It is now pointed out that the *vārttika* on P. 1.4.51 which makes words expressive of time, action, distance to be covered and country objects of intransitive verbs is unnecessary.

67. When words expressive of time, action, distance to be covered and country come together with any intransitive verb which implies another action, they become the object (of that action).

[So far the three kinds of object (*karma*) all coming under P. 1.4.49 have been considered. This was followed by a consideration of how what was object before becomes agent in some cases and matters arising out of that. Now the author takes up the consideration of some points arising out of other *sūtras* relating to *karma.* On P. 1.4.51, there is the following *vārttika.*

'*kālabhāvādhvagantavyāḥ karmasaṃjñā hyakarmaṇām. Deśaśca.* (M. Bha. I, p. 33, 1.1).

This varttika declares that words expressive of time, action and distance to be covered are objects of intransitive roots. But this *vārttika* is unnecessary in order to make them objects (*karma*). Because they would become *karma* without it. The intransitive roots imply another action than the one which they openly express and the words expressive of time, etc. become the *karma* of that action. For example, *māsam āste* means *māsaṃ vyāpya āste*=he stays, covering a period of one month. The period of one month has become the object of covering, by the original *sūtra* itself, that is, P. 1.4.49. There was no need for this *vārttika.* Even though time, etc., thus become

the *karma* of *akarmaka* roots, these do not cease to be *akarmaka* (intransitive) roots, because it is only when a root has an *antaraṅgakarma,* that is, a *dravyakarma,* an object in the form of a thing, that it is called a transitive (*sakarmaka*) root. As, thus, roots like '*ās*' continue to be *akarmaka* even after time, etc. have become their objects, the suffixes *la, kṛtya, kta* and *khal* can be added to them according to P. 3.4.69 in the sense of *bhāva*'. Thus action, etc., become *karma* according to P. 1.4.49 itself and not according to the *vārttika* under discussion, because the *āsanakriyā* (the action of staying) in *māsam āste* involves that of covering (*vyāptikriyā*).]

It is now stated how time, etc. are only minor objects whereas an object in the form of a thing or substance (*dravyakarma*) would be the main object.

68. Having become a kind of substratum for the substance—objects, time etc. later become objects having a different status (*bhinnakakṣyam*).

[It has been said before that time, etc. are only external *karmas* and not internal (*antaraṅga*). They are secondary objects. They become a kind of substratum in which the main object or the agent resides. In *kurūn svapiti* = 'he sleeps in the Kuru country,' it is clear that the country is the place where he sleeps; in other words, it is a kind of *ādhāra* (substratum). In *māsam odanaṃ pacati* = 'he cooks rice for a month', where the main object also comes in the sentence, it is clear a month' is a kind of *ādhāra* for the main object also. The point of the comparison may be that just as a place becomes connected with action through the agent or the object, in the same way, time, etc. become objects through the main object. Action becomes connected with the main object first and then only with the secondary object. Therefore, the latter becomes an object only in the second stage. In cooking, for example, the time taken depends upon the nature of the main thing which is cooked. Thus time, etc. become connected with action through the main object. When both the ob-

jects are mentioned in the same sentence, the suffixes *'la'*, *'kṛtya'*, etc. express the object, and not time, etc. They are expressed by the second case-affix found in a separate word.]

What follows because of time, etc. coming within the range of all roots and because of their being objects having a different status is now stated.

69. Therefore, when the root comes together with those objects which are not things, it is intransitive and it becomes the occasion for taking verbal suffixes in the sense of object (*karmaṇi*) or action (*bhāve*).

[Where there is no main object in the form of substance, there the verbal suffix comes in the sense of minor object or mere action. In *māsa āsyate devattena* = 'a month is spent by Devadatta', the verbal suffix is expressive of a minor object which, in this case, is 'a month'. In *māsam āsyate devadattena* = 'for a month, a stay is made by Devadatta' the verbal suffix is expressive of action. This is according to P. 3.4.69, where the word *akarmaka* means a root which has no object in the form of a substance (*dravyakarma*). Though time, distance to be covered, etc. have been declared to be objects (*karma*), yet a root which has only such an object and not an object in the form of substance is deemed to be *'akarmaka'*. See M. Bhā. on P. 1.4.52.]

It is now stated that time, etc. are not the only objects having a different status.

70. All that is not declared (to be something else) and so becomes object (according to P. 1.4.51) is understood to have a different status, because, it is not what is most desired to be attained by the agent, coming, as it does, within the scope of the meaning of the root in a different way (*dhātvarthoddeśabhedena*).

[It is not only time, etc. which are objects having a different status. All that becomes object according to P. 1.4.51 can be so looked upon. In *gāṃ dogdhi payaḥ* = "he extracts milk off the cow', the cow is the object of a second order compared to milk. The cow is only a means to an end. The cow comes within the scope of the meaning of the root as its object in the second stage and milk in the first stage. The cow is resorted to as a means (*upāya*). This is what is meant by *dhātvarthoddeśabheda*. The author does not accept this way of looking at it. He is going to show that *karma* is one. Here a doubt arises: Time, etc. may be considered to be objects of a second order. But how can the cow be so considered? Because, after all, milk depends on the cow. One who wants milk must first find a cow. This is true and yet the cow does have a different status as an object. See M. Bhā. on P. 1.4.51.]

This point is now further clarified.

71. That which causes the action to be done is said to be the main object (*pradhānakarma*). That which becomes connected with the action in order that it (the main object) may be attained is something else and has been called 'that which has not been declared to be anything else' (*akathita*).

[The difference in status is due to difference in importance. That to attain which all the accessories are set in motion and after attaining which relax is the main object, that which is most desired to be attained by the agent. In the sentence *gāṃ dogdhi payaḥ*, it is milk which is in this position. The cow is resorted to only as a means. It is therefore, relatively unimportant. Where milk is not the objective and the milking is done only to prevent the cow from drying up we say *gāṃ dogdhi* and here *gām* is the main object. In *gām dogdhi payaḥ*, there is the relation of *nimitta* and *nimitti* between the cow and the milk. Therefore, they belong to

two different categories. There the cow cannot become the object according to P. 1.4.49. It does so according to P. 1.4.51.]

The author now says something about the objects of the roots *'nī'* and *'vah'*.

72. As (the cow etc.) in the case of roots *duh*, etc. (village etc.) in the case of roots *'nī'* etc. they become objects because no other name has been taught for them. As for one who expounds (*ākhyātā*), where there is no acquisition of knowledge in the prescribed manner (*upayoga*), he would come under the rest (*śeṣa*) because of the restriction due to the specification of roots.

[As the cow in the case of roots like *duh,* in the case of roots like *'nī'* etc. also, the destination is an object by P. 1.4.51. A *vārttika* under this *sūtra* enumerates the roots where this takes place. That is why in *naṭasya śṛnoti* = 'he listens to the actor', the actor does not become the object. The actor would become *apādāna* if there was *upayoga,* that is, acquisition of knowledge in the prescribed manner. Where this does not exist, the actor should really become an object according to P. 1.4.51, but does not do so because the roots have been specified and *śru* = 'to hear' is not one of them.]

It is now stated that, according to some, the object is the main one in the case of these enumerated roots also.

73. In the case of roots like *'duh'* which involve the meaning of the causative affix, cow, etc. become objects by the first rule (P. 1.4.49) as in the case of roots ending in the causative affix. That is why there is restriction in regard to the roots ending in the causative affix.

(The last part of the *kārikā* should be: *ṇijantaniyamas tathā*).

[Others think that the object taught under P. 1.4.51 can be looked upon as the main object, because the roots enumerated under that *sūtra* imply the idea of somebody causing somebody else to do something (*praiṣa*), that is, the meaning of *ṇic*. Something becomes the *karma* of *ṇic* by P. 1.4.49. *gāṃ dogdhi payaḥ* = "he extracts milk off the cow" would be explained as: *Kṣarantīṃ gāṃ kṣārayati* = 'he prompts the cow which drips (milk) to do so. Here, in reality, milk is more important than the cow, but linguistically, it is vice-versa. that is why in '*gaur duhyate payaḥ* = 'the cow is milked milk, the verb expresses the fact of the cow being the object and not that of the milk. Strictly speaking, the cow being the starting point of the milk, it should be *apādāna* and take the fifth case-affix, but it becomes the object because the latter is taught later. All the roots enumerated under P. 1.4.51 can be explained as involving the meaning of the causative affix. The restriction taught in P. 1.4.52 does not apply to these roots because that restriction applies only to roots ending in the causative affix and these roots are not so.]

It is now explained how the important and the unimportant can both become the object.

74. Just as there is no difference in degree in the instrument within its own sphere, similarly, there is no difference in degree in the object within its own sphere.

[It might be said that both what is important and what is not important should not become the object (*karma*) by the same rule. After all, there is the suffix '*tamap*' in the *sūtra*: *kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma* (P. 1.4.49). According to that, only the important should become the object. To this, the answer is that difference of degree is not considered within the same kind. For example, in *aśvena pathā dīpikayā yāti* = 'he goes along the path on horse-back with a light, all the words ending in the third case-affix are instruments (*karaṇa*) even though there may be difference of degree between them. Simi-

larly, between two things both of which are objects, no difference of degree is considered.]

It is now stated that this view is not right.

75. As difference of degree is accepted in regard to the quality of being desired to be attained (by the agent) of the object, therefore, a great difference is accepted (between that which becomes object by P. 1.4.51) and that which becomes object by the first rule (P. 1.4.49).

[There is a difference between the instrument and the object in this respect. All the accessories (*kāraka*) are means (*sādhana*) and that which reaches the climax in being the means is called the instrument (*sādhakatama*). Thus, it is a difference in degree within its own sphere. But all the accessories are not desired to be attained (*īpsita*) by the agent. Only the object is so. Therefore, that which reaches the climax in being *īpsita* has difference in degree within the sphere of the object and not outside it, whereas in the case of the instrument, the difference in degree is in regard to all the accessories. In the case of the object, as the difference in degree is within its own sphere, there should be different degrees. It is only by understanding it in this way that the sphere of the *apādāna* (starting point) can be distinguished from that of the object.]

Something is now being said as to whether the cow, in connection with the root '*duh*', can become the object according to P. 1.4.49.

76. Just as, in the case of a verb ending in the causative affix, it is the active agent who is prompted, in the same way, in the case of roots like '*nī*', the agent, though inactive, is prompted.

[One cannot compare cases like *gāṃ dogdhi payaḥ* with *gamayati grāmaṃ devadattam*. In *gamayati*, the root expresses one action and the causative affix (*ṇic*) another. Each has its own object according to P. 1.4.49. In *dogdhi*, there is only one action and the cow and milk become objects in regard to the same action. Between the two, there is difference of degree in the matter of being desired to be attained by the action of the agent. Milk has a greater degree of it and so it becomes the object under P. 1.4.49 and the cow becomes so under P. 1.4.51.]

Just as *gamayati* is explained as: 'he prompts to go the person who goes', in the same way, why not explain *dogdhi* as: he prompts to yield (milk) that which yields?

77. As for the explanatory sentence in regard to verbs ending in a causative affix and to the roots *nī* and *duh,* it consists of different words and has no connection with the root in question.

[As for explanatory sentences like *gacchantam prayuṅkte* = 'he prompts to go the person who goes', in the case of *gamayati* and *grāmam prāpnuvantīm ajām prayuṅkte* = 'he prompts the goat which is going to the village' in the case of *ajām grāmaṃ nayati,* they are really different from the verbs which they are supposed to explain. They only draw out the implication of the meaning of the verb. They should not be taken too seriously. Therefore the meaning of the causative affix is really not implied in the meanings of the roots *duh* and *nī.* These roots express only one action having two objects, the main object comes under P. 1.4.49 and the secondary object under P. 1.4.51. They belong to two different categories as mentioned in stanza 70. In the case of roots like *nī* and *duh,* the passive verb expresses the secondary object as taught in the *vārttika.*

pradhānakarmaṇyākhyeye, etc. under P. 1.4.51.]

The author now states the accepted doctrine.

78. Just as the starting point (*apādāna*) which is one is shown in the Science of Grammar as many, in the same way, the object (*karma*) also, which is one, is expounded as many.

[Just as all that can be called *apādāna* comes under the *sūtra*: *dhruvam apāye 'pādānam* (P. 1.4.24), similarly, all that can be called the object (*karma*) comes under the very first *sūtra* (P. 1.4.49). The other *sūtras* in both cases, are only meant for elaboration, for making things easier for the uninitiated. Where the same root denotes two actions, the objects of both are so called by P. 1.4.49. In the sentence, *taṇḍulān odanaṃ pacati* = 'he cooks the rice grains into rice', the root *'pac'* means to make something soft. Becoming soft is included in it. Rice-grains (*taṇḍula*) are the object of making soft, through becoming soft, whereas rice (*odana*) becomes so directly. Thus both are *karma*, each in regard to one of the two actions expressed by the same verb and stands towards each other as primary (*pradhāna*) and secondary (*guṇa*). The meaning of *'dogdhi'* can be analysed in the same way and both the cow and the milk would then become the *karma* in regard to one of the two actions expressed by *'duh'*. In this way, there is no harm in holding the view that the meaning of the causative affix is included in the meaning of *'duh'*. Even in a verb actually having the causative affix, the agent who is prompted loses his independence and becomes somewhat inactive (*niṣkriya*). In *'dogdhi'*, there is no causative affix at all. What is expessed by *sādhayati* is expressed by the plain root in *'pacati'*.

In P. 1.4.49, the suffix *'tamap'* is not to be taken seriously. So whatever is desired to be attained (*īpsita*) becomes *karma* by that *sūtra*. If, in *dadhnā bhuñjīya* = with curds, I might eat. (M. Bhā. I, p. 322, l. 22) *'dadhi'* is not *karma*, it is because it is not desired to be attained (*īpsita*).]

As different kinds of objects such as 'that which is to be made' (*nirvartya*) are mentioned in the science, how is it that it is here declared to be one? This question is now answered.

79. Whether the object be something to be made or something to be modified or something to be reached, it is the substratum of power and is presented as an accomplished thing (*siddharūpa*), because it is only actions which are to be accomplished (*sādhya*).

[The object is One. Division such as '*nirvartya*' do not take away this one-ness. They are names given to the objects on the basis of the particular kinds of action with which they become connected. In all these connections, the common point remains: it is something which the word presents as accomplished (*siddha*) as against action which the verb presents as something to be accomplished (*sādhya*).].

The author now considers cases like: *viṣam bhakṣayati* = he eats poison.

80. Just as, through greed, one (that is, a sick man) has the desire (to eat) what is not good, similarly, through fear one acts in regard to poison etc.

[In sentences like *visam bhakṣayati, coram paśyati,* it is not really according to P. 1.4.50 that poison and thief becomes objects, but by the main *sūtra* itself (P. 1.4 49). In certain circumstances, one may wish to take poison. All one's actions are not the result of careful consideration. A sick man may want to eat what is not good for him through greed. In such cases, *īpsita* would only mean becoming the object of the action of eating and that happens in the case of poison. Similarly, a thief is '*īpsita*' in the same sense. The grass which one treads on while going to the village is also *īpsita* in the same sense. Thus everything can become an object by the main *sūtra,* including such cases as *akṣān dīvyati* = he throws the dice, *rāmam abhikrudhyati* = 'he gets angry with Rama.']

The author now states what happens when a thing becomes the object of two actions in the same sentence.

81. When one and the same thing has the power (of being the object) in regard to two actions, the main one and the secondary one, the power in regard to the secondary action follows that in regard to the main one.

82. Where the power (of being the object) relating to the main action is expressed by the verbal suffix, then the one relating to the secondary action, though not expressed, is understood.

[It has been said before that where the one and the same action has two objects, the verbal suffix expresses the main one and the other is expressed by the case-ending as in *ajā nīyate grāmam* = the goat is taken to the village, when the same object is connected with two actions and the verbal suffix expresses the object in regard to the main action, that in regard to the other need not be expressed. It would be understood without it.]

An example is now given.

83. Where the root 'to cook' (*pac*) takes the suffix *ktvā* in the sense of pure action, the power of being object in regard to it which is not expressed is in the same position as the other one in regard to the root 'to eat' (*bhuj*) which is actually expressed.

[An example of the principle laid down above is: *paktvā odano bhujyate* = the rice is eaten after cooking. Here the suffix *ktvā* has only *bhāva* = 'action' as its meaning according to the M. Bhā. According to the *vārttika ā ca tumunaḥ*, etc. (vā. 3. on P. 3.4.26), on the other hand, the suffixes *tumun*, etc. have the same meaning as the verbal suffixes added to the roots used together with *ṇamul* etc. In *svādumkāraṃ bhujyate yayvāgur devadattena* = 'Barley gruel is eaten by Devadatta after making it tasty', the verb *bhujyate* expresses the object; therefore the suffix *ṇamul* in *svāduṃkāram* also

does the same. That is why there is no second case-affix after *yavāgū*. Similarly in *paktvā odano bhujyate*, the *ktvā* expresses the object because the verb expresses it. The former expresses it in regard to the action of cooking and the latter in regard to the action of eating. As both the aspects of *karma* are thus expressed, there is no need to use the second case-affix after *odana*. According to the M.Bhā. the *ktvā* has the meaning of *bhāva* and not of *karma*.]

Another example of the same is now being given.

84. (In the sentence *iṣyate grāmo gantum* = the village is desired to be reached), because of the connection of the verb *iṣyate* with *gantum*, the verbal suffix which is prescribed to express the power of the village to be the object of *iṣ* also expresses its power to be the object of *gam*.

[Another example of the above principle is the sentence *iṣyate grāmo gantum*. Here the verb expresses the power of being its object which exists in the village (*grāma*). But the village is the object of the root *gam* also in *gantum* and that is also understood from the sentence though there is nothing specific to express it.]

An explanation of the same according to another view is now given.

85. In the sentence 'after cooking, it (the rice) is eaten (*paktvaudano bhujyate*), according to some, the root 'to cook' does not require rice as its object. That (rice is the object) is understood by inference.

[Others explain the sentence *paktvaudano bhujyate* differently. According to them, the rice is not the object of the action of cooking at all. All that the sentence means is: after cooking, the rice is eaten. It does not say that the rice is cooked. In other words, this is not a case of one and

the same thing being the object of two actions openly. Openly it becomes the object of one action only, that of eating. That it is the object of cooking also is understood by inference rather than from the words. The inference is due to the fact that cooking is also mentioned in the same sentence. The inference is possible because the two actions stand in the relation of primary and secondary to each other. That is why the former view is better.]

The author now extends this principle to the other accessories (*kāraka*).

86. (In the sentence: 'after eating, the city is entered = *bhuktvā nagaro 'bhiniviśyate*) that which is the object of the verb *abhiniviś* and is expressed by the verbal suffix is the substratum of the action denoted by the word ending in *ktvā* and yet the use of the locative case-ending to express it is not wanted.

[It is not merely the power of being an object which is sometimes understood though not expressed. Other accessories are also sometimes in the same position. In *bhuktvā nagaro 'bhiniviśyate* = after eating, the city is entered, the verbal suffix expresses the fact of the city being the object (*karmatva*). The fact that the city is the substratum of the acion of eating is not openly expressed by anything and yet it is understood. Similarly in *nagare 'bhiniviśya bhunkte* = he eats in the city after entering it, the city is the substratum of the action of eating as expressed by the verbal suffix. By inference it is understood to be the object of the action of entering.]

The author now explains how, in the sentence *guḍam bhakṣayati* = he eats sugar, sugar comes within the definition of an object.

87. The object which is already accomplished and which does not acquire any special feature because of

coming within the range of action is *īpsita* (desired to be attained) inasmuch as it becomes the object of actions like eating.

[How does sugar (*guḍa*) come within the definition of object (*karma*) in the sentence *guḍaṃ bhakṣayati?* As it is already there it cannot be the *nirvartya* kind of object. Eating does not make any difference to it as sugar. As sugar, it is already there. Its mention gives completeness to the action of eating, because unless there is something to eat, eating cannot be done. Sugar becomes *īpsita,* because it attains differentiation according as it becomes the object of the action denoted by this root or that. In this way, it becomes the kind of object called '*prāpya*' (something to be reached). Although sugar is already there, in the sentence under discussion, it is presented as becoming the object of the action of eating and not of any other action. That is the special feature which it acquires here and that is why it is considered to be *prāpyam karma.* Nothing more than this is required for something to become this kind of object. Satisfaction is the result of eating sugar. Sugar is the means in regard to this satisfaction, but it becomes the means only when it becomes the object of the action of eating. Just as the *guru* is the means in regard to the production of merit but can become so only if he is served. Thus it has been shown that in the sentence in question sugar and the action of eating it are both *īpsita.*]

If something which is not in any way affected by an action can still be looked upon as its object, how can the distinction between transitive (*sakarmaka*) and intransitive (*akarmaka*) among roots be maintained? This is now answered.

88. (1) When the root is used in a meaning other than its usual one (2) when the object is included in the meaning of the root (3) or is well known (4) or is not meant to be expressed, the action (denoted by the root) is said to be without an object.

[The distinction between transitive and intransitive roots in not affected. Some actions denoted by roots imply an object as part of the meaning of the root. Other roots denote actions which have an object outside their meaning. The former are intransitive and the latter transitive roots. *āste* which can be analysed as *āsanaṃ karoti* = 'he does sitting,' denotes an action which has an object which is part of the meaning of the root. But *pacati* in *odanaṃ pacati* denotes an action which has an object outside the meaning of the root. That is why the root *pac* = 'to cook' is said to be a transitive root (*sakarmaka*). Sometimes a root is said to be intransitive even if the action which it expresses has an object outside the meaning of the roots. That will be explained later. A root which is ordinarily transitive becomes intransitive when it is used in a meaning other than its ordinary one. For example, in *bhāraṃ vahati* = 'he carries a load', the verb 'carries' is transitive. But when we say *nadī vahati* = the river flows, that meaning is absent and so the root *vah* is now intransitive. 'To flow' means an action which is not presented by the word as affecting something else than the agent. When the meaning of the root itself includes a hidden object, such a root also is intransitive. For example, *jīvati* = he lives. This verb really means *prāṇān dhārayati* = 'he maintains life'. So an object is implied in it and is, therefore, intransitive. Another similar case is that of verbs which invariably bring an agent and an object to the mind even though neither is mentioned. For example, *varṣati* = 'it rains'. Here '*deva*' is understood as the agent and water is understood as the object. Such verbs are also intransitive and that is why the suffix '*kta*', when added to such roots, denotes the agent. Sometimes the speaker does not want to say anything about the object. Then the verb, though ordinarily transitive, becomes intransitive. We can just say *pacati* in answer to the question *kiṃ karoti*. It is then intransitive.]

It is now stated that, in addition to the four ways mentioned in the previous stanza, there are other ways in which a verb becomes intransitive.

89. The four kinds (of objectless actions) which have been shown in a general way have many variations because of difference in circumstances etc.

[The four ways in which a root becomes intransitive can have many variations because of difference in circumstance, place, time etc. The verb *carati* = 'he goes', is ordinarily transitive, The preposition *ut*, when added to it, makes it intransitive. *Tapati* = 'burns', is transitive, but *uttapate* = 'he shines' is intransitive. In *yāvad bhuktam upatiṣṭhate* = 'he is present whenever it is meal time, the root *sthā* has become intransitive, though with the preposition *upa*, it is usually transitive. In *nadī vahati*, the verb is intransitive because of the nature of the agent, the river. When something becomes *karmakartā*, the root has only half its original meaning and so becomes intransitive: *pacyata odanaḥ svayam eva* = 'the rice cooks by itself'. Similarly when the object is included in the meaning of the root, there are various possibilities. In *jīvati*, due to the nature of the action, an object is included in it. In *putrīyati chātram* = 'he treats his pupil as a son', it is only at the time of grammatical analysis that the son appears as the object and as the standard of comparison and it is included in the meaning of the verb *putrīyati*.]

The topic of 'object' has now come to an end.

The author now takes up the treatment of the accessory called instrument (*karaṇa*).

90. When, after the activity of something the action is meant to be conveyed as accomplished, then that thing is said to be the instrument.

[Many things are accessories to an action, but the speaker usually means to convey that the action is accomplished after the activity of some particular thing. It is then called the instrument (*karaṇa*). It is a question of what the speaker wants to convey. This is a general principle in grammar. Ordinarily, the speaker might say *dātreṇa lunāti* = he cuts

with a sickle. Here sickle is the instrument. But sometimes he might say *balena lunāti* = 'he cuts with strength'. Here *bala* (strength) becomes the instrument. Ordinarily, the pot is presented as a receptacle for cooking as in *sthālyāṃ pacati*= 'he cooks in the pot'. But sometimes the speaker might present it as the instrument, as in *sthālyā pacati* = he cooks with the pot. Ordinarily, the eye is presented as the instrument of seeing as in *cakṣuṣā paśyati* = he sees with the eye, but when the speaker says *ālokena paśyati* = 'he sees with light', *āloka* becomes the instrument.]

The same idea is now further explained.

91. In reality, nothing can be indicated as the instrument, nothing is predetermined to be so. Because, one does see speakers wishing to say that the cooking is done with the pot (*sthālyā pacati*).

[What is called instrument is not something having any particular characteristic such as a particular universal. Nothing is predetermined to be the instrument. The pot is known to be the receptacle of cooking, but a speaker may sometimes say that the cooking is done with the pot when he wants to emphasise its particular suitability for the purpose.]

It is now stated that agents pay special attention (*saṃrambha*) to the instrument as it is the most useful accessory.

92. In order to accomplish the main thing (that is, the action) agents improve their instruments again and again and apply them in various ways.

[Those who desire the fruit have to improve their instruments again and again. Sharpening the sickle is a way of improving it. Raising it and lowering it are various ways of applying it. Applying ointment (*añjana*) to the eye is a way of improving it; focussing it is a way of applying it.]

It is now shown how in a sentence like *aśvena pathā dīpikayā yāti* = 'he goes on horse-back along the path with a light', several things are presented as rendering maximum service (*upakāraprakarṣa*) at the same time.

93. Among instruments themselves, all belonging to the self-same category (*svakakṣyāsu*) there is no difference in degree. The definition refers to superiority in regard to other (accessories).

[Among instruments themselves, there is no difference of degree. The suffix '*tamap*' in P. 1.4.42. is added to the word *sādhaka* = accessory in general. So instrument is that which is an accessory in the highest degree in comparison with the other accessories and not in regard to other instruments.]

It is now stated why the agent who employs all the other accessories, is not considered to be the best accessory.

94. Even though independent, agents help action only from a distance. The activity of all the other accessories is separated from action by that of the instrument.

[Nor can one look upon the agent himself as the accessory in the highest degree on the ground that all the accessories are employed only after the agent comes on the scene. The action is accomplished immediately after the activity of the instrument and not after that of the agent whose work consists in setting the other accessories in motion. So there is a big interval between the activity of the agent and the accomplishment of the action. But, the action is done immediately after the activity of the instrument. That is why it is the accessory in the highest degree.]

It is now stated that there cannot be any comparison with the agent.

95. It is in regard to the accomplishment of the action that there arises the question of degree. Towards the agent, there is subordination (*nyagbhāva*). The common feature of being an accessory attains degree when it has come into being.

[What is meant here is that in regard to the accomplishment of action, the instrument has a certain superiority. The question whether the agent or the instrument is the accessory in the highest degree should not arise at all. Nothing is an accessory until the agent employs it in order to accomplish the action. In that stage, the question of degree can arise only among the accessories set in motion by the agent and not between them and the agent who is in a different category altogether. The agent is independent (*svatantra*) and the others are independent and dependent (*svatantra-paratantra*).]

It is now explained how sometimes the instrument itself becomes the agent.

96. When the sword etc. are themselves presented as agents, sharpness etc. become the instruments. When sharpness etc. are presented as independent (agents) then they appear in a two-fold capacity.

[The fact is that sometimes the speaker wants to convey the extreme sharpness of the sword and says: the sword cuts (*asiś chinatti*). The fact that the real agent cuts with the sword is not presented here. The sword itself is presented as the agent and its extreme sharpness, weight, hardness and shape are presented as the instruments. The speaker can go further and say: the sharpness cuts (*taikṣṇyaṃ chinatti*). In this case, one would postulate something else as its instrument, because sharpness has become the agent. The new instrument may not be different from the agent, but words would present it as different.]

If a thing cannot be agent and instrument at the same time, what was the need of the *vārttika*: *karaṇam parāṇi* (vā. 32. on P. 1.4.1.)? This is now explained.

97. In spite of this difference (brought about by the speaker's intention) a thing remains as it is, being the basis of the fictional difference. That is why the fact of being an agent sets aside (the instrument).

[Sometimes there seems to be a conflict between the two capacities in regard to the same thing, in which case, it has been declared in the *vārttika*: *karaṇam parāṇi* .... (on P. 1.4.1.) that the accessories taught after the instrument in *Aṣṭādhyāyī* would prevail over it. The idea is this. Even though it is true that whether a particular thing is the agent or the instrument of an action is a matter of presentation by the speaker, still a thing cannot lose its own nature. For a speaker to present a thing now as agent and now as instrument is, after all, a kind of fiction. For all that, a thing cannot change its identity. The fiction is, after all, based on the same thing which would become the recipient of two names, Thus a conflict would arise between the two names and the *vārttika* in question is meant to resolve the conflict.]

Nor is it necessary that the instrument should have external existence.

98. Just as instrumentality is understood when a thing is present, in the same way, it is understood when a thing has no existence because the action in question is accomplished.

[Sometimes an action is accomplished by the absence of something. A sword can become an instrument of cutting if it is available. But in the sentence: *dhanābhāvena muktaḥ* = 'freed because of the absence of money, it is the absence of money which is the instrument.]

It is now shown that this is confirmed by the *sūtra* of Pāṇini.

99. 'Little' etc. attain the status of instrument when only little is forthcoming or when what is not forthcoming is only little, so it has been declared.

The sentence *stokān muktaḥ* = 'freed because it (the debt) is small' is an illustration of P. 2.3.33. Here the word '*stoka*' (small) does not express '*sattva*'. In the sentence in question, it is the instrument of the action of liberation. The debtor has paid a little of what he owes but cannot produce the little more that he owes. So he has been freed. The interpretation may be that only a little of what he owes remains unpaid and so he has been freed. Similarly, when we say *ekānna viṃśatiḥ* 'not twenty by one, we mean that the negation of twenty is due to the absence of one which thus becomes the instrument.]

It is now stated that, as the notion of means depends upon the speaker's intention, whatever is intended by the speaker to be the means in the highest degree becomes the instrument.

100. Action differs according as things and their properties are looked upon as identical or different from one another, just as it differs according to the different ways in which the starting point is looked at.

[Thus what is called instrument is a matter of the speaker's intention. He can look upon things and their properties as identical with one another or different from one another. The instrument will vary accordingly. When he says: *devadattaḥ kāṣṭhair odanaṃ pacati* = 'devadatta cooks rice with wood-fuel', the fire is the fuel which does it. Here wood-fuel and the fire have been identified. When he says: *edhāḥ pakṣyanti tejasā* = 'the wood-fuel will cook with its fire', fire is the instrument because it is now presented as something different from fuel. When the speaker goes further and says: *tejaḥ pacaty auṣṇyena* = 'fire cooks with its heat, fire and heat

are looked upon as different. All this is similar to what happens with actions which differ according to difference in starting-points. The following sentences illustrate this principle: *grāmād āgacchati, grāmasya samīpād āgacchati.* In the first sentence, the word *grāma* has an inclusive denotation and in the second, it has a more restricted denotation.]

Here ends the treatment of instrument. The agent is now going to be dealt with.

101-102. The independence of the agent is accepted for the following reasons: (1) because the agent acquires his capacity before (the operation of the other accessories) and from some other source (2) because he keeps the others subordinate (to himself) (3) because the others act according to his direction (4) because the agent can hold back the others already engaged (5) because no substitute for him is seen (6) because he is present even when the others are not, even though he helps in the accomplishment of the action from a distance.

[The agent has been defined as *svatantra* (independent) in relation to the other accessories. It is the agent who employs the accessories and not vice-versa. It is like this. The agent desires the fruit of the action and sets about collecting the accessories. So he is free or independent from the very beginning. The other accessories are also relatively free in regard to their role but only after the agent enters the scene. In any case they are under the control of the agent. He can restrain any accessory who goes too far. There is always an agent, whether the other accessories are there or not. If there is no agent, there can be no substitute for him or rather if anybody else does the action, he would not be called a substitute as he can do the action on his own, being independent. But if any of the other accessories is not available, they can be replaced.]

It cannot be objected that an inanimate object cannot have these properties and, therefore, cannot become an agent.

103. By means of the properties mentioned above it is the thing which is conveyed by the word that is characterised and not the real thing. When the speaker wishes to convey the properties of the agent, the latter is understood from the words.

[The properties of the agent mentioned above may or may not actually exist in the thing which is the agent in a sentence. But it would be the agent if the words present it as having these properties. In other words, that thing becomes the agent which the speaker presents as having these properties. Therefore, whether a thing is sentient or not, it is the agent really and not merely figuratively, if the words present it as having these properties.]

If independence is a matter of the speaker's intention, the following results.

104. When, on the basis of different fancies (*buddhyavasthābhiḥ*) difference is imagined (in one and the same thing) the qualities of being an object or instrument or agent are brought about.

[If whether a thing is independent or not, is a matter of how the speaker presents it, one can easily understand how one and the same thing can be an agent, an object and an instrument, as in the sentence: *hanty ātmānam ātmanā* = 'he kills himself.' It is only because of the speaker's intention that *ātmā* can become the object (*karma*) and the instrument (*karaṇa*), not in reality. Fictitious difference based entirely on the speaker's fancies, is the basis of such expressions.]

It is now shown that when the fact of being the agent is a matter of presentation by words, other things also become clear.

105. Before it is produced, there is no existence. On the basis of the special intention of the speaker, it becomes, without difference from any other existing thing, the agent of the act of being born.

[Once it is grasped that what is called agent is a matter of presentation by words, other things can also be understood. In the sentence *aṅkuro jāyate* = 'the sprout is born', the sprout which is born either exists or does not exist. If it already exists, why should it be born? If it does not exist how can it be the agent of the act of being born? Such doubts arise if the idea of agent is not a matter of presentation by words, but something having outside reality. An answer to such doubts was given on the basis of *upacārasattā* in the *Sambandhasamuddeśa.* But to say that things denoted by words have *upacārasattā* does not mean that they are figurative meanings of words. That is a different conception altogether. In the expression under discussion, due to the speaker's intention, the idea of sprout comes to the mind. By coming to the mind, it acquires a kind of *sattā* (being). The sprout is now *sat.* So the word *aṅkura* is used. When the word *jāyate* is added, what happens is that the sentence so formed says: the sprout which has already acquired *sattā* and so the capacity of being the agent of the act of being born, is actually born, that is, it is actually born in the external sense also. Thus, there is a difference between the being and the fact of being the agent of the sprout; but this is a difference which exists only in the realm of words (*śābdī*) and not in reality. Thus there is no *upacāra* here, even though there is *upacarasattā.*]

106. Or when the cause appears as the effect, it receives the name of the effect and is said to be born as the effect.

[The expression: the sprout is born (*aṅkuro jāyate*) can be explained even without reference to the world of words,

but with reference to the world of reality. In the previous stanzas, the expression was sought to be explained from the point of view of the effect. It was then necessary to refer to what happens in the mind. But it can be explained from the point of view of the cause. According to the *Sāṅkhyas*, the cause transforms itself into the effect. So *aṅkuro jāyate* would mean: the cause (the seed), being existent, is the agent of the act of being born, i.e. of attaining the next transformation.]

It is now stated that, from the point of view of the grammarian also, it is the cause which becomes the effect.

107. Like the curling-up of a snake or the closing up of the fingers (into a fist) so does the fact of being born belong to existing things.

[What is called being born is nothing more than the same thing appearing in a different form, just as a snake becomes curled up or the fingers become closed in the shape of a fist. The curled-up snake is not different from the uncurled one nor the closed fingers different from the extended ones. The relation of cause and effect is nothing more than different states of the same thing. The same thing persists in all the states.]

It is now stated that even according to the view that the effect is different from the cause, the expression *aṅkuro jāyate* can be explained as an external reality.

108. It is the universal which appears as the particular when the effect which is different from the causes emerges out of them.

[The effect which is different from the cause does not exist as such before its production but it exists in its universal form. It is this universal which, for its own manifestation, sets in motion the accessories. So it is the universal

which already exists that is born as the particular. Thus, as the universal it is the agent and as the particular it is born.]

The author now reaffirms his view that what is called the object (the meaning) is what the word conveys.

109. Both cognition and the word are based on forms existing (in the mind). One does not say: 'it does not exist' without a basis and the non-existent does not really differ from the existent.

[In this stanza, the view that the object (*artha*) is what the word conveys is emphasised. Both cognition and the word are based on whatever form is understood. In the expression '*nāsti*' both the cognition and the word are based on some form or other. Thus they are not different from cognition and the word is based on what exists. In both cases, there is some form or other. There is, really speaking, no difference between *bhāva* and *abhāva*. Whether the thing in question exists outside or not is irrelevant. Thus whether the sprout has an external existence or not, the expression *aṅkura jāyate* is alright because there is some form which figures in the mind.]

110. Cognition and the word relate to objects as experienced. There cannot be any usage of them through any other essence (*tattva*).

Remarks. The text should be *yathābhūteṣu* and not *yathā bhūteṣu*.

[In worldly usage, apart from coming within the range of cognition and the world, objects have no external existence. What is called usage is nothing more than cognition and expression; no cognition exists in which an object does not figure and what figures in it acquires existence and can become the agent of action. In the expression *nāsti*, the external existence of a thing at a particular time and place is denied but it still figures in the mind in a certain form and that is

the agent conveyed by the suffix. Similarly, in the expression *aṅkuro jāyate,* even though the sprout has no external existence, it figures in the mind and as such, it becomes the agent of the action of being born.]

The author now explains the impossibility of birth and destruction according to Monism.

111. Like division of *ākāśa* and movement of shadow, birth and destruction of the One Reality are only fictions of some.

[*Ākāśa* has no division, but divisions are attributed to it on the basis of the objects with which it comes in contact. Shadow is the absence of light and so it has no motion, but motion is attributed to it on the basis of the movement of the object which shuts off the light and causes the shadow. There is no such thing as *abhāva.* There is neither birth nor destruction.]

It is now shown that destruction is only a fiction.

112. Just as the (unreal) absence of *ākāśa* is imagined on the basis of the presence of limited objects, in the same way, the absence of limited bodies is also imagined on the basis of the presence of *ākāśa.*

[What is called destruction is really a fiction. *Ākāśa* is all-pervasive. There is no place where it is not. And yet one creates the fiction that where the limited objects are there is no *ākāśa.* Similarly, there is no such thing as the total destruction of even limited objects like a jar. And yet when they are not visible one understands that there is *ākāśa* where the objects were. When the objects are manifested, one looks upon them as being born. Thus both being born and being destroyed are fictions. Things are neither born nor destroyed. What is called *ākāśa* is not the absence of things. If there is no absence of things, there cannot be birth either, because things are always there.]

Even if birth is real, the expression 'it is born' can be explained.

113. Just as the main action is called by the name of the preliminary acts leading to it, on the basis of their identification, so is the case with the cause and the effect.

[In stanza 106, the expression 'it is born' was explained on the basis of the real identity of cause and effect, according to the *Satkāryavādins*. Now it is being explained on the basis of secondary identity. The root '*pac*' means 'to become soft', as rice does when it is cooked. But Devadatta is supposed to cook, not because he becomes soft but because he does actions like putting the vessel on the fire, etc. which are for the purpose of ultimately making the rice soft. In other words, the result and what leads to it are identified. The cause leads to the effect, it is meant for the effect. So the two can be identified, of course, only secondarily. That is what, we do when we say: 'the sprout is born'. The sprout is the effect but its cause the seed, is secondarily identified with it.]

114. When a doubt arises as to whether it is the modification or the original material which is the agent of the act of being born students hold different views on the basis of different indications.

[The cause is what already exists and the effect is what comes to be. So the effect should really be the agent of the act of being born. But when the relation between cause and effect is that of material and its modification, both the cause and the effect can in turn be the agent of the act of being born. There are expressions like *kṣīraṃ dadhi sampadyate* = milk becomes curds. Here a doubt arises. Is the material 'the main thing (*pradhāna*) or the modification thereof? The main thing is the agent of the act of becoming and the secondary thing is so through the main thing. So

the two are in apposition to each other (*sāmānādhikaraṇyam*) in the sentence. If the two are presented as quite distinct, the modification becomes the agent of the act of being born as in the sentence: *bījād aṅkuro jāyate*='the sprout is born of the seed', because the material is presented as the starting-point. Those who say that the modification is the agent of the act of being born mean this: being born means attaining one's own self. That which was not already existent attains its own self. So it is the modification which attains its self. Those who think that the material is the agent of the act of being born say that a modification which does not yet exist cannot look forward to attaining its own self. So it cannot be the agent of the act of being born. What is called being born is the fact of looking forward to being born. As the material is already there, it can look forward to attaining the next stage, the modification. So it is the material which is the agent of the act of being born.]

The author now indicates the respective scope of the two points of view.

115. According to the *vārttika—kḷpi sampadyamāne* (vā. 2. on P. 2.3.13.) the fourth-case affix comes after the word expressive of modification. The (dual) number is based on *kuṇḍala* (ear-ring) when the material is a lump of gold.

[According to the *vārttika-kḷpi sampadyamane*, the fourth case-affix comes after the word expressive of modification, as in the sentence: *mūtrāya sampadyate yavāgūḥ*. The modification is the agent of the act of becoming (*sampatti-kriyā*) because the sentence really means: *yavāguḥ mūtraṃ sampadyate*. Here the material is connected with action through the modification. Where the two are conceived of as quite distinct, one would say: *yavāgvā mūtraṃ jāyate*. Here the material is presented as the source or the starting point (*apādāna*) and so there is the fifth case-affix. Where the two are not thought of as quite distinct, there is the fourth

case-affix. That is the difference in the scope. In the expression: *suvarṇapiṇḍaḥ kuṇḍale bhavataḥ*, it is the modification (ear-rings) which is the agent of the act of becoming, as shown by the dual number is *bhavataḥ*.]

Difference of scope is now explained in another way.

116. In the sentence, it is the word '*saṅgha*' which is the agent of the action denoted by the suffix '*cvi*' but in a complex formation (*vṛtti*) it is the word *brāhmaṇaḥ* which is the agent.

[The expression '*saṅghībhavanti brāhmaṇāḥ*' is an illustration of P. 5.4.50. To explain it in a sentence, one would say: *asaṅgho brāhmaṇāḥ saṅgho bhavati*. In the former sentence, the verb is in the plural, showing that *brāhmaṇāḥ* is the agent of the action of becoming *saṅgha* (group, association), that is, the material is the agent. In the explanatory sentence, it is the modification, the *saṅgha*, which is the agent.]

Here is an indication pointed out by the author of the M.Bhā. that the original material can become the agent.

117. In the sentence *atvaṃ tvaṃ sampadyate tvadbhavati*, the person of the verb *tvadbhavati* is not according to the modification *tvam* which is the agent but it is according to the original, that is, *atvam*.

[In *atvaṃ tvaṃ sampadyate tvadbhavati*, it is the modification *tvam* which is the agent and so the verb should really be *bhavasi* and yet it is *bhavati*. In other words, it is according to the original (*prakṛti*) *atvam*.]

The difference in scope and the consequent difference in usage are now explained.

118. What is being born is something which does not give up the previous condition (cause) and is about

to attain the next condition (effect) and is thus something which is a combination of both.

[How to explain this difference in scope and the consequent difference in usage? The fact is that the thing which is born is not something which was totally non-existent. Even while being born, it does not completely abandon the previous condition of being the cause. Thus that state is also the agent. But it is not inactive in that condition. It is about to enter into the next condition. So the next condition is also the agent. Thus what is born has one foot in the previous condition and the other foot in the next condition. It extends from one condition to the other (*pratāyamānarūpam*) and is, therefore, in agreement with the meanings of both the root and the suffix.]

The objection that both would then be always agents is answered as follows;—

119. One of them is more active and the attribute is just understood in the other case. Even though the powers of things are different, they are sometimes combined.

[As the material and the modification are identical, both can be the agents of the **act of being born.** Sometimes the material is active and sometimes the modification. But it has been shown that sometimes they have different scopes. Both are agents but one of them is presented as being more active and the other less so.]

Why one does not say *'atvaṃ tvaṃ sampadyase tvadbhavasi'* is now explained.

120. If the person is interchanged, it would convey the opposite meaning, because the accessory would be understood as active (and another modification would have to be postulated as having the fruit).

[We do not say *'atvaṃ tvaṃ sampadyase tvadbhavasi'*, because the meaning intended to be conveyed, namely that *'atvam'* is the material and *'tvam'* is the modification would not be understood. Instead, one would understand that *'tva'* is the active material and one would think of some other modification of it.]

This point is now explained.

121. Here, as in the case of a king becoming a servant, one would have to imagine something like: You are becoming something else.

[It would be like the following example. In the sentence "*rājan arājā sampadyase* = 'O king! you are becoming a non-king' it is king who becomes non-king. The king is, therefore, the *prakṛti,* (the original material) and is in apposition to *tvam* which is understood from the verb. The king in the sentence is active and is the agent of the act of becoming non-king. Similarly, if the sentence were *'tvadbhavasi' tvam* would become the agent of the act of attaining another state and so the meaning intended would not be conveyed. In order that it may be conveyed, the verb has been put in the first person. The sentence should not mean something different from what is intended. In *'suvarṇapiṇḍaḥ kuṇḍale bhavataḥ'* = 'the lump of gold becomes two gold ear-rings', even when one understands that it is the two ear-rings which are the agents of the act of becoming because of the dual suffix in *bhavataḥ* nobody understands the opposite of what is intended. Nobody understands that the ear-rings become gold. Gold cannot be the agent of the action denoted by the root *'bhū'* except through its modification.]

If one who is independent (*svatantra*) is the agent, how can he remain so when he is made to do something by somebody else? This is now explained—

122-123. The agent who is prompted by another is not different from the other independent agents about

whom there is no doubt because (1) he has been chosen as the agent for his capacity to accomplish the action, (2) he engages the other accessories to do the action which they can accomplish, (3) he is prompted by another and so becomes subordinate just because of his independence.

[The agent has been said to be independent and independence has been defined in stanzas 101-102. But when A makes B do something, how does B become the agent? He has no independence. The answer is that B does not lose his independence merely because A makes him do something. A would not make him do it unless A knew his capacity. This capacity makes him retain his independence. Just because of this capacity-independence, he comes under somebody else's orders. Thus there is no contradiction between his independence and his dependence. The one who is ordered retains his independence in the matter of engaging the other accessories of the action in a suitable manner. There he is not under anybody else's order. In this way, he is not different from a person who acts spontaneously.]

124. For some reason or other everybody acts for his own benefit. Following the wish of another is also in order to fulfil one's own purpose.

[It is also possible to hold that nobody loses his independence merely because of his being prompted by another. Everybody acts for his own benefit: the servant who works for his master and the sage who is free from all desires and works for others ultimately act to fulfil their own purposes. In such expressions as *bhikṣā vāsayati* = 'alms make one live (in a particular place), the *bhikṣā* is treated as a sentient thing and an intention is attributed to it.]

The topic of 'agent' has now come to an end, and that of '*hetu*' who is nothing more than the agent who prompts another, is now going to be dealt with.

125. It is the agent who, by ordering or requesting and doing things favourable to an action, acquires the name of prompter which is taught in the *śāstra*.

[The agent who prompts another is called *hetu* according to P. 1.4.55. Prompting an inferior to act by giving an order is what is called *preṣaṇa*. Prompting a superior is called *adhyeṣaṇa*. Prompting somebody to act can be attributed even to insentient things like 'alms'. *Hetu*, the prompter must be distinguished from what is called *hetu* in the world. In the world, whatever brings about a substance or a thing or a quality is called *hetu* as in the expressions: *dhanena yaśaḥ* = glory through wealth, *pākena raktaḥ* = red through heat. The word *hetu* is used in the *śāstra*, now in the sense of prompter which is a technical meaning and now in the sense of cause, which is the worldly meaning. In P. 3.1.26; and 7.3.40, the word is used in a technical sense but in P. 2.3.23; 3.2.126; 3.2.20 and in 3.3.156, it is used in the worldly sense.]

The idea is further explained.

126. The imperative (*loṭ*) is used after roots like *pṛcch* when the bare object is prompted. When the already active object is prompted, it comes within the scope of the use of the causative affix (*ṇic*).

[The imperative (*loṭ*) is used when some one who is not yet an agent is sought to be made an agent, as in *kaṭaṃ kuru*. The causative (*ṇic*) is used when someone who is already an agent is sought to be kept in that position, when it is desired that he should not cease to be an agent.]

It is now shown why the one who is prompted is called the agent (*kartā*) and not (*karma*).

127. The agent who becomes the object of the act of prompting is called by his own characteristic (agent) because he retains his independence in regard to his

own minor action and also because of the restriction of the name (*karma*) (to special cases).

[Here a doubt arises: The one who is prompted is sought to be reached by the prompter and so he is *īpsitatama* and should get the name of *karma* according to P. 1.4.49. and not that of *kartā*. This doubt is removed as follows. It has already been pointed out that the one who is prompted does not lose his independence. So he remains the agent and does not become the object (*karma*). Secondly it is only in the case of certain fixed types of roots that what was the agent in the absence of the causative affix (*ṇic*) becomes the object in the presence of *ṇic*. That is the purpose of the *sūtra* P. 1.4.52.]

As the ultimate result to be achieved also prompts the agent in a way, why is it not called the '*hetu*', the agent-prompter ? This is now answered.

128. The object (the result) prompts (*preraka*) the action and the prompter prompts the agent. The action consisting of production (*utpatti*) modification (*saṃskāra*) and reaching (*pratipatti*) is for the sake of the fruit (*karma*).

Remark. The second line of the stanza should be: *Karmārthā hi kriyotpattisaṃskārapratipattibhiḥ*.

[The object cannot be called *hetu* on the ground that it prompts the accomplishment of the action on which its own existence depends. Because, according to the *śāstra*, the *hetu* (prompter-agent) prompts, not the action but the agent. The object (*karma*) is the fruit of the action. So the action is done for the fruit thereof. The action in question may be production, modification or reaching. In any case, if the object prompts anything at all, it is the action and not the agent.]

Here ends the treatment of *Hetu*.

Now begins the treatment of *sampradāna*.

129. That factor in the act of giving which is sought to be reached by the thing given is called *sampradāna* when he does not prohibit the giver, or requests him or gives his consent.

[The dative case is now being explained. The word for it in Sanskrit is *sampradāna*. It is one of the factors in the act of giving. Giving means relinquishing one's own ownership over something without taking anything in return. The giver intends to reach somebody with his gift and that person is called *sampradāna*. The one who receives does not decline nor does he prohibit the giver from giving. Sometimes the receiver himself makes a previous request for the gift. When the person who receives gets the name of *sampradāna*, the fourth case-affix (*caturthī*) is affixed to the word expressive of it. This suffix cannot be affixed unless the name *sampradāna* is applicable. It cannot come according to the rule '*tādarthye caturthī*' *vācyā* (cf. vā. 1 on P. 2.3.13), because there is no *tādarthya* = the fact of being meant for something, in cases of gift. In *upādhyāyāya gāṃ dadāti* = he gives the cow to the teacher, the teacher, being a *kāraka* is meant for the action of giving and not vice-versa.]

The main kind of *sampradāna* has thus been explained. The minor kinds are now explained.

130. In the *sūtras* beginning with *rucyarthānāṃ prīyamāṇaḥ* (P. 1.4.33), it is the *śāstra* which gives the name of Recipient (*sampradāna*) to what would otherwise have been *Hetu*, *Karma* or *Śeṣa*.

[But for P. 1.4.33, there would be no fourth case-affix (*caturthī*) after the word Devadatta in a sentence like *Devadattāya rocate modakaḥ*, because Devadatta is really *Hetu*. How? Devadatta prompts the cake which is becoming the object of desire. So the word Devadatta should take whatever case-affix the prompter is supposed to take. But the *sūtra* concerned makes him a *sampradāna* and so the word

gets the fourth case-affix. As Devadatta ceases to be *Hetu*, there is no causative affix (*ṇic*) and no prompting. So the cake does the action quite independently as the agent. *Rocate* means 'becomes the object of desire'. Similarly in the other *sūtras* that immediately follow P. 1.4.33 which teach the name *sampradāna*, something which would otherwise have been *Hetu* or *Karma* is given that name and so the word gets the fourth case-affix. The *sūtra*: *karmaṇā yam abhipraiti sa sampradānam* (P. 1.4.32) teaches the normal natural *sampradāna* whereas the others give the technical name *sampradāna* merely to explain the fourth case-affix.]

131. When difference is meant to be conveyed, each succeeding action becomes the object (*karma*) of the preceding one and that is why the mention of *kriyā* has not been made.

[When there is a transitive verb one can understand that the agent may intend the actions in question for somebody who thus becomes the recipient (*sampradāna*). Can there be a recipient when the root is *akarmaka* (intransitive)? The author of the *Mahābhāṣya* has expressed the view that the action itself can become *karma* in the technical sense and whomsoever that action is meant for becomes *sampradāna* as in the sentences *patye śete, yuddhāya sannahyate*. Here the actions of *śayana* (lying down) and *sannahana* (getting ready) are respectively meant for the husband and the battle. So the latter become *sampradāna* and the words expressive of them take the fourth case-affix. They have become *sampradāna* by the main *sūtra* itself (P. 1.4.32) without there being any necessity to introduce the word *kriyā* in the *sūtra* as had been suggested. See M.Bhā. on P. 1.4.32 and *Kārikas* 16-17.]

132. When, on the other hand, the different actions are looked upon as a unity, then the object itself is connected with action and is called by its own name (*karma*).

[Here it might be said that if action can also be looked upon as *karma* and what it is meant for becomes *sampradāna,* one would have to say *odanāya pacati,* because the action of cooking is meant for the production of cooked rice which thus becomes the *sampradāna* and takes the fourth case-affix. But this is not the correct position. The action of cooking is not thought of as having parts related as *aṅga* and aṅgin to one another or as *kriyā* and *kāraka* to one another. It is thought of as a unity and in relation to that the cooked rice is the *karma* and not *sampradāna.* No action becomes *karma* in the technical sense in this case.]

133. Whether the action is to be conveyed as a whole or as having parts depends on its own nature. Therefore, there is no mistake in respect of the object of roots having the meaning of motion.

[Whether an action is to be thought of as a whole or as having parts depends upon worldly usage. The destination of the act of going can be *karma* or *sampradāna* according as the act of going with its previous mutual stages is thought of as a unity or as having parts. That is why both the second and the fourth case-suffixes are taught with verbs expressive of the act of going as in: *grāmaṃ gacchati* or *grāmāya gacchati.*]

134. If both the names (*karma* and *sampradāna*) were optionally possible everywhere, the approval and rejection of the *sūtra* (P. 2.3.12) would not have the same effect.

[If some principle to regulate when the action is to be thought of as a whole and when it is to be thought of as having parts is not adopted, both the names would be possible everywhere. So some regulating principle is needed. In regard to roots expressive of actions involving movement, there are both possibilities. In cases like *srāddhāya nigalhate,* the

action is always thought of as having parts. In cases like *pacaty odanam,* it is always thought of as a unity. In *manasā pāṭaliputraṃ gacchati* and *adhvānam gacchati,* also, it is always thought of as a unity. Both the second and the fourth case-suffixes are optionally added to a word expressive of an object (*karma*) which has not been reached or contacted (*asamprāpta*). As one is already in contact with the path along which one walks, the word expressive of it like *adhvan* can only take the second case-affix as in *adhvānaṃ gacchati* = he walks along the path.]

The last point is now explained.

135. In the case of the object (of going) which is said to be contacted (*āsthita*), action has two aspects: abandonment of what has already been reached and contact of what has yet to be reached.

[The action of going along a road consists of two parts: Abandoning the spot which has already been reached and the reaching of the spot which has not yet been covered. It is a continuous process of which the road is the object. The road is not thought of as something for which the action is meant. It is thought of as something to be covered by the action of going. So it does not become the *sampradāna.* But when the idea is that one reaches the right road by going along the wrong one, then the word denoting the right road would take both the second and the fourth case-affixes optionally as in *panthānaṃ gacchati, pathe gacchati.*]

Here ends the topic of *Sampradāna.*

Now begins the treatment of *apādāna* = starting point.

136. A starting-point is of three kinds: that in relation to which a movement is mentioned, that in relation to which the verb expresses the movement only partly and that in relation to which some movement is required.

[That which is still firm in a case of separation or departure is called *apādāna* = starting point. When something goes off from a starting-point, the latter is stable and that which goes off has movement. In *grāmād āgacchati* = 'he comes from the village, the movement from the starting point is directly expressed. In *valāhakād vidyotate vidyut* = 'the lightning flashes from the cloud, 'flashes' does not mean 'shines' only, but 'comes out and shines, that is, the action in relation to which the cloud is the starting point is not mentioned but understood. There is a relation of primary and secondary between what is mentioned and what is understood. In *māthurāḥ pāṭaliputrakebhya āḍhyatarāḥ* = 'the inhabitants of *Mathurā* are richer than those of *Pātaliputra*', no action or movement is mentioned. But the word '*pāṭaliputrakebhyaḥ* has the fifth case-affix and so it denotes the starting-point. But a thing can be a starting point only in relation to a separation or departure which is therefore, required here. One has to supply something mentally.]

It is stated that separation or departure is not mere movement.

137. Just as 'revolving' is indeed a kind of going conditioned by conjunction in a particular direction, in the same way, what is called departure is indeed conditioned by the starting point and it inheres in that which moves.

[What is meant by *apāya?* It is not mere movement. According to the *Vaiśeṣikas* what is called revolving is only movement conditioned by conjunction and disjunction in a particular direction. In the same way what is called *apāya* is a kind of abandonment inhering in something which moves and having something which does not move as the starting point. It is called *apāya* in relation to the starting-point. The starting point thus helps in the accomplishment of this kind of movement and so it becomes the *kāraka* (accessory to action) called *apādāna*.]

It is now explained how even that which moves can be a starting-point.

138. Stability (*dhrauvyam*) is not understood from the *sūtra* as the property of a thing. What is meant is stability in relation to the particular movement called separation.

[What is meant by *dhruva* (stable, firm) is not that it is a permanent property of a thing, but only that it is not affected by the movement of that which departs. In the sentence *dhāvato' śvāt patati* = 'he falls from the running horse', even though the horse is presented as moving, it is not affected by the movement of the one who falls. What is called *apāya* (separation, departure) is accomplished by two things: something which is active and something which is inactive. Here the horse is inactive as far as the falling is concerned. Mere inactivity is not enough, it has to be inactivity in relation to the departure of that which departs. Hence in the sentence: *grāmād āgacchati pathā parvatam* = 'from the village he comes along the road to the mountain', though the road and the mountain are inactive, they are not so in regard to the action of coming and so they are not *apādāna*. The village is stationary in regard to the action of coming and so it is *apādāna*.]

139. In regard to the (horse's) action of trotting, Devadatta (the rider) is stationery; in regard to Devadatta's falling, the horse is stationary. That which is affected by the separation has been declared to be active.

[In regard to the horse's action of trotting, Devadatta (the rider) is inactive; in regard to Devadatta's falling, the horse is inactive. In either case, what is inactive or stationary (*dhruva*) is not affected by departure or separation. Not being affected by the separation is given as the reason for being considered stationary.]

How to distinguish between what is stationary and what is not when both have movement is now explained.

140. Even though both the rams are active in regard to the separation cause by the action of both, the two actions of separation are meant to be different.

[In the sentence: *apasarpato meṣān meṣo 'parsarpati'*, both the rams are presented as active in regard to the separation which takes place. But there are two acts of separation and in regard to each of them, the other ram is inactive (*dhruva*) and so becomes *apādāna.*]

Therefore,

141. In regard to the other ram, each one is the starting point; in regard to its own action, each one is the agent.

What happens when the two rams are not presented as starting-points for each other is now explained.

142. If the same action is presented as accomplished by both, then both become agents of the action of departure (separation) if some other starting-point is mentioned.

[In the sentence *meṣāv apasarpataḥ* both the rams are presented as agents of the action of going away. Both would, however, become agents of the action of departure (*apāya*) if some starting point were mentioned as in *parvatād apasarpataḥ* = 'the two move away (depart) from the hill .]

It is now shown that there cannot be any *apāya* unless there is a starting-point.

143. It is understood that unless there is a starting point, there cannot be any departure (*apāya*). This

has been explained in the *Bhāṣya* in regard to the sentence: *vṛkṣasya parṇaṃ patati* = 'the leaf of the tree falls'.

[It is explained in the *Mahābhāṣya* on P. 1.4.23 that a movement cannot be called *apāya* except in relation to a starting point. That is why in the sentence *vṛkṣasya parṇam patati* = 'the leaf of the tree falls' the action of falling is not *apāya* because the tree is not presented as the starting-point. In the sentence *vṛkṣāt parṇam patati* = the leaf falls from the tree, the falling is *apāya* because the tree is here presented as the starting point.]

How one and the same thing becomes a different *kāraka* is now explained.

144. Difference, identity, separation, resting place — these mutually contradictory properties in regard to the cloud are not desired to be conveyed by the speaker at the same time.

[If, according to the *vārttika*: *apādānam uttarāṇi* (vā. 30 on P. 1.4.1.), the *kārakas* taught after *apādāna* supersede it, how do we get expressions like *valāhakād vidyotate*, *valāhake vidyotate* and *valāhako vidyotate* where *valāhaka* is *apādāna* also. The answer is that it is a question of how the speaker wants to present it. Light is one of the constituents of a cloud. If the speaker wants to present it as different from the cloud, as something coming out of the cloud which is the starting point, then the fifth case-affix would come after the word *valāhaka*. But it is open to the speaker to present the cloud not as the starting point but as the resting point and say *valāhake vidyotate* = 'it flashes in the cloud'. It is also open to the speaker to present the light as identical with the cloud and say *valāhako vidyotate* = 'the cloud flashes'. These expressions are used only in turn, according to the speaker's intention. So they do not go against the *vārttika* in question.]

It is now going to be shown that the *vārttika* in question applies when both the powers are meant to be conveyed at the same time.

145. In the expression *dhanuṣā vidhyati* = 'he hits with the bow', unless the idea of the arrow going off the bow is meant to be conveyed, the bow cannot be the instrument of the act of shooting. Therefore both the ideas apply at the same time.

[In *dhanuṣā vidhyati,* the name *karaṇa* supersedes that of *apādāna.* Nobody can shoot with a bow unless the bow is at the same time the starting point of the arrow. Or rather, the speaker has to mean that it is the starting point. Thus both the names *karaṇa* and *apādāna* are applicable but, according to the *vārttika*: *apādānam uttarāṇi,* the later name *karaṇa* supersedes the former name *apādāna* and the third case-affix comes after the word *dhanus* and not the fifth. Really speaking, there is no difficulty about two names being applicable at the same time to the same thing, but two suffixes cannot come after the same word at the same time. So one name has to be kept in abeyance.]

It is now stated that the two powers can be looked upon as one.

146. Or rather the power is really one, having two forms which are occasions for the application of two names. The earlier one is superseded by the later one.

[In the previous stanza, it was assumed that the same thing (the bow) had two distinct powers: that of being the starting point and that of being the instrument and that, in the act of shooting, both the powers play a part and so both the names become applicable. With the two names would come two suffixes after the same word which is impossible. So the later name was said to supersede the former and so only one

suffix comes after the word. The difficulty can be solved in another way also; that is, by looking upon the two powers as one, the power of being the starting point being merged in that of being the instrument. In fact, the bow can be the instrument only because it is the starting point for the arrow to go off. The power is one and it does two actions related to each other as primary and secondary: the going-off of the arrow is secondary to the act of hitting.]

147. (The name *apādāna* = starting point) taught in connection with selection (*nirdhāraṇe*), separation (*vibhakte*) and with roots expressive of the ideas of fear, protection etc. (*bhītrādīnām*), is either that in relation to which a movement of separation is mentioned (*upātta*) or that in relation to which some movement is required (*apekṣita*) and it has been done only to help the ignorant.

[The fifth case-affix is taught in P. 2.3.41 and 42 and the name *apādāna* is taught in P. 1.4.25 and 26 and in Vā. 1. on P. 1.4.24. Really speaking, these *sūtras* and the *vārttika* are unnecessary. Without them, the name *apādāna* and consequently, the fifth case-affix would result from the main *sūtra*, namely, P. 1.4.24. In all these cases, there is mental contact followed by mental separation, which is the essence of *apāya*. In some cases, the movement of separation is mentioned, while in some other cases, it is required. In all cases, there is separation of some kind.]

Here ends the treatment of *apādāna*.

Now begins the treatment of *adhikaraṇa* (abode, location).

148. That which helps in the accomplishment of the action by holding it indirectly through the agent or the object is called *adhikaraṇa* (abode) in the Science of Grammar.

[In the world, a thing can be called *adhikaraṇa* (abode, location) in relation to an action, a quality or a substance. In grammar, a thing is so called when it helps in the accomplishment of the action by doing the service called *dhāraṇa* = holding. Action is directly connected with the agent or the object. That which holds these two is called *adhikaraṇa*. In other words, it helps in the accomplishment of the action only indirectly, through the agent or the object. By holding the agent or the object, as in *kaṭe āste* = he sits on the mat, *sthālyāṃ pacati* = he cooks in the pot, a thing is called abode (*adhikaraṇa*).]

149. Contact (*upaśleṣa*) is the same whether the abode be sesame (*tila*), space (*ākāśa*) or mat (*kaṭa*) etc. But the service rendered differs according as the objects are in contact through *saṃyoga* (conjunction) or through *samavāya* (inherence).

[The relation between an abode (*ādhāra*) and what is on it (*ādheya*) is contact (*upaśleṣa*). It is the same in all the three kinds of abodes. Where there is conjunction (*saṃyoga*), the contact is not at all points, as in *kaṭe āste* = he sits on the mat. The sitter is not in contact with the mat at all points. Where there is inherence (*samavāya*), the contact is at all points, as in *tileṣu tailam* = 'oil in the sesame seeds'. In *khe śakunayaḥ* = 'birds in the sky' and *gurau vasati* = 'he lives with the *guru*, the abode is said to be *vaiṣayika*. *Ākāśa* has no real parts but only fictional ones. To say that the disciple lives with the *guru* means that he depends upon him. It is in that sense that the *guru* is the abode, The contact between the two is mental.]

What the services are is now explained.

150. Non-destruction, independence in supporting the weight, connection with particular regions, such are the causes of difference.

[The sesame seed renders service to the oil by not itself perishing, a couch renders service by supporting the weight of the person who lies on it, the sky prevents birds from falling (from coming into contact with the lower region). To say that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west expresses the connection of the sun with these two regions.]

What the final abode of all is, is now stated.

151. According to some, it is *ākāśa* (space) which, by postulating regional differences, becomes the support of all things which come into contact with others.

[If all material things have an abode or a support, the latter, being itself material, must have a support. And what is that? It is *ākāśa*. Stars and planets have *ākāśa* as their support. Somethings have earth as their support but earth itself has *ākāśa* as its support. Parts are the support of the whole. In the last resort, atoms are the support of divisible things but *ākāśa* is the support of atoms.]

Some question the very existence of *ākāśa* and so the proof of its existence, known in the world, is now being given.

152. The expression: 'this thing is here' in regard to objects would not be possible on the basis of non-existence. Therefore, it has been declared to be based on *ākāśa*.

[The existence of *ākāśa* is based on the principle that for the grammarians, what the word conveys is the object. There are expressions like this: *idaṃ nakṣatram atra tiṣṭhati* = this star is here. The word *atra* 'here' must point to something and not to nothing. Whatever it points to is *ākāśa*. We use expressions after perceiving or cognising something. In verbal usage that which has been cognised is what exists. That is why even non-existence (*abhāva*)

becomes a support in expressions like *śatror abhāve sukham*= 'in the absence of the enemy, there is happiness.']

While *ākāśa* is the support of all finished (*siddha*) things, it is now declared that Time is the support of all unfinished things or processes (*sādhya*).

153. It is through Time that actions are divided and it 'is through space that all objects are divided. So much is the differentiation based on Unity.

[Time is responsible for the birth, existence and decay of things. Time is the support of these three processes. Space distinguishes object from one another by allotting to them particular regions. The universe consists of differentiated objects and actions and this differentiation is based upon the unity of Time and Space, which in their turn, being powers of Brahman, are based upon its absolute Unity.]

Under P. 1.4.48, Katyayana says that the 'abode' in relation to the action denoted by the root '*vas*' with the preposition '*upa*' namely 'to fast' cannot become *karma*, as it does when the action is merely to 'reside'. Patañjali points out that this prohibition is unnecessary. It would not have become *karma* in any case. Taking the example *grāme upavasati*, 'he fasts in the village', Patanjali points that the village is the abode, not in relation to the action of fasting, but in relation to the action of residing or staying which is understood here. The sentence means: *grāme 'sau vasanstrirātram upavasati* = 'while staying in the village, he fasts for three nights' (*M.Bhā.* I, p. 332, l. 8). Fasting is always for a definite period the word expressive of which automatically becomes the *karma*. The word expressive of residing is not mentioned but the action is understood and it is in relation to that that the village is the 'abode' (*adikaraṇa*) and takes the seventh case-affix.

What happens when a particular abode is also meant to be conveyed is now stated.

154. Even when fasting takes place in a particular place it still depends upon a period of time, because of the natural power of words.

[Even when a particular place is meant to be associated with the fasting as in the sentence, '*tīrthe upavasati*' = 'he fasts in the holy place', the connection of fasting with the holy place is only indirect. A person has to stay somewhere before fasting. Though in the sentence in question, there is no word expressive of staying it is understood and it is in relation to that that '*tīrtha*' is the abode.]

It is now stated that time, though not mentioned in the sentence under discussion, becomes the *karma*, because of the nature of the act of fasting which is the main thing in the sentence.

155. Though the act of staying is not mentioned, the place is the abode and though a word like 'three nights' is not mentioned, it is declared to be object of the act of fasting.

[The village is unfit to be connected with the act of fasting and so it becomes the abode (*adhikaraṇa*) of the act of staying which is understood even though not mentioned. The means is capable of bringing to the mind the action of which it is the means, even though it is not mentioned. It comes to the mind as the *karma* of the act of fasting. The act of staying is secondary compared to the act of fasting. As the scope of the name *karma* has already been fulfilled it does not affect the name 'abode' of the village in relation to the act of staying. When the root *vas* with the preposition *upa* means a particular kind of staying, then the village can become its *karma* as in *grāmam upavasati* = he dwells in the village.]

Here ends the treatment of 'abode' (*adhikarana*). The meaning of the sixth case-affix is now going to be consider-

ed. How it is an accessory and how it is *śeṣa* (the rest) will be explained.

156. That relation which is different from those called 'accessories' and is preceded by the relation of action and accessory whether the action is mentioned or not, is now explained.

[The relation which is different from, that is, which remains after the six relations beginning with *karma,* is called *śeṣa*=the rest. The *Bhāṣyakāra* has said that when any of the six relations is not meant as such, it become *śeṣa* (*M.Bhā.* I, p. 463, l. 13). By saying that it involves a previous relation of action and accessory, it has been made a kind of accessory. The relation of master and servant in the expression *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ* = 'the King's man', implies a previous relation of action and accessory, or rather of donor and recipient between the two and that is how this relation also becomes a kind of accessory (*kāraka*). The previous relation of donor and recipient is the cause and the later relation of master and servant is the result. When the previous particular relation is not meant to be conveyed, a very general relation is all that remains and that is what is called *śeṣa*. In this example, no action is mentioned. In *mātuḥ smarati* = 'he remembers his mother', the fact of mother being the object of remembrance is not meant and so the relationship comes under *śeṣa*. That is why there is the sixth case-affix in *mātuḥ* and not the second case-affix. Here, an action is mentioned.]

Why the sixth case-affix is not added to the word '*puruṣa*' also is now explained.

157. Even though it (the *śeṣa* relation) rests on both it brings about a distinction in what are secondary because of their being subordinate to something else. Being expressed there (that is, in what are secondary), it touches what is primary also.

[The relation (of master and servant, in this case) is one though it rests on both and so it is right that the sixth case-affix should be used only on one of the terms. If it were used on both, the relation would be understood twice. If it is to be used only once, it is natural that it should be joined to the word expressive of what is secondary and not to the one expressive of what is primary. What is secondary follows what is primary. The relation brings about a distinction in what is secondary and so it causes a change in the form of the word expressive of it. What is primary retains its original form and comes within the relation. Whatever peculiarity it gets (that is, the fact of belonging to somebody) is due to the sentence and so it cannot affect its form. Hence the sixth case-affix is not added to it.]

From the relation which is the result, one can infer in a general manner that it must have been preceded by the relation of action and accessory. But how to understand which particular action and accessory ?

158. The particular (action which is the) cause of the relation is not understood from the words. The post-positions (*karmapravacanīyas*) relate it to a particular (action).

[In some expressions denoting relation but not mentioning any action, the latter can be understood from the nature of the things related, as in *pituḥ putraḥ* = 'the father's son', But from the expression *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ* = 'the king's man' it is not easy to understand the particular action which has brought about the relation of master and servant. When there is *karma-pravacaniya*, the particular action which brought about the relation can be understood. For example, in the sentence *śākalyasya saṃhitām anu prāvarṣat* = 'it rained after the recitation of *Saṃhitā* by *Sākalya*', thert is the relation of cause and effect between the recitation and rain and this relation is due to the action of hearing. The post-position '*anu*' tells us that it is due to this action because this postposition is seen elsewhere associated with the action of hearing as in '*anu-*

niśamya'. '*Anu*' cannot suggest a verb here in the same way as *vi* suggests the verb *vimāya* in *prādeśaṃ viparilikhati*. Here the word *prādeśam* has a case-ending belonging to a *kāraka* and so *vi* can bring a verb expressive of action to the mind. But in *śākalyasya saṃhitām anu prāvarṣat,* the case-ending is not expressive of *kāraka,* but of *śeṣa*. Nor can *anu* directly expresses the relation of cause and effect, because that is done by the second case-affix which takes the place of the sixth case-affix. The real function of *anu* is, therefore, to delimit the relation, to say that it is brought about by the particular action of hearing.]

Why are P. 2.3.51 and the following *sūtras* given considering that the sixth case-affix can come in all the cases mentioned in these *sūtras* by P. 2.3.50?

159. The sixth case affix is taught when the relation comes under 'the rest' and is qualified by one of the means and when the action is actually mentioned in order to prevent the formation of a compound word.

[In P. 2.3.50 'the rest' is given as the present state of what was a means like *karma* before. That becomes, therefore an adjective qualifying 'the rest'. Even though the sixth case-affix can come by P. 2.3.50, some cases are separately mentioned in P. 2.3.51: in order that the sixth case-affix may actually be used and not elided. In other words, the purpose is to prevent the formation of a compound word where the sixth case-affix would naturally be elided.]

160. The sixth case-affix which is taught in P. 2.3.65 is prohibited when the *kṛt* suffix is *kta* according to P. 2.3.69. As the sixth case-affix is because of the relation coming under 'the rest' the formation of the compound is not allowed.

[A word ending in the sixth case-affix according to P. 2.3, 65 can enter into a compound with another word connected in

meaning as in *'dharmānusmaraṇam, arthānusmaraṇam* and so on. In *mātuḥ smṛtam,* the sixth case-affix comes because the relation is *śeṣa.* It cannot be looked upon as *kāraka-ṣaṣṭhī,* because it is prohibited by P. 2.3.69. That is why the two words cannot be joined to form a compound word.]

It is now stated that the same thing can be primary and secondary in regard to two different things.

161. When something already characterised by one thing becomes related to still another, it partakes of two properties in different spheres.

[In the sentence *rājñaḥ puruśasya kambalaḥ* = 'the blanket of the king's man', *rājñaḥ* qualifies *puruṣa* which is, therefore, primary in regard to it. It qualifies *kambala* and therefore becomes secondary in regard to it. Thus one and the same thing can be primary and secondary in regard to two different things.]

162. After having attained importance in regard to what is secondary to itself it becomes secondary in regard to something else which is primary, when the word '*saha*' is used. When something is connected with its own property, its previous importance in regard to what is secondary to itself is not affected.

The *puruṣa* became first the primary in regard to *rājñaḥ* which expresses that which qualifies it. When next *puruṣa* becomes something which qualifies and, is, therefore, secondary to *kambala,* it does not cease to be primary in regard to *rājñaḥ* because the two spheres are quite different. It is in regard to the same object that a thing cannot be primary and secondary at the same time. The case considered is like the following one: in *devadattasya putraḥ, putra* is primary in regard to *devadatta,* but in *putreṇa sahāgataḥ* = 'he comes with the son', the word '*saha*' shows that *putra* is secondary in regard to the action of coming according to P. 2.3.19.]

Here ends the treatment of *śeṣa* (the rest).

The six accessories described in the preceding pages can be expressed by verbal suffixes, those of the primary and secondary derivations and by compounds. When not expressed by any one of these four the case affixes are used to express them. When they are already expressed by one of these four, the first case affix is used after the stem, because a bare stem cannot be used. When a noun is used without any other word following it, the first case affix is used as in *vṛkṣaḥ*. Here there is the fiction that the verb *'asti'* though absent, is understood and as the verbal suffix in it is expressive of the agent, and as the word *vṛkṣa* is in apposition to it, the latter takes the first case affix, according to the principle *tiṅsamānādhikaraṇe prathamā*. A noun in apposition to another ending in the first case affix also takes it.

The first case affix has been prescribed while addressing somebody (*sambodhana*). The vocative case is now going to be explained.

163. Merely turning the attention of somebody already there towards oneself has been declared to be the nature of the vocative case (*sambodhana*). It is, indeed, one whose attention has been attracted that is employed in some action.

[Turning the attention of one who is already there in order to prompt him to do something is what is called the vocative and it is a meaning over and above that of the bare stem. It is quite different from relations with action such as *karma*, etc. As it is one whose attention has been invited that is employed to do an action, this inviting of attention helps indirectly (but not directly) in the accomplishment of the action.]

Even when indirectly connected with action, the meaning of the vocative is not part of the meaning of the sentence.

164. (a-b) It is handed down from the ancients that the vocative is not part of the meaning of the sentence.

[The meaning of the word in the vocative case can be understood without reference to the meanings of the other words in the sentence. So even if it is indirectly connected with action, it is the meaning of the individual word and not to the sentence. The idea of *karma,* for instance, presupposes action if it is to become the means but, for that reason, it does not become the sentence meaning. The same thing can be said about the idea of the vocative.]

(c-d) The meanings of the case affixes are analysed out of the meaning of the sentence.

The author now points out an indication from the *śāstra* to show that the meaning of the case affix is different from that of the stem.

165. As the formation of an *avyayībhāva* compound in the meaning of a case affix has been taught, one has to understand that the meaning of the case affix is other than substance and that is expressed by the indeclinable.

[In P. 2.1.6, the formation of an *avyayībhāva* compound in the sense of a case affix is taught and we get forms like *adhistri.* If the case affix conveyed the substance, it would have no place in the compound because the word '*strī*' itself conveys substance. From this teaching it also becomes clear that the stem cannot convey the notions of *karma*, etc. According to the above *sūtra,* the indeclinable which expresses the notion of abode enters into a compound with a following word: In stanza 43, it was shown by the method of agreement and difference that the stem and the case affix have different meanings. It is stated here that indications in the *śāstra* also confirms it. The conclusion is that whether one adopts the view that the stem conveys five things (*pañcaka*) or less, the case affix expresses or illuminates a meaning having a fixed power and different from substance.]

From P. 3.2.25 and P. 3.4.21, one understands that substance can be means. How has it then been stated that the

meaning of the case affix, namely the means (*sādhana*) is different from substance. To answer this objection, it is now stated that it is power which is the means.

166. Substance always remains as it is. Even when the actions (with which it is connected) change, the essence of the substance does not change.

[Substance remains the same in all circumstances. One has, therefore, to account for the fact that it appears as different means in the expressions *vṛkṣam, vṛkṣeṇa,* etc. It cannot be maintained that it becomes different kinds of means when it becomes connected with different actions. Nothing changes its nature because of its association with other things.]

Therefore

167. Whatever substance is instrument would not become the object. Otherwise all substance would change into something else.

[The conclusion is that what is called means is the power of a thing and not the thing itself. As the powers are many, the same thing armed with this power or that, becomes the means in the accomplishment of different actions and is therefore, called by different names.]